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Abstract
‘Culture’ is defined as information, such as knowledge, beliefs, sldlls, attitudes 
or values, that is passed from individual to individual via social (or cultural) 
tiansmission and expressed in behaviour or artifacts. ‘Cultural evolution’ holds that 
this cultuial inlieritance system is governed by the same Darwinian processes as gene- 
based biological evolution. In Part A of this thesis it is argued that as compelling a 
case can now be made for a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution as Darwin himself 
presented in The Origin O f Species for biological evolution. If culture does indeed 
evolve, then it follows that the stimcture of a science of cultural evolution should 
broadly resemble that of the science of biological evolution. Hence Part A concludes 
by outlining a unified science of cultuial evolution based on the sub-disciplines of 
evolutionary biology.
Parts B and C comprise original empirical and theoretical work constituting two 
branches of this science of cultural evolution. Part B describes a series of experiments 
testing for a number of hypothesised biases in cultural transmission. Evidence was 
found for a ‘social bias’ that acts to promote infoimation concerning third-party social 
relationships over equivalent non-social information, and a ‘hierarchical bias’ that 
acts to transfonn knowledge of everyday events from low-level actions into higher- 
level goals. Three other hypothesised biases concerning status, anthropomorphism 
and neoteny were not supported, although each gave rise to potential, future work 
using this methodology. Part C presents a theoretical investigation into the
rv
coevolution of the genetic bases of human mating behaviour and culturally inlierited 
folk beliefs regarding paternity. Gene-culture coevolution and agent-based models 
suggested that beliefs in ‘partible paternity’ (that more than one man can father a 
child) create a new more polygamous foim of society compared with beliefs in 
singular paternity (that only one man can father a child).
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Introductory Remarks
CHAPTER 1 - In t r o d u c t io n
The core topic of this thesis is human culture, and in particular the study of 
cultuie and cultural transmission from an evolutionary perspective. Following 
Richerson and Boyd (2005), culture is defined as “information capable of affecting 
individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members of their species thiough 
teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission” (p.5). Cultural (or social) 
transmission hence describes the process by which this information is passed from 
individual to individual. Finally, cultural evolution concerns the application of 
Dai*winian principles of evolutionary change to cultural phenomena.
Theories of ‘cultural evolution’ have had a somewhat troubled history in 
science. Early attempts to apply evolutionary theoiy to culture were deeply flawed, 
drawing more from Spencer than Darwin (Plotkin, 2004), resulting in the progiessive 
and unilinear theories of Tylor (1871) and Morgan (1877). Hence human societies 
were seen as progiessing inexorably through a fixed set of evolutionary stages, from 
‘savagery’ tlirough ‘barbarism’ and finally to ‘civilisation’ (Laland & Brown, 2002). 
Despite the notion of inevitable progress being antithetical to Daiivinian evolution, 
these flaws persisted within anthropology until the mid-20th century (e.g. Sahlins & 
Seiwice, 1960; Steward, 1955; Wliite, 1959).
The application of a tine Darwinian theory of evolution to culture remained rare 
and somewhat informal (e.g. Campbell, 1960; Dawkins, 1976b) until the seminal
works of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), which 
applied rigorous population genetics methods to cultural phenomena. By this time, 
however, sociobiology (Wilson, 1975) had become the dominant school of 
evolutionary thought as applied to humans. Sociobiology, and its descendant 
evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992), have tended to ignore 
social influences on human behaviour in favom' of explanations purely in terms of 
genetic fitness. And partly as a legacy of the early progressive theories of cultural 
‘evolution’ and their association with eugenics and racism, social scientists within 
anthropology, psychology and sociology have tended to be hostile to any evolutionary 
approach to the cultural phenomena that they study (Laland & Brown, 2002). In the 
last few decades, then, any work that has sought to bridge the gap between the social 
and the biological sciences (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 
1981; Plotkin & Odling Smee, 1981) has been relatively neglected and unpopular. In 
essence, such work was deemed too social for evolutionary scientists, and too 
evolutionary for social scientists.
hi recent years, however, there has been a gi’owing interest in the topics of 
cultuial transmission and cultural evolution amongst certain evolutioiiarily-minded 
psychologists, anthropologists, archaeologists, linguists and economists (e.g. Aunger, 
2002; Aunger, 2000b; Blackmore, 1999; Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Mace & Holden, 
2005; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2004; Mufwene, 2001; O'Brien & Lyman, 2000, 
2002; Pagel & Mace, 2004; Plotkin, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Runciman, 
2005; Schotter & Sopher, 2003; Shennaii, 2002; Wheeler, Zinian, & Boden, 2002). 
There has also been a burgeoning interest in culture and social learning in non-human
species (e.g. Avital & Jablonka, 2000; Byrne et al., 2004; Fragaszy & Peny, 2003; 
Hurley & Chater, 2005; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; van Schaik et a i, 2003; Whiten, 
2000a; Wliiten et a l, 1999,2001; Whiten, Homer, & Marshall-Pescini, 2003).
This thesis represents an attempt to both integrate and contribute to this growing 
field of cultural evolution. Pait A comprises two novel theoretical reviews concerning 
evolutionary approaches to human culture. The first of these (Chapter 2) argues that 
as compelling a case can now be made for a Darwinian theory of cultui al evolution as 
Darwin himself presented in The Origin O f Species (1859) for biological evolution. 
The second (Chapter 3) takes this aigument to its next logical step and contends that if 
a Daiivinian theory of cultural evolution is accepted as valid, then the stmcture of a 
science of cultural evolution should resemble in key ways that of the science of 
biological evolution, i.e. evolutionaiy biology.
The following sections then present original empirical and theoretical work that 
represents two branches of this science of cultural evolution. Part B concerns the 
experimental study of human cultural transmission, comprising a literature review 
(Chapter 4) and five original experimental studies (Chapters 5-9). The literature 
review identifies Baitlett’s (1932) ‘transmission chain method’ as a potentially 
valuable but undemsed means of investigating cultural transmission. In this method, 
material is passed along a chain of participants in a maimer similar to the children’s 
game ‘Chinese Whispers’ or ‘Broken Telephone’. Measuring the changes that occur 
to the material as it is tiansmitted, and comparing the degradation rates of different 
types of material, can then reveal systematic biases in cultural ti ansmission. The five
subsequent chapters used this methodology to test for the presence of five such biases: 
Chapter 5 looked at whether human cultural transmission is biased towards social 
over equivalent non-social information; Chapter 6 studied how event loiowledge is 
transformed according to a hierarchically structured ‘action script’; Chapter 7 looked 
at the effect of the status of the source on transmission; Chapter 8 examined the effect 
of anthiopomorphism on the transmission of descriptions of animal behaviour; and 
Chapter 9 tested whether a preference for neoteny affects the tiansmission of teddy 
bear faces.
Part C presents a mathematical model of gene-culture coevolution (Chapter 11). 
The ‘gene-culture coevolution’ approach (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976) uses a set of mathematical 
techniques drawn from population biology to explore the parallel transmission of both 
culture and genes, and the interaction between these two separate inheritance systems. 
An alternative agent-based modelling technique was also employed. The case 
investigated in Chapter 11 concerned the inheritance of cultural beliefs about 
paternity, specifically whether paternity is seen as ‘singular’ (only one male can father 
a child) or ‘partible’ (more than one male can father a child). The models explore the 
coevolution of these culturally transmitted beliefs with genes that influence mating 
behaviour. Finally, Chapter 12 diaws general conclusions from the preceding chapters 
about cultural transmission and cultural evolution, and outlines how the studies 
presented in this thesis can guide future work in order to provide a fuller and richer 
understanding of human culture.
Part A - Cultural Evolution
CHAPTER 2 - Is H u m an  C u l t u r a l  E v o lu t io n  D a rw in ia n ?  
E v id e n c e  R ev iew ed  f ro m  t h e  P e r s p e c t iv e  o f  T h e  O rig in  o f
Species^
2.1 A bst r a c t
The claim that himian culture evolves through the differential adoption of 
cultural valiants, in a manner analogous to the evolution of biological species, has 
been gieeted with much resistance and confusion. Here it is ai'gued that as compelling 
a case can now be made that cultuial evolution has key Daiwinian properties, as 
Dai*wm himself presented for biological evolution in The Origin o f Species. Culture is 
shown to exhibit variation, competition, inheritance, and the accumulation of 
successive cultural modifications over time. Adaptation, convergence and the loss or 
change of function can also be identified in cultuie. Just as Daiwin knew nothing of 
genes or particulate inheritance, a case for Darwinian cultinal evolution can be made 
irrespective of whether unitary cultural replicators exist or whether cultural 
transmission mechanisms are well-understood.
‘ Adapted with minor revisions from Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. and Laland, K.N. 
(2004). Is human cultural evolution Darwinian? Evidence reviewed from the perspective of 
The Origin Of Species. Evolution, 58(1), 1-11.
2.2 In t r o d u c t io n
In The Origin o f Species (1859), Darwin frequently used analogies with cultural 
change to illustrate his theory of biological evolution. More recently, arguments that 
insights into cultural evolution are to be gained by appreciating its Darwinian 
properties have been developed by eminent figures in fields ranging from biology to 
philosophy to psychology (e.g. Dawkins, 1976b; Dennett, 1995; Hull, 1982; Popper, 
1979; Skinner, 1981). In the last few years such efforts have intensified, with an 
extensive literature proliferating on relationships between biological and cultural 
evolution (e.g. Aunger, 2002; Aunger, 2000b; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli- 
Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Plotldn, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Shennan, 2002; 
Wheeler et al., 2002).
However, attempts to apply the theory of evolution by natural selection to the 
origins of the diverse range of beliefs, knowledge and artifacts that constitute human 
culture have met with great resistance in some quarters (e.g. Fracchia & Lewontin, 
1999; Gould, 1991; Hallpike, 1986; Pinlcer, 1997), comparable to that which followed 
Dai-win’s insight. A prime focus of these debates (see Aunger, 2000b) is a 
preoccupation with the possibility of cultural ‘units of inheritance’, sometimes called 
'memes' (Dawkins, 1976b), the delineation of which is often (erroneously) seen as a 
necessary prerequisite for Darwinian evolution. Darwinian models of cultural 
evolution have consequently been criticised (and are commonly being rejected) on the 
gi'ounds that culture cannot be divided into discrete particles (e.g. Bloch, 2000; Kuper, 
2000) or that to the extent that such particles exist, they do not faithfiilly replicate in 
the way genes do (Sperber, 2000). However, when he wrote The Origin, Dai*win knew
notliing of genes, and he had little understanding of Mendelian particulate inheritance. 
Many contemporary commentators therefore appear to be rejecting Daiwinian cultural 
evolution on grounds that might have led them to reject the fundamental case made 
for evolution tlirough natuial selection in The Origin.
In this chapter it is argued that a cleaier approach to these issues can be made 
by returning to the basic principles of the theory supported in The Origin, and testing 
these against the rich variety of empirical data concerning human culture that have 
been garnered in a diversity of human sciences since The Origin was written. 
Accordingly, we shall briefly reprise the key elements of the case for biological 
evolution thiough natural selection that were presented by Daiwin in The Origin o f 
Species and explore the extent to which a parallel case is justified for the evolution of 
cultme. Just as The Origin forced biologists to take the theory of evolution seriously, 
it is hoped that a similar treatment for cultural evolution will force those in the social 
sciences to give the argument serious consideration, and provoke biologists into 
giving the matter more thought than they perhaps have done in the past.
The comparison with The Origin is more than just an intellectual exercise or 
historical curiosity. It is of considerable significance to biologists if the core 
evolutionaiy processes at the heait of their discipline govern an aspect of human life - 
culture - that is often contrasted with biology. This is not only because the theories, 
tools and findings of biological evolution may generalise to other disciplines, 
rendering the study of evolution far broader and more important than currently 
conceived, but also because biological evolution would have to be regarded as
interwoven into a lattice of interacting evolutionary processes, for which hierarchical, 
multiple-level or multiple process models will be required (e.g. Hull, 2001; Laland, 
Odling Smee, & Feldman, 2000; Plotkin & Odling Smee, 1981).
A final justification for this comparison derives from a common criticism of the 
proliferating ‘memetics’ literature: its reliance on theory over data (Laland & Brown,
2002). In this field there is much aiinchair speculation and little attempt to integrate 
multiple sources of existing evidence to malce a coherent case. By contrast, the 
integration of several disparate sources of evidence was instrumental to Daiwin’s 
argument (e.g. the fossil record, geographical distribution of species, taxonomy, 
morphological features, artificial breeding). A similar breadth of sources is drawn on 
below. If it is accepted that Darwin provided a robust case for biological evolution by 
natuial selection, and an equivalent case can be made for the evolution of culture, then 
either Daiwinian cultural evolution should be accepted as a valid theory in the domain 
of culture, or the burden of proof is being placed unfairly high. This position does not, 
of course, imply that a biological model is by itself expected to provide a complete 
theory of a phenomenon as complex as human culture, and this chapter concludes by 
highlighting some key points of departure of human cultural evolution from the 
principles of biological evolution.
2.3 P r e l im in a r y  D e f in it io  n s
Daiwin had the considerable luxury of not being required to define the 
phenomenon (Tife’) that he was trying to explain. However, a long history of 
confusion over how to define ‘culture’ (Kroeber & Kluckohn, 1952) suggests an
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explicit definition is needed here. Following Boyd and Richerson (1985), culture is 
defined as acquired infonnation, such as Icnowledge, beliefs and values, that is 
inherited through social learning, and expressed in behaviour and artifacts. Cultural 
evolution is consequently the idea that the infonnation in this cultural domain 
hequently changes according to a similar process by which species change, that is, 
through the selective retention of favourable cultural variants, as well as other non- 
selective processes such as drift. Forthwith, use of the teim ‘cultural evolution’ will 
imply such a general Darwinian process. This should be distinguished fi'om firstly 
non-evolutionaiy theories of cultuial change, as exemplified in the cultural 
detenninism of Boas (1940), Mead (1928) and Benedict (1934), the structuralism of 
Lévi-Strauss (1963), or the semiotic theories of Geertz (1973), and secondly non- 
Daiwinian theories of cultural evolution. This latter distinction is important, since 
distortions of Darwinian. thinking have long been used to bolster erroneous, 
prejudicial, linear and progi'essive conceptions of cultural change (e.g. Morgan, 1877; 
Tylor, 1871). .
The distinction between ‘cultural selection’ and ‘natural selection’ is also 
emphasised (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). For example, smoking may increase 
or decrease in frequency tluough the differential adoption of the habit (cultural 
selection) or through the differential survival of smokers (natiual selection). Although 
both processes operate on human cultural variation, it is cultural selection that 
concerns us here.
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2.4 T h e  E v id e n c e
In The Origin^ Daiwin set out his logical case, empirically backed at each step, 
by first establishing the extent of variation in chai acters, followed by analyses of the 
inevitable competitive stmggle for existence, and its consequences, through 
inheritance, for the shaping of forms of life. Likewise we will consider in turn 
variation, competition and inheritance, followed by other major themes The Origin 
developed, namely the accumulation of modifications, adaptation, geographical 
distribution, convergence, and changes of function.
2.4.1 Variation
.. .we have many slight differences which may be called individual 
differences...[which] are highly important for us, as they afford 
materials for natural selection to accumulate... (Darwin 1859, pp. 101- 
102)
Essential to Darwin’s case was the need to demonstrate the existence of 
variation between individuals in a population. Without variation there can be no 
selection of favourable variants, and hence no accumulation of beneficial 
modifications. Does human culture meet this requirement?
That human cultiue displays great variation is obvious, but its extent is worth 
briefly documenting in comparative perspective, through illustrative statistics. A point 
of contrast is with our closest relatives, hr the case of chimpanzees, 39 geographically 
variable behaviour's have been distinguished, such as the use of different kinds of 
tools (Whiten et a l, 1999; 2001), which are thought to represent distinct cultural
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variants, with a comparable figure of 24 variants for orangutans (van Schaik et a l,
2003). In contrast, Basalla (1988) reports that 4.7 million patents had been issued in 
the U.S.A. alone since 1790, while the latest edition of the Ethnologue (Grimes, 2002) 
lists a total of 6,800 languages spoken world-wide. Steward (1955, p. 81) reports that 
an attempt to catalogue all ‘culture elements’ (e.g. pottery, the bow, shamanism, 
polyandry) in various groups of American Indians resulted in the identification of 
3000-6000 elements, while the United States military force that landed in Casablanca 
during World War II was equipped with over 500,000 different material items. 
Finally, Basalla (1988) notes Karl Marx’s surprise at learning that 500 different types 
of hammer were produced in Birmingham in 1867.
However, what is critically required for the Darwinian process is that variants 
are of a kind that will compete with each other for differential representation in the 
future. Thus, among any set of 500 different hammers, it will be important to 
distinguish between those which vary because they perform different fiinctrons, and 
those that represent alternative designs for the same purpose, for it is between the 
latter that the ‘struggle for existence’ is expected to be most acute. While certain 
cultural phenomena such as alternative religious beliefs would seem to be mutually 
incompatible and vying with each other, there appears to be surprisingly little 
systematic documentation of cultural variation that is in competition. One rather 
whimsical but significant example is provided by Hinde and Barden (1985), who 
measured the facial dimensions of teddy bears over an 80 year period and found a 
gradual enlargement of the forehead and slirinlcing of the snout, which they 
interpreted as reflecting a human preference for baby-like neonatal features. This was
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interpreted as the result of selection pressure from consumers of teddy bears, acting 
on the considerable variation on these dimensions that the authors measured at each 
point along the historical progression.
hi general, we might expect that behavioural or teclmological irmovations, such 
as those indicated in the patent statistic cited above, may be variations on existing 
patterns, and so provide the variation of interest. Competition between new and older 
variants would then ensue. According to an extensive analysis by Basalla (1988), 
technological change tlirough gradual modifications of what went before is the r*ule 
rather than the exception. Amongst numerous examples cited by Basalla (1988) are 
Joseph Henry’s 1831 electric motor, which borrowed many features from the steam 
engine, and Eli Wliitney’s 1793 cotton gin, designed to remove seeds from cotton 
plants, which was based on a long line of Indian devices. The new variations would 
be precisely the kind likely to compete with their more long-standing counterparts.
Evidence that two or more cultural variants are indeed competing comes from 
testing the prediction that over time one variant will increase in frequency while 
another shows a coiTesponding decrease. This has been demonstrated by 
archaeologists using the method of ‘frequency sériation’, in which the frequencies of 
excavated cultural artifacts are recorded at different time periods, thereby 
reconstmcting lineages of competing artifacts (O’Brien & Lyman, 2000). For 
example, Kroeber (1916) reported that corrugated pottery found in New Mexico 
gradually decreased in frequency over time, while the frequency of painted pottery 
increased. More recently, O’Brien and Lyman (2000) have detailed how lineages of
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prehistoric projectile points from the south-western United States show an increase in 
functional efficiency over time, demonstrating competition of successive forms in one 
or more lineages, with each new, more efficient variant out-competing and replacing 
the older foim. Section 2.4.4 below examines how other cultural traits, such as stone 
tools and mathematical systems, show a similar accumulation of successive forms 
over time, each the result of competition amongst similar variants.
Wliat aie the soui'ces of cultural variation? Darwin had only the vaguest 
understanding of how the process of biological (sexual) reproduction could give rise 
to variation, noting only that: “ ...individual differences...are Imown frequently to 
appear in the offspring from the same parents...” (p. 102). At a similai’ level of 
analysis, cultural vaiiation arises through eirors or improvisation in learning and 
distortion in transmission. This distortion has been demonstrated by ‘transmission 
chain studies’, in which material is passed from person to person, in a manner similar 
to the children’s game ‘Chinese whispers’. For example, Bartlett (1932) found a 
tendency for British participants to distort material originating from a Native 
American culture according to their own cultural background, while Allport and 
Postman (1947) found that a description of a pictuie was distorted according to the 
subjects’ racial prejudices. Reviewing the relevant literature, Campbell (1958) listed 
21 different systematic biases in human social transmission that involve the loss of 
information, the distortion of existing infonnation, or the mtroduction of novel 
infonnation. Similarly, Buckliout (1974) detailed the selective and constructive nature 
of human memory in the context of eyewitness testimony resear ch. Such studies show
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that the storage and transmission of cultural knowledge is far from perfect, and much 
variation is spontaneously introduced.
Darwin proposed that the presence of variation is required for there to be a 
response to selection pressures, a principle later foimalised in Fisher’s Fundamental 
Theorem (Fisher, 1930). A similar phenomenon is exemplified in the study of 
creativity, hi a longitudinal study of teams of molecular biologists, Dunbar (1995;
1997) found that those teams composed of scientists with varied research 
backgrounds made more key discoveries and breakthroughs than otherwise equivalent 
teams composed of scientists with similai' backgrounds and expertise. The implication 
here is that the more heterogeneous teams generated a richer variety of ideas upon 
which cultural selection could work than the more homogeneous teams. There was 
also a tendency for the successful teams to focus on unexpected findings, suggesting 
the benefit of introducing novel variation. These results echo more general findings in 
the human creativity literature (Simonton, 1999) that creative individuals tend to be 
more prolific in their output (inespective of the quality of that output) and exhibit 
more divergent thinldng compared with less creative individuals, both of which will 
increase the chances of encountering a successful variant. There is also widespread 
experimental evidence that groups, especially heterogeneous gi’oups, outperform 
individuals in tasks of problem-solving or decision making (GaiTod & Doherty, 1994; 
Moshman & Geil, 1998; Schulz Hardt, Frey, Luethgens, & Moscovici, 2000), again 
suggesting that more variation is generated on which selection can then act.
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Darwin argued that biological variation is naturally produced without regard to 
its consequences (what we now think of as random mutation), with favomable 
variations being recognised tlu'ough an independent selection process. In the case of 
human culture, however, we must contemplate the possibility that foresight may be 
applied to produce variation channelled towards a certain solution to a problem. This 
would constitute a departure from a Darwinian model of cultural change, raising the 
question of how much cultural evolution may be ‘directed’ in this way, rather than 
tlu'ough the Daiwinian algorithm of undirected variation coupled with selection.
In fact, the literature on human creativity indicates that much variation in 
culture is not directed in this sense. Simonton (1995) has shown that innovation or 
discovery is often the result of trial and error, such as when Watson and Crick 
painstakingly tided to fit molecular models together until they hit on the double helix. 
Although their intention was to solve this specific problem, intention itself was not 
sufficient to reach that solution. Other cases demonstrate that intention to solve is also 
not a necessary condition, such as when William Roentgen, winner of the first ever 
Nobel Prize for physics, accidentally and imwittingly discovered x-rays in 1895 whilst 
studying how cathode rays penetrate different materials. Other serendipitous or 
accidental discoveries and inventions listed by Simonton (1995) include animal 
electricity, laughing gas anaesthesia, electromagnetism, ozone, photography, 
dynamite, the gramophone, vaccination, saccharin, radioactivity, classical 
conditioning, penicillin, Teflon and Velcro.
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In other cases, however, cultural variation may not be independent of selection, 
representing what Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman (2000) have termed ‘smart 
variants’. Biologically evolved biases in cognition and other cultural ti*aits may guide 
behaviour in a non-random direction. What remains to be clearly determined is the 
relative importance of directed and non-directed variation in actual cultural evolution.
Viewing the comparison between biological and cultuial evolution from the 
reverse perspective, it is also important to note that biological variation is also to a 
degree directed, insofar as any potential variation is heavily constrained by an 
organism’s present foim, which is in tuin deteimined by the species’ history of 
selection. Variation is only random within such boundaries. Indeed, Hull, Langman 
and Glenn (2001), in a general account of Darwinian selection processes, have argued 
that
...statements about the sorts of vaiiation that function in selection 
processes need not include any reference to their being blind, random, 
or what have you. All of the teims that have been used to modify 
variation are extremely misleading. Hence, we see no reason to put any 
adjective before variation in our definition of selection. (Hull et a l, 
2001, p. 514)
hi conclusion, human culture has been shown to exhibit extensive variation that 
is both necessary and conducive to cultural evolution. Although this variation may not 
be entirely random with respect to selection, ultimately it matters less to the 
Daiwinian process how variation arises, than that variation exists and is exposed to 
selection.
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2.4.2 Competition
A stmggle for existence follows from the high rate at which all organic 
beings tend to increase. (Daiwin 1859, p. 116)
Inspired by Malthus’ Essay on the Principle o f Population (1798), which 
showed how a geometric increase in the world’s population will lead to rapid 
overcrowding and a shortage of key resources, Daiwin realised that a similar shortage 
of resources in natuie will lead to competition between variants, and hence the 
selection of favourable variants. Similarly, no individual person can adopt and express 
all of the immense cultural variability indicated above, so competition for expression 
in human brains, behavioural repertoires and material products will occur. Daiwin 
(1871) himself argued that such competition occui's amongst words:
A sti*uggle for life is constantly going on amongst the words and 
giammatical foims in each language. The better, the shorter, the easier 
forms are constantly gaining the upper hand, and they owe their 
success to their own inherent virtue. (Darwin 1871, p. 91)
Cleai'ly, the ‘stmggle’ Darwin was alluding to here cannot be directly compared 
to the competition over finite physical resources alluded to by the reference to 
Malthus, Rather, we have to thinlc in more general teiins, of a competition for limited 
‘slots’ or functionally equivalent ‘solutions’ to specific ‘problems’. In the case of 
Malthusian overcrowding the available slots are limited by the carrying capacity of 
the environment. In Darwin’s linguistic example, the slots may instead be semantic 
categories, which alternative terms compete to label, an example of which would be 
the successive replacement over recent yeais in youth culture of the adjectival 
synonyms ‘neat’, ‘fab’ and ‘cool’.
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One way to conceptualise what any set of cultural variations are in general 
competing over is in terms of functional categories. Thus, synonyms will be in 
competition for describing the same semantic category; different haimners will be in 
competition with respect to effective hammering; and different gestures may be in 
competition to fulfil the same social function. This is analogous to the biological case, 
for although variations such as those in foraging strategies and tenitorial defence may 
indeed sub-serve competition for limited resouices in the narrow Malthusian sense, 
‘competition’ considered more broadly is focused on relative functionality, thus 
extending to characters such as predator defence strategies, which are not directly 
concerned with competition for resources.
Competition between functionally equivalent variants is predicted to lead to the 
eventual extinction of less favourable fonns. Darwin argued against the permanence 
of species by pointing to fossils of extinct species:
...each new variety, and ultimately each new species, is produced and 
maintained by having some advantage over those with which it comes 
into competition; and the consequent extinction of less favoured fonns 
almost inevitably follows. (Darwin 1859, p. 323)
The typically faster rate of cultural change compared with biological change 
potentially makes cultural extinctions much easier to obseiwe. For example. Rivers 
(1926) detailed how the canoe, pottery, the bow and arrow and circumcision 
disappeared from various islands of Oceania. Some cases, such as the canoe, were 
attributed to the death of all members of the society who had the requisite skills to 
manufacture the artifact, but some, like circumcision, died out despite the continued 
survival of its foimer practitioners. Similar extinction of technology has been
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documented in Japan, with the loss of the gun and of domesticated animals and 
wheeled vehicles (MacFarlane & Harrison, 2000; Penin, 1979), and in Tasmania, 
where cultural artifacts such as bone tools and cultural practices such as fishing were 
lost following isolation from mainland Australian populations (Diamond, 1978). 
There is also at present a very high extinction rate of languages, with Krauss (1992) 
estimating that half of the 6,800 languages world-wide will be extinct within a centuiy 
if the present rate continues, although estimates as high as 90% are plausible 
(compared to just 7.4% of mammalian and 2.7% of avian species that are listed as 
endangered: Krauss 1992).
The latter data illustrate the important point that, as in biological evolution, the 
scale of competition can vary considerably. At one extreme, whole languages may be 
in competition, with one replacing the other; at the other end of the scale, individual 
synonyms for denoting ‘the same thing’ may compete; and in between, as the Darwin 
quotation above illustrated, there could be competition over the grammar that a 
linguistic community must share.
Cultural variants are commonly conceived as being passed from brain to brain, 
in which case the ‘struggle for existence’ can also be construed as over representation 
in the brain. In one sense this is simply a reference to the neural counteipai't of the 
functional categories outlined above: it is brains that make the selections between 
competing cultural variants. However, the properties of the human mind/brain impose 
additional competitive pressures on available variants. ‘Interference effects’ on 
memory indicate competition for finite ‘brain space’. Interference occurs when recall
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of previously learned information is dismpted by the learning of new information, 
with the new infonnation displacing the old. This phenomenon has been shown in 
countless studies (for a review see Baddeley, 1990), although is best illustiated by 
McGeoch and MacDonald’s (1931) original demonstration. These authors found that 
recall of a list of previously learned adjectives was greatest when no task was 
performed during the inteiwal between learning and recall, and decreased when the 
subjects were given a second list to remember in the interval. Notably, greater 
interference occurred for synonymous adjectives than for uiuelated or nonsense 
words, suggesting that, as Darwin observed, competition is greatest between similar 
kinds:
...it is the most closely-allied forms, -  varieties of the same species, 
and species of the same genus or of related genera, -  which, from 
having nearly the same stmcture, constitution, and habits, generally 
come into the severest competition with each other. (Daiwin 1859, p. 
154)
2Â.3 Inheritance
Essential to Darwin’s case was that the favourable variation is preseiwed along 
successive generations, or that it is heritable: “Any variation which is not inherited is 
unimportant for us” (p. 75). At the same time, however, he admitted that “[t]he laws 
governing inheritance are quite unlaiown” (p. 76).
Darwin’s focus on inlieritance reflects the fact that biological characters are 
constrained to being transmitted from parent to offspring, a constraint which does not 
apply to cultural tiansmission. Hence, a more appropriate focus for cultural evolution 
would be between-individual ‘transmission’ or ‘replication’, rather than ‘inheritance’.
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Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) adopted the teims ‘vertical’ to describe 
transmission of cultural tiaits from biological parents to their offspring (paralleling 
biological inheritance), and ‘horizontal’ to describe transmission of traits within a 
single biological generation (resembling the transmission of pathogens as studied by 
epidemiologists), Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen and Dombusch (1982) found 
evidence of vertical cultmal transmission by surveying the opinions and attitudes of 
Stanford university students and their parents, finding high parent-offspring 
conelations for religion (r = 0.71), politics (0.61), superstitious beliefs (0.49) and 
entertainment (0.44), traits which are presumably not entirely genetically inherited. 
Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) found even stronger parent-offspring cultural 
inheritance in the Aka pygmies of central Africa. Seventy-two members of a 
community of Aka were interviewed to find out fr om whom they learned a variety of 
practical skills, such as hunting techniques, tool-making skills and food preparation. 
For the 50 traits that were assessed, 80.7% of acquisitions were attributed to parents, 
5.2% to other family members, 12.3% to unrelated others and only 0.9% to 
independent leaiuing. Similarly, Aunger (2000a) found that among horticulturalists in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, children acquire Icnowledge about food primarily 
fr om their parents. Bany, Josephson, Lauer and Marshall (1976), meanwhile, showed 
varying strengths of transmission (‘inculcation’) of personality traits (toughness, 
maturity, dutifulness, submission and sociability) from adults to children among 182 
societies world-wide.
Examples of horizontal cultmal transmission include aspects of language 
acquisition (Pinker, 1995; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993), where children
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acquire the features of a specific language, from phonemes to complex rules of 
grammar, from other adults and children. Nagell, Olguin and Tomasello (1993) and 
Whiten et al (1996) showed that 2-4 year olds imitate tool use and other manipulative 
behaviour modelled by non-kin, even when individual learning would have been more 
efficient. Bandura’s social learning experiments (e.g. Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961) 
also demonstrate children’s wide-ranging imitative capacity. Finally, the vast 
literature on the diffusion of imiovations reviewed by Rogers (1995) constitutes 
evidence for the transmission of a wide range of inventions and practices. For 
example, Ryan and Gross (1943) traced the diffusion of hybrid seed com use through 
a community of Iowan farmers, and Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966) the diffusion 
of a new antibiotic amongst doctors.
Wliile parent-offspring corTelations could in principle be generated tlu'ough 
individual adaptation to similar environments rather than inheritance, there is 
considerable evidence for the role of descent in culture. There are many instances 
when environmental conditions change but cultuie does not, due to the lag caused by 
the inheritance process. For example, McGovern (1981) describes the case of a 
Viking colony in Greenland who failed to relinquish their Scandinavian fanning 
methods and adapt to their new climate. The colony ultimately died out when 
conditions deteriorated during the Little Ice Age that began in the 13^ ’^ century, while 
the Inuit, living under even harsher conditions but using better adapted technology, 
survived. Cultural inlieritance can also be observed in the different responses to the 
same environmental changes by societies with different cultural histories. For 
example, Le Vine (1966) found that Nigerian tiibes categorised as scoring high on a
24
‘need for achievement’ trait, such as the Ibo, were more successful than tiibes low in 
this trait, such as the Hausa, when Western capitalist societies became more 
influential.
In other cases, the transmission biases of cultui'al inlieritance may lead to the 
spread of traits that fulfil a specific function less well than other competing traits. A 
familiar example is the spread of the VHS format of video recorder at the expense of 
the supposedly teclinically superior Betamax recorder. Arthur (1990) has argued that 
this was due to a process of positive feedback in which consumers chose not the best 
product but the most populai" product, a possible example of Boyd and Richerson’s 
(1985) ffequency-dependant conformist bias.
The issue of inheritance, however, gives rise to an immediate and common 
objection to the application of Darwin’s theory of evolution to cultuie: that culture 
sometimes exhibits Lamarckian inheritance, or the inheritance of acquired phenotypic 
characteristics. Clearly cultmal inheritance is not literally Lamarckian, insofar as 
acquired cultmal Icnowledge is not transmitted genetically to the next biological 
offspring (a position held by eaiiy wiiters such as Semon, 1921), so in this sense the 
application of the term ‘Lamarckian’ does not discredit or disprove cultm al evolution. 
A more common characterisation is that people often adopt a cultmal trait, modify it, 
and then transmit that modified trait to someone else. Whether this is regarded as 
Lamarckian, however, depends on how the replicator-interactor distinction is drawn 
(Hull, 2000), and it is generally unclear whether the term ‘Lamaickian’ can be 
meaningfully applied outside of its original context. This also does not mean to say
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that all cultmal evolution occms through the individual modification of tiansmitted 
cultural variants, and it is quite possible that the inlieritance of some cultural traits 
resembles Mendelian inheritance, in a strict analogy with biological evolution as it is 
now miderstood.
2.4.4 Accumulation o f Modifica tions
It is one thing to demonstrate the transmission of cultme firom parent to 
offspring, or child to child, but quite another to demonstrate the long-teim 
accumulation of modifications (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello et a l, 1993) that 
is characteristic of biological evolution.
If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which 
could not possibly have been foimed by numerous, successive, slight 
modifications, my theory would absolutely brealc down. (Darwin 1859, 
p. 219)
Curiously, the accmnulation of material cultme was demonstrated shortly after 
publication of The Origin. Pitt-Rivers (1875) used a wide collection of archaeological 
artifacts to illustrate the gradual changes that occurred for stone tools and spears. Each 
new specimen can be recognised as a slight modification on the one before, much as 
the fossil record shows a succession of related biological forms. A detailed 
quantitative analysis of the cultmal selection and drift processes responsible for 
changes in lithic technology can be found in Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981).
A similar case for the evolution of technology has been made more recently by 
Basalla (1988), who amassed extensive historical evidence against the commonly held
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‘great leaps by gieat minds’ view of technological change. That is, rather than single 
‘genius’ inventors making unprecedented advances, technological change is more 
accurately seen as a series of successive modifications. For example, the idea of the 
steam engine did not spontaneously emerge fiom James Watt’s inventive mind, but 
was actually a modified version of the existing Newcomen steam engine, with which 
Watt had had extensive experience, and which in turn was a modification of a 
previous model, and so on back through history (Basalla, 1988).
Mathematics, like technology, has evolved thiough the accumulation of 
successive innovations by different individuals in different societies over vast periods 
of time, with each new imiovation paving the way for the next. Wilder (1968) details 
how even the basic base 10 decimal system took over 4000 years to emerge. Only 
after the Sumerians began to use written symbols to represent numbers in around 
2400 BC could the Babylonians invent the place value system, in which the position of 
a digit with respect to the decimal place deteimines its value. This then allowed the 
Hindus and Mayans to invent a written symbol for zero, which in turn allowed 
calculations to be performed. This accumulation of directly related successive 
inventions proceeded for centuries, with major additions from the Greeks (e.g. 
geometiy), Arabs (e.g. algebra) and Europeans (e.g. calculus), tlnough to present day 
mathematics.
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2.4.5 Adaptation
We see these beautiful co-adaptations...in the structure of the beetle 
which dives through the water; in the plumed seed which is wafted by 
the gentlest breeze; in short, we see beautiful adaptations everywhere 
and in every part of the organic world. (Darwin 1859, pp. 114-115)
Darwin’s theory aimed to explain the fit between organisms and their 
envhonments. Cultural traits, such as clothing or faiming practices, also commonly 
show a functional appropriateness to environmental conditions that has allowed 
humans to exploit an imprecedented range of habitats across most of the planet. The 
work, of human behavioural ecologists has been to show that many cultural 
differences act as adaptations to different environmental conditions (e.g. Smith & 
Winterhalder, 1992). By contrast, some evolutionary psychologists argue that cultural 
diversity is largely the result of a (biologically) evolved universal human cognition 
responding to different environmental conditions, characterised as ‘evoked culture’ 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, pp. 209-210). Approaches such as these would not be 
fruitful if there were no correspondence between human cultural practices and 
ecological variations.
Darwin knew only too well, however, that perfect biological adaptation is not to 
be expected:
Natural selection will not produce absolute perfection, nor do we 
always meet, as far as we can judge, with this high standard under 
nature. (Daiwin 1859, p. 229)
It is, in fact, the imperfections in organisms that gave Darwin’s theory some of 
its greatest support. We have already seen evidence that cultural evolution also does
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not inevitably lead to perfect adaptation, in those cases where cultui'al inheritance 
prevents culture from changing in response to environmental flux. Further instances 
are seen in the existence of cultural vestiges discussed in Section 2.4.8.
Another consideration, when discussing human adaptation, is that cultuial traits 
will not necessarily promote the inclusive fitness of the humans expressing them 
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). hi the same way that parasites can manipulate 
behaviour to their own ends (Moore, 2002), cultural variants that exhibit high rates of 
(non-vertical) transmission (such as smoking) can spread whether or not they enhance 
fitness and promote adaptation in the individuals who adopt them.
2 A. 6 Geographical Distribution
...neither the similarity nor the dissimilarity of the inhabitants of 
various regions can be accounted for by their climatal and other 
physical conditions. (Darwin 1859, p. 344)
Darwin realised that the geographical distribution of species could often better 
be explained by descent than by environmental conditions per se. To illustrate this he 
compared species at the same latitude in Australia, Africa and South America, finding 
great differences despite similar environments. Is cultural variation similarly predicted 
by descent?
Hallpike (1986) found that East African and Indo-Iranian cattle pastoralists 
shared the same ecology and means of subsistence, but differed in their social 
organisation and religious beliefs (the East African societies were stmctured around
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age and were monotheistic, while the hido-Iranian societies had no age-based rank 
structure and were polytheistic). Conversely, Hallpike (1986) also found essentially 
identical social institutions, religious beliefs and cultural values between two 
Ethiopian societies, the Konso and the Borana Galla, despite very different ecologies 
and means of subsistence. These observations led Hallpike (1986) to conclude that 
“[r]ather than ecology, it seems that historical relationship...is a more reliable 
predictor of social organisation and religion.” (p. 181). Similar obseiwations 
concerning Melanesian and Polynesian societies had earlier been made by Sahlins 
(1963).
Further evidence of descent was found in an analysis of the geogiaphical 
distribution of 47 cultural tiaits in 277 African societies by Guglielmino et al (1995). 
First, it was found that ecology alone could not account for the distribution of any of 
the traits. Second, family and kinship traits (e.g. the degree of polygamy, or how 
property is inherited by kin) were found to follow the geogi aphic pattern of language, 
suggesting descent from a common ancestor. Third, sexual division of labour, 
religious beliefs, sexual behaviours and house structure were found to cluster around 
specific geogiaphical areas, suggesting the role of cultural diffusion. This also fits 
with potential inlieritance mechanisms. For example, family and kinship traits tend to 
be inherited vertically from parents to offspring and so change slowly, allowing 
descent to be more easily observed. A similar study by Hewlett, de Silvestri and 
Guglielmino (2002) found that, in 36 African populations, 20 cultural tiaits (called 
‘semes’ rather than ‘memes’ by the authors, to underline their semantic or symbolic 
aspect), predominantly kinship, family and political traits, coiTelated with genetic
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and/or linguistic similaiities, suggesting vertical transmission. Twelve traits, including 
house building and sex taboos, correlated with geographical proximity, suggesting 
cultural diffusion. Only four tiaits coiTelated with ecological variations.
A second way to test for descent is by constmcting cross-cultural phylogenies 
for cultural traits, as is done in comparative analyses of biological traits. Mace and 
Pagel (1994) presented a phylogeny for nine Kenyan pastoralist cultures, suggesting 
that the distribution of camel-keeping can be explained most pai'simoniously by a 
minimum of four independent instances of cultural change (i.e. invention or 
diffusion), with all other similarities due to descent. Gray and Jordan (2000) similarly 
found that the distribution of 77 Austronesian languages could most parsimoniously 
be accounted for with a phylogenetic tree branching from a single common ancestor 
in Taiwan. Also using phylogenetic methods, Baihrook et al (1998) and Tehiani and 
Collard (2002) found evidence for cultural descent in manuscripts of The Canterbury 
Tales and the decorative patterns of Turlonen textiles respectively.
Darwin also recognised the importance of baniers, such as oceans, to 
evolutionary change;
.. .baniers of any kind, or obstacles to free migration, are related in a 
close and important manner to the differences between the productions 
of various regions. (Daiwin 1859, p. 345)
Just as Daiwin used the flora and fauna of island ranges, such as the Galapagos, 
to illustrate his point, Cavalli-Sforza and Wang (1986) studied differences in the 
languages of the Caroline Islands in Micronesia. It was found that the degi ee to which
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languages shared words declined according to a negative exponential of the distance 
between those islands, in a manner directly equivalent to biological traits. This 
suggests that the islands originally shared a common linguistic ancestor and have 
since diverged, just as species on island ranges have diverged from a common 
ancestor in relation to distance.
Darwin realised that where migration does not occur, such as on isolated 
oceanic islands, the resultant paucity of introduced species and loss through drift may 
result in proportionately fewer species than in mainland areas.
The species of all kinds which inhabit oceanic islands aie few in 
number compared with those on equal continental areas (Darwin 1859, 
p. 379)
The same observation for culture has been made for the indigenous population 
of Tasmania (Diamond, 1978; Hemich, 2004). Wlien first contacted by European 
settlers in 1798, the Tasmanians had been isolated from any other society for 12,000 
years. As a result, the Tasmanians had the simplest material culture of any modem 
humans, lacking agricultuie, domesticated animals, bone tools, bows and aiTows, and 
effective clothes, dwellings or fire technology. The archaeological record even shows 
a reduction in material culture since isolation, with the loss of bone tools and fishing.
2.4.7 Convergent Evolution
Of coiuse, an evolutionary approach does not preclude the independent 
invention of identical cultural traits, just as it does not preclude the convergent
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evolution of similar biological traits in distinct lineages. This very point was 
recognised by Daiwin, who noted that
...in nearly the same way as two men have sometimes independently 
hit on the very same invention, so natural selection.. .has sometimes 
modified in very nearly the same manner two parts in two organic 
beings, which owe but little of their structure in common to inlieritance 
fr om the same ancestor. (Darwin 1859, p. 223)
Daiwin himself famously confirmed this when he and Alfred Russel Wallace 
independently proposed the theory of natural selection. Better examples might involve 
more isolated cases, such as the independent inventions of writing by the Sumerians 
around 3000 BC, the Chinese around 1300 BC, and the Mexican Indians around 600 
BC (Diamond, 1998). A striking case of convergent evolution in action is the tendency 
for Mickey Mouse to become increasingly neotenous over successive caitoons 
(Gould, 1980), in precisely the same way, and over the same period, as teddy bears 
(Hinde & Barden, 1985).
Convergent evolution occurs because of similai* selection pressm*es, which in 
the case of culture might be due to universals of human cognition, such as a 
preference for neoteny, or the result of other cultuial tiaits in the population (in the 
case of writing, for example, the tiading of material goods necessitated some method 
of stocktaking, which makes up the vast majority of early manuscripts: Diamond,
1998).
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2 A .8 Change o f Function
Darwin also used morphological evidence to demonstrate descent with 
modification, specifically when a tiait originally used for one function is modified to 
perform another function or to perfoim no function at all.
I believe that disuse.. .has led in successive generations to the giadual 
reduction of various organs, until they have become rudimentary, - as 
in the case of the eyes of animals inhabiting dark caverns, and of the 
wings of birds inhabiting oceanic islands, which have seldom been 
forced to take flight, and have ultimately lost the power of flying. 
(Daiwin 1859, p. 431)
With respect to culture, Darwin himself drew a linguistic analogy:
Rudimentary organs may be compared with the letters in a word, still 
retained in the spellmg, but become useless in the pronunciation, but 
which sei*ve as a clue in seeking for its derivation (Daiwin 1859, p. 
432)
As well as vestigial letters, language provides many otlier instances of vestiges, 
such as irregular verbs (Pinker, 1999). Vestigial features are also common in 
technological artifacts, especially when new raw materials become available. Indeed, 
Basalla (1988) notes that such cases are common enough to merit their own label, 
namely a ‘skeuomorph’, which is defined as an “element of design or structure that 
serves little or no puipose in the artifact fashioned from the new material but [which] 
was essential to the object made from the original material” (Basalla 1988, p. 107). 
Stone columns, for example, retained tlie masonry joints of their wooden precursors, 
despite no longer serving a fimction. A familiar vestige is the QWERTY keyboard 
layout, designed in the 19*^  centuiy to reduce jamming of the hammers in typewriters 
by making typing as slow as possible (Rogers, 1995). This layout has nevertheless
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been preserved in modem computer keyboards, despite no longer serving its original 
purpose.
A second feature of morphology that suggests descent is the presence of traits 
that have adopted new functions.
...an organ originally constmcted for one purpose...may be converted 
into one for a wholly different purpose.. .(Darwin 1859, p. 220)
Daiwin gave the example of the swimbladder in fish becoming the lung in 
teiTestrial animals (although recent evidence suggests that this may not be the case; 
Perry, Wilson, Straus, Hairis, & Remmers, 2001). Again, Basalla (1988) notes similar 
cases for teclmology, such as Edison’s gramophone, originally used for dictation in 
offices, being turned into julceboxes and record players, and the derivation of nuclear 
energy from the atomic bomb. In fact, Basalla (1988) argues that very few 
technological innovations were originally designed for their eventual function.
2.5  P o ssib l e  P o in t s  o f  D e p a r t u r e
It was noted earlier that there is no reason to expect all cultural phenomena to 
map to biological evolution. Two points of depaiture, the inheritance of acquhed 
characteristics, and the transmission of infomiation between non-relatives, have 
already been discussed. This final section concerns tliree others that have been 
proposed by various authors.
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2.5.1 Convergent Lineages
The only diagram in The Origin displays the tree-like branching of continually 
separating lineages, seemingly very different to the cross-fertilisation that can occur in 
cultures. Indeed, this has been seized upon by opponents of cultural evolution.
Biological evolution is a system of constant divergence without 
subsequent joining of branches. Lineages, once distinct, are separate 
forever, hi human history, transmission across lineages is, perhaps, the 
major source of cultural change. (Gould, 1991, p. 65)
However, to elevate this contrast to a dichotomy would be a distortion of both 
biology and cultuie. That cultural evolution occurs predominantly through 
convergence is an assumption. Examining this empirically in the context of Turkmen 
textile artifacts, Tehrani and Collard (2002) found that divergent phylogenesis 
accounts for much more of the vaiiation in their data than convergent ‘ethnogenesis’ 
does. Conversely, certain kinds of convergence of biological lineages occur. 
Symbionts such as lichen represent the converging of distinct biological lineages, as 
do the symbioses between protoeulcaryotes and the alpha-proteobacteria that went on 
to become mitochondria, and the cyanobacteria that became chloroplasts (Schwartz & 
Dayhoff, 1978). Genetic material may be tiansmitted across species boundaries 
(inti'ogression), and horizontal transmission of genetic material occurs through the 
action of viruses and plasmids. Doolittle (1999) reviews examples of exchanges 
across archaeal and bacterial lineages, through the process of lateral gene transfer. In 
all these respects there is, therefore, a less distinct difference between cultuial and 
biological evolution than implied by Gould’s assertions.
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2.5.2 The Nature o f Selection
If cultural inlieritaiice is sometimes seen as Lamarckian, as noted above, then 
this inheritance of acquired variation means that human decision-making processes 
will determine the adoption and expression of cultural tiaits, and hence affect the 
cultural evolutionary process. The idea that cultural evolution is directed towaids 
some specific goal has been used to discredit the theory:
Memes such as the theoiy of relativity are not the cumulative product 
of millions of random (undirected) mutations of some original idea, but 
each brain in the chain of production added huge dollops of value to 
the product in a non-random way. (Pinker, cited in Dennett, 1995, p. 
355)
Although Pinlcer talks of ‘memes’ - Dawkins’ (1976b) term for a cultural 
replicator - the criticism that cultural evolution is ‘directed’, ‘intentional’ or 
‘conscious’ can equally be made for a mechanism-neutral theory of cultural evolution 
as presented here.
The case of directed selection is analogous to artificial selection as discussed by 
Daiwin in the first chapter of The Origin, Darwin described how human selection for 
certain naturally existing variants over successive generations has led to the 
emergence of domestic breeds of plants and animals. However, the reason Darwin 
drew this analogy between artificial and natural selection was that the process -  the 
selective preservation of favourable variants over time -  is identical. Darwin further 
argued that while the immediate selection of the best individual in any one generation 
may be ‘intentional’ or ‘conscious’, this need not imply an intention to create the 
long-term cumulative change that may eventually result in diverse breeds.
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...a man who intends keeping pointers naturally tries to get as good 
dogs as he can, and afterwards breeds from his own best dogs, but he 
has no wish or expectation of permanently altering the breed. (Darwin 
1859, p. 93)
The same applies to cultural selection, hideed, one might argue that dog 
breeding is an aspect of our culture and that in Darwin’s example aitificial selection is 
cultural evolution.
2.5.3 Species and Conceptual Lineages
At first sight, culture does not contain separate species. Hull (1982), however, 
has developed a potential cultural analogue of the species. Hull (1982) argued that 
scientific communities (e.g. Daiwinians) are a collection of interacting scientists that 
have in common one or more cultural beliefs (e.g. natuial selection or Mendelian 
genetics) that are expressed in an evolving conceptual system (e.g. Darwinism). What 
unites them is the notion that they derived their beliefs from preceding Darwinians. 
We can tell whether a scientist is part of a scientific community in exactly the same 
way we can tell whether an individual organism is a member of a particular species, 
by determining whether they have inherited shared infoimation from the same source. 
To belong within the same conceptual lineage, people must have gained their 
information from each other, rather than merely holding similai* views. It follows that 
‘spéciation’ events can occur when previously sharing conceptual lineages become 
isolated.
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS
Even if it has been shown that culture evolves in a Daiwinian manner, why is 
this of any interest or use? First, at a practical level, researchers can bonow 
sophisticated techniques originally developed for studying evolutionary change in 
biology to analyse cultural change. Population dynamic models designed to track 
changes in gene frequencies are already being used to analyse culture (e.g. Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981), as are phylogenetic methods (e.g. 
Gray & Jordan, 2000; Mace & Pagel, 1994).
Second, on a theoretical level, the synthetic framework provided by 
evolutionary theory (Mayr, 1982) has successfully integiated several disparate 
disciplines into a coherent research progiamme, evolutionary biology, and has the 
potential to do the same for the study of culture. Just as Darwin drew upon evidence 
from zoology, botany, geology, palaeontology and physiology, this chapter has 
incorporated findings from anthropology, psychology, sociology, linguistics and 
history, with the hope of mtegi'ating these traditionally separate disciplines. 
Furthermore, the synthetic evolutionary fr amework has resulted in biology, since The 
Origin, becoming an enormously productive scientific discipline. Conversely, the 
field of cultural (or social) anthropology emerged at about the same time as Darwin’s 
writings, but has become preoccupied with self-examination (Bloch, 2000; Kuper, 
2000) that questions its status as a progressive research discipline comparable to 
evolutionary biology or genetics.
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Finally, an evolutionary perspective gives focus to future empirical work. Some 
of the studies cited here were specifically designed to test cultmal evolution, but most 
originated from unrelated theoretical perspectives. By recognising that our current 
understanding of culture is comparable to that attained by biology in 1859, perhaps 
some shortcuts can be taken by learning lessons from the succeeding 150 years of 
biological research. Cultural equivalents of biological concepts such as character 
displacement can be tested for (Laland & Brown, 2002). Studies of social learning are 
needed, such as more extensive transmission chain studies, in a manner analogous to 
Mendel’s transmission studies with pea plants. The cultural ‘Watson and Crick’, 
meanwhile, are likely to be neuroscientists, looking at how information is stored in 
the brain. Cultural information may be stored and transmitted in a different way to 
genetic information, but this just makes the fact that culture evolves more interesting. 
In short, the imifying framework of Daiwinian evolution has the potential to 
synthesise the social sciences as it has the natural sciences, as explored in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 - T o w a rd s  a  U n ified  S c ien ce  o f  C u l t u r a l
Evolution^
3.1 A b st r a c t
If it is accepted that human cultme exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary 
properties, then it follows that the stnictui'e of a science of cultmal evolution should 
share fundamental features with the structure of the science of biological evolution. 
This chapter tests this claim by outlining the methods and approaches employed by 
the principal sub-disciplines of evolutionary biology and assessing whether there is an 
existing or potential corresponding approach to the study of cultural evolution. 
Existing approaches within anthropology and archaeology demonstrate a good match 
with the macroevolutionary methods of systematics, paleobiology and biogeography, 
while mathematical models derived from population genetics have been successfully 
developed to study cultuial microevolution. Much potential exists for experimental 
simulations and field studies of cultural microevolution, where there are opportunities 
to borrow further methods and hypotheses from biology. Finally, the cultmal 
equivalent of molecular genetics is somewhat restricted by limitations in 
neuroscience. It is argued that studying culture within a unifying evolutionaiy 
framework has the potential to integrate a number of separate disciplines within the 
social sciences.
 ^Submitted as Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. & Laland, K.N. Towards a unified science of 
cultural evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
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3.2 In t r o d u c t io n
Parallels or analogies between biological and cultural evolution have been noted 
by a number of eminent figures from diverse fields of study (e.g. Darwin, 1871; 
Dawkins, 1976b; Demiett, 1995; Dobzhansky, Ayala, Stebbins, & Valentine, 1977; 
Hull, 1982; Huxley, 1955; James, 1880; Medawar, 1982; Popper, 1979; Skinner, 
1981), and in the last few years a burgeoning literature exploring this relationship has 
emerged (e.g. Aunger, 2002; Aunger, 2000b; Blackmore, 1999; Boyd & Richerson, 
2005; Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone, & Wagner, 2004; Mace & Holden, 2005; Mesoudi 
et a l, 2004; Mufwene, 2001; Pagel & Mace, 2004; Plotkin, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, 
2005; Runciman, 2005; Shennan, 2002; Wheeler at a l, 2002; Ziman, 2000).
The implication of this growing body of theory is that culture exhibits key 
evolutionary properties (see Chapter 2). If this is accepted, it follows that the same 
tools, methods and approaches tliat are used to study biological evolution may 
productively be applied to the study of human culture, and furthermore that the 
structure of a science of cultural evolution should broadly resemble the stmctuie of 
evolutionary biology. In this chapter this comparison is made explicit, by examining 
the different approaches and methods used by evolutionary biologists and assessing 
whether there is an existing con esponding approach or method in the study of cultural 
evolution. Where such an existing coiTespondence is not foimd, we will explore 
whether there is the potential to develop one. Potential differences between biological 
and cultural evolution will also be explored.
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The purpose of this comparison is primarily to stimulate a more progressive and 
rigorous science of culture. While evolutionary biology has become enoimously 
productive since Darwin’s theory of evolution was foimulated, the discipline most 
directly engaged in the study of cultme - cultmal or social anthropology - has been 
much less demonstratively productive over the same time period, particularly in terms 
of establishing a secme body of data and theory that earns and deserves the attention 
of researchers working in sister disciplines. This is increasingly acknowledged by 
many of its own practitioners (e.g. Bemiett, 1999; Bloch, 2000; Kuper, 1999). For 
example, in a recent review of the history of antluopology, Bennett (1999) states that 
“the cultmal side of the discipline tends to smother its data with personal and arcane 
theorizing” (p. 951), while another anthi'opologist, Bloch (2000), states that cultmal 
anthropology “with time, has become theoretically more and more vague, pretentious 
and epistemologically untenable” (p. 202).
Why has biology been so much more successful than anthropology over the past 
150 years? It is doubtful that biologists are on average more able than researchers who 
have traditionally studied culture, nor is biology significantly easier to study than 
culture. While many non-human species are practically and ethically easier to 
experiment on, for example, they cannot tell us about their actions and do not keep 
historical records. Rather, two factors are likely to be of particular importance. First is 
the relative willingness of biologists to make simplifying assumptions and use what 
may be comparatively cmde but workable methods, in order to make complex 
systems tiactable and contribute to the steady accmnulation of Imowledge that will 
ultimately foim the basis of a sophisticated miderstanding of the phenomena in
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question. While many social scientists frequently object that human culture is too 
complex to be amenable to such simplifying assumptions and methods, the relative 
success of biologists in studying enormously complex biological systems suggests 
such objections may be misguided.
Second, and particularly relevant to this chapter, the theory of evolution 
encompasses and integi*ates a multitude of diverse sub-disciplines within biology, 
from behavioural ecology to paleobiology to genetics, with each sub-discipline 
stimulating and contiibuting to several others (see Mayr, 1982 for further details of 
this 'evolutionary synthesis'). In a similai* way, applying evolutionary theory to the 
cultural domain has the potential to integrate a number of currently separate 
disciplines, such as cultmal antliropology, archaeology, psychology, economics, 
sociology and history. Such an integration could serve to highlight how these 
disciplines are, in fact, studying complementary aspects of the same problems, and 
emphasize how multiple and multidisciplinary approaches to these problems are not 
only possible but necessary for their full exposition. At present, many of the 
individual studies considered below are the result of independent developments at the 
fringes of separate fields of study. Placing these disparate studies side-by-side within 
a broader evolutionary framework, as is done here, will hopefully contribute towards 
creating a coherent unified movement and bring evolutionary analyses of cultural 
phenomena into the mainstream.
An evolutionary fr amework also brings with it a set of proven methods that 
have rich potential within the study of culture. A number of cases are noted below in
44
which methods developed within evolutionary biology have been adapted for use in 
the study of culture (e.g. phylogenetic analyses or population genetic models). As 
shown below, several of these evolutionary methods have already contributed to 
significant advances over more traditional non-evolutionary methods.
The left hand side of Figure 3.1 illustiates the overall structure of evolutionary 
biology, as described by Futuyma (1998 pp. 12-14) in what is, perhaps, the most 
widely used undergraduate textbook in the field. The study of biological 
macroevolution deals with change at or above the species level, while biological 
microevolution concerns changes within populations of a single species. The foimer 
comprises systematics, paleobiology and biogeography, while the latter involves 
population genetics (theoretical, experimental and field-based), evolutionary ecology 
and molecular genetics. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 each of the sub-disciplines of 
evolutionaiy biology aie examined in turn, first outlining then general methods then 
briefly describing examples of recent studies to illustrate how those methods are 
applied and the kind of results they yield. This is followed in each case by a 
discussion of existing analogous methods within the social sciences regarding human 
culture, again describing recent key studies. These cultural disciplines, and the way in 
which they map onto the sti*ucture of evolutionary biology, are illustrated on the right 
hand side of Figure 3.1. While there may be no obvious precedent for two distinct 
fields to exhibit the same internal structure, the similarity of the underlying processes 
(see Chapter 2) leads us to expect a correspondence. It is hoped that this mapping will 
(1) help make sense of actual developments in the study of cultural evolution; (2)
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suggest new research progi'ammes and hypotheses; and (3) help identify the most 
promising research strategies.
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Figure 3.1 - Major subdivisions within evolutionary biology (left hand side; after 
Futuyma 1998) and conesponding disciplines cunently or potentially employed in the 
study of cultural evolution (right hand side)
The definition of culture and the precise theory of cultural evolution that this 
comparison is based on were specified in Chapter 2. It should further be emphasised 
that the field of cultural evolution outlined in this chapter is distinct fr om the field of 
evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barkow et a l, 1992; Pinker, 1997), which deals with 
biologically evolved featuies of the human mind, shaped by genetic rather than 
cultural inlieritance. Evolutionary psychology therefore more accurately belongs on 
the left hand side of Figure 3.1 (although it is not shown), and should be distinguished 
from the separate cultural inheritance system outlined on the right-hand side. 
Although some evolutionary psychologists tend to downplay the role of tiansmitted 
culture (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, pp. 115-117), there is ample evidence that
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culture plays a powerful causal role in determining human behaviour and cognition 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). This is not to say, however, that 
biologically evolved features of cognition do not affect cultural processes in important 
ways, as emphasised by gene-cultuie co-evolutionists (e.g. Durham, 1992). This 
interaction is discussed ftirther in Section 3.4.5.2.
3.3 M a c r o e v o l u t io n
3.3.1 Systematics
3.3.1.1 Biology.
Systematics is the study of the diversity of organisms and of the relationships 
between them. Modern systematists adopt the principles of cladistics, which holds 
that these relationships should be based exclusively on phylogeny, or descent 
(Futuyma, 1998; Harvey & Pagel, 1991; Hennig, 1966). Hence modem systematists 
seek to reconstruct the evolutionary history of species based on similarities in their 
moiphological, behavioural or genetic characters. (A biological character is defined 
as an inherited tiait or feature, while a character state describes the form or value of 
that character. For example, ‘blue’ and ‘brown’ are character states of the character 
‘eye colour’.) This section only concerns the analytical techniques used to identify 
these relationships, rather than the methods used to obtain the geographical or 
ai'chaeological data used in these analyses, which are discussed in the following 
sections.
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Two species might share a character or character state either because they each 
inherited it from a common ancestor {homology) or because the character evolved 
independently in the two species’ separate lineages {analogy). In order to eliminate 
the latter and determine phylogenetic relationsliips, systematists identify shared 
derived characters, i.e. traits that evolved only once in a pair of species’ common 
ancestor, but are not obseiwed in close relatives. Because shared derived characters 
are unique to species directly related by descent, they can be used to identify 
branching points in the phylogeny. The principle of parsimony can then be used to 
constmct a phylogenetic ti*ee which requires the fewest number of these branching 
points, often using computer programs such as PAUP (Swofford, 1998) or MacClade 
(Maddison & Maddison, 1992).
For example. Bums, Hackett and Klein (2002) recently applied phylogenetic 
analyses to the moiphological features of 88 species of Daiwin’s finches of the 
Galapagos Islands, finding that all descended from a common ancestor originating in 
the Caribbean, rather than South America as had commonly been thought. The 
evolutionary history of specific traits can also be studied using phylogenetic methods, 
such as Whiting, Bradler and Maxwell’s (2003) finding that, while the common 
ancestor of all insects is thought to have possessed wings for flight, the common 
ancestor of the stick insects was wingless, and wings re-emerged in the stick insect 
lineage on a number of independent occasions.
Phylogenetic methods are also used to identify general pattems of evolution. 
For instance, Goodwin, Balshine-Eam and Reynolds (1998) found that
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‘mouthbrooding’ behaviour in cichlid fish, in which eggs are incubated in the mouth 
of the parent, has evolved on 10-14 independent occasions fi*om the ancestral state of 
guarding eggs in nests, illustrating convergent evolution. The association of 
mouthbrooding with reduced fecundity and larger eggs additionally illustrates the 
selective effects of one trait on others.
33.1.2 Culture.
Just as biologists seek to reconstruct a species’ evolutionary history using 
shared characters, anthropologists seek to reconstruct the history of groups of people 
based on cultural traits, such as language, tools, customs or beliefs. In doing so, 
anthi'opologists have faced the same problem as evolutionary biologists, that of 
distinguishing between homologous and analogous traits. Indeed, this was recognised 
within antlu'opology as long ago as 1889 by Francis Galton, which has led to it being 
refened to as ‘Galton’s problem’.
The fact that Gabon’s problem is virtually identical to the problem faced by 
biologists has recently led a number of antliropologists to adopt the same solutions. 
Mace and Pagel (1994) argued that the phylogenetic analyses used by systematists are 
superior to previous attempts to solve Gallon’s problem, such as Murdock’s cross- 
cultural sample (Murdock & White, 1969) or the statistical removal of inherited traits 
(e.g. Dow, Bui'ton, White, & Reitz, 1984), both of which involve the loss of important 
aspects of the data. Mace and Pagel (1994) treated cultural traits as equivalent to 
biological characters, with independent instances of cultural change occurring when a 
cultural hait is invented, acquired from another cultuie, changed or lost. Shared,
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derived characters can then be identified, and the parsimony-based computer 
progiams developed by systematists can be used to reconstruct the most likely 
evolutionary history of those cultural traits of interest.
For example, Holden (2002) applied cladistic methods to linguistic data fiom 75 
Bantu languages spoken in sub-Saharan Africa. Items of basic vocabulary whose 
meanings were common to all gioups (e.g. ‘man’, ‘woman’) were taken as characters, 
and the different lexical fonns used to represent these meanings were treated as 
character states. A shared character state was therefore one in which the same word 
foim was used for the same meaning in both languages. Geographical and 
archaeological data were also obtained (see next sections). It was found that the 
linguistic data showed a good fit with the phylogenetic tree model, and that this tree 
coiTelated with geographical proximity and archaeological data suggesting that 
language was associated with the spread of fanning across prehistoric Africa. A 
further study on the same populations (Holden & Mace, 2003) suggested that the 
acquisition of cattle led to a change fiom matrilineal to patrilineal inheritance of 
wealth.
Using similar methods, Gray and Jordan (2000) found that the distribution of 77 
Austi'onesian languages was most consistent with a single common ancestral form in 
Taiwan which rapidly spread tlnough the region, while Gray and Atkinson (2003) 
found evidence supporting the theory that the Indo-European language gioup was 
associated with the spread of agriculture fiom Anatolia ai'ound 8000-9500 years ago.
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The recognition that cultural traits may be directly acquired from other cultures, 
i.e. ti'ansmitted horizontally, raises possible objections (e.g. Moore, 1994) to the use 
of these biological methods, which were originally developed to deal only with 
vertical (genetic) transmission and hence might be unsuitable for studying some 
cultural evolution. This echoes the more general criticism already discussed in Section
2.5.1 that culture is convergent and cross-fertilising, whereas biology is divergent and 
branching (Gould, 1991). As argued in that section, however, this dichotomy 
represents a distortion of both biology and culture. Another potential objection to the 
use of cladistic methods in anthropology is the difficulty of identifying distinct 
‘characters’ in cultural artifacts (see also criticisms of memetics in Section 3.4.5.2.). 
The identification of characters in cultme is undoubtedly difficult (O'Brien & Lyman, 
2003a, p. 143), but it is important to acloiowledge that it is probably no more difficult 
than for biological characters, and this difficulty has not prevented biologists from 
producing valuable work using the character concept (Wagner, 2000).
3.3.1.3 Conclusions.
Treating cultural tiaits as equivalent to biological characters allows 
anthropologists to apply the same rigorous phylogenetic methods to cultmal data as 
used by evolutionary biologists. This is because anthropologists and biologists share 
the same cmcial goals: to reconstruct the history of certain tiaits and to identify 
general pattems of change. A nmnber of studies applying phylogenetic methods to 
cultmal data demonstrate that such methods can be successfully used to achieve these 
goals, for example in deteimining whether a group of traits are related by descent.
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whether their spread was associated with other traits, or whether they generated 
selection for other traits.
3.3.2 Paleobiology
3.3.2.1 Biology.
The aim of paleobiology is to use the fossil record to identify prehistoric species 
and reconsti'uct their evolutionary history (Futuyma, 1998; Simpson, .1944), 
consequently helping to explain the present diversity and distribution of living 
species. The principle methods involve the collection of fossils and analysis of their 
features, with age and environment reconstructed based on these features and the 
characteristics of the surrounding rocks. Analysis of these data often involves the use 
of the phylogenetic methods described above in order to distinguish between 
homologous and analogous tiaits. The fossil record is a much more direct (albeit 
incomplete) source of evidence about the evolutionary past than the distribution of 
existing species, and additionally allows paleobiologists to provide an absolute time 
scale for evolutionary events using radio-decay dating techniques.
For example, Zhou, Barrett and Hilton (2003) describe exceptionally well- 
preserved fossils ftom north-eastern China from the Early Cretaceous period, the 
forms of which support the theories that birds ai e direct descendants of the dinosaurs, 
that feathers evolved before flight, and that there was rapid adaptive radiation of bird 
ancestors. Seiffert, Simons and Attia’s (2003) phylogenetic analysis of strepsirrhine 
primate fossils, meanwhile, suggests that the group is much older than was previously 
thought and has an Afto-Aiabian origin. These studies, and countless others, show
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that fossil evidence can be used to date evolutionary events, support hypotheses 
concerning the origin of traits, and reveal general evolutionary pattems such as 
adaptive radiation.
3.3.2.2 Culture.
In general, ai'chaeologists have similar goals to paleobiologists -  to identify 
prehistoric artifacts, to reconstmct lineages of these aitifacts and of the people 
associated with them, and to reveal the evolutionary relationships between these 
lineages. The basic methodology -  extracting specimens from the ground -  is also 
similar. It is only recently, however, that some archaeologists have begun to adopt 
explicitly evolutionary models and tools (for overviews see O'Brien & Lyman, 2002; 
Shennan, 2002). The key assumption underlying both paleobiology , and archaeology 
is that similar forms which vary tlnough time are causally connected by inheritance 
(which O'Brien & Lyman, 2000 teim the assumption of 'heritable continuity'). Such 
sequences of causally connected fomis constitute evolutionary lineages. Simpson 
(1961) proposed that evolutionary lineages should be used as a means of defining a 
species, rather than requiring reproductive isolation (Mayr, 1963), and this 
‘evolutionary species’ concept is increasingly being used in evolutionary biology 
(Wiens, 2004). The same lineage-based species concept has been suggested by Hull 
(1982) for culture, and extended by O’Brien and Lyman (2000) specifically for 
prehistoric artifacts.
O’Brien and Lyman (2000) have argued that evolutionary lineages can be 
reconstmcted using the method of sériation, in which a collection of artifacts is
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ordered according to their similarity: the more featmes two artifacts share, the closer 
they are in the order; the fewer they share, the further apart they are placed. O’Brien 
and Lyman (2000) argue that where such orderings exhibit gradual, overlapping 
change, it can be assumed that the sériation represents an evolutionary lineage 
causally connected by cultural tiansmission.
Early archaeologists used the method of sériation to identify lineages of coins 
(Evans, 1850), stone tools (Pitt-Rivers, 1875) and Egyptian pottery (Petrie, 1899). The 
method fell out of favour, however, in the mid-20‘^ ' centuiy, which O’Brien and 
Lyman (2000) attribute to the increased popularity of an essentialist stance in 
archaeology, in which types are perceived to have distinct ‘essences’ and change only 
occurs when one type suddenly transforms into another. This contiasts with 
evolutionary ‘population thinking’ (Mayi*, 1982) which recognises naturally occuning 
vaiiation within populations, rather than focusing on typological essences. O’Brien 
and Lyman (2000) have consequently made efforts to reintroduce the sériation into 
archaeology as a method of studying evolutionary change in artifacts. This is 
demonstrated by their analysis of projectile points from south-western U.S.A., which 
they show to exhibit continuous, giadually changing variation rather than a small 
number of distinct types. O’Brien and Lyman (2000) argue that forcing artifacts into 
distinct categories often distorts their tine phylogenetic relationships.
The method of sériation is nonetheless vulnerable to the same problem as 
similar methods in paleobiology: distinguishing between homologies and analogies. 
Hence O’Brien, Daiwent and Lyman (2001) and O’Brien and Lyman (2003a) have
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argued that it is also necessary to adopt the cladistic methods described above to 
reconstmct evolutionary lineages accurately. For example, O’Brien et al. (2001) and 
O’Brien and Lyman (2003a) carried out a phylogenetic analysis of 621 Paleoindian 
projectile points from south-eastern United States (see Figuie 3.2), while Telnani and 
Collard (2002) used similar methods to reconstmct the history of Turkmen textile 
pattems.
Figure 3.2 - A phylogenetic tree of 17 projectile points from south-eastern United 
States, from O’Brien and Lyman (2003a), illustrating divergence from a single
common ancestor.
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Other evolutionary archaeologists have adapted neutral drift models from 
evolutionary biology (e.g. Crow & Kimura, 1970) to account for ‘stylistic vaiiation’ 
in artifacts. For example, Neiman (1995) demonstrated that changes in decorative 
styles of Illinois Woodland ceramics can be predicted by a model incorporating the 
selectively neutral but opposing forces of drift and innovation. Bentley and Shennan
(2003) found that the fr equencies of West German pottery decorations over 400 years 
can be predicted by a similar model of unbiased cultural transmission, with some anti- 
confoimist bias in later periods.
As well as prehistoric artifacts, past cultures - unlike past species - have often 
left detailed written records or direct historical evidence of their knowledge, skills and 
technology. For example, Hinde and Barden (1985) found that the facial dimensions 
of teddy bears became increasingly baby-like over an 80 year period, which they 
attributed to a biologically evolved human preference for baby-like faces. Basalla 
(1988), meanwhile, collected numerous examples of teclniological change, which 
exemplify the giadual modification of preceding technology (see also Petioski, 1994; 
Ziman, 2000). For example, while Eli Whitney’s cotton gin is commonly described as 
unprecedented, it was in fact based on existing mechanical cotton gins used to extract 
other varieties of cotton seed, which were in turn derived from previous hidian gins 
and before that an older still sugar cane press (Basalla, 1988, pp. 32-33). Such 
gradual, cumulative change suggests the presence of evolutionary lineages of ai'tifacts 
linked by cultural tiansmission.
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Methods developed within evolutionary biology can also be applied to historical 
data. Howe et al (2001) describe how different manuscript versions of the same text 
can be used to reconstruct the evolution of that text. This was demonstrated by 
Barbrook et al (1998), who used cladistic methods to reconstmct the historical 
relationships between 58 different manuscripts of Chaucer’s ‘The Canterbuiy Tales’, 
improvmg on previous non-phylogenetic reconstmctions. Similarly, Bentley, Halm 
and Shennan (2004) found that the frequencies of first names and patent applications 
in 20^ ’^ century U.S.A. both conform to a simple model of random copying originally 
developed in evolutionary biology (Crow & Kimmu, 1970). This neutral model 
represents a useful null hypothesis describing the case where no selection is operating.
3.3.2.3 Conclusions.
Archaeologists face essentially the same task as paleobiologists - to identify 
earlier forms of the phenomena of interest (often now extinct or superseded) and 
reconstmct their history. It is therefore not surprising that the tools and approaches 
used by paleobiologists have been successfully imported into archaeology. Adopting 
evolutionary ‘population thinking’ (O'Brien & Lyman, 2000), using the methods of 
cladistics (Mace & Holden, 2005), and importing models of neutral diift (Neiman, 
1995) can produce a more accurate understanding of history than tiaditional 
archaeological methods. Historical records of cultural artifacts will often be more 
complete and accurate than the fossil record, offering a potentially important role for 
historians in the study of cultural evolution.
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3.3.3 Biogeography
3.3.3.1 Biology.
Biogeogi-aphy is the study of how biological, ecological, geographical and 
historical factors determine the spatial distribution of organisms (Brown & Lomolino, 
1998; Futuyma, 1998). Members of a population may adapt to their new environments 
when they disperse, or populations may be divided by physical barriers and evolve 
distinctively. Islands ai e often of particular interest to biogeographers (e.g. MacArthur 
& Wilson, 1967) because of their isolation from other tenestrial ecosystems. Long- 
teim geographical factors such as climate change or tectonic plate movement can 
affect organisms’ spatial distiibution, as well as shorter-teim ecological factors such 
as competitors or pathogens. Fossil evidence and phylogenetic analyses are used to 
infer the past distribution of organisms, which can help to explain their present 
distribution, and which has led biogeogiaphy to become intimately linked with both 
paleobiology and systematics.
The methods of biogeography can be classed as either descriptive or analytical. 
Descriptive methods consist of documenting the present distribution of organisms in 
space, along with their ecology and physical environment. Once these data have been 
gathered, analytical models, including the cladistic techniques described above, can 
be constructed and tested to try to explain this distribution.
For example, Stephens and Wiens (2004) sought to explain the geographical 
distiibution of emydid turtles in eastern North America, which exhibit two broad 
pattems of commimity stmcture. Phylogenetic analyses of morphological and
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molecular data combined with details of habitat and diet revealed that the differences 
between the two groups aie predominantly due to ‘phylogenetic conservatism’ (i.e. 
descent from two distinct evolutionary lineages), although the dispersal of several 
species from one group to the other has reduced these differences.
Roca et al. (2004) used fossil data to explain the distribution of an island 
species. Phylogenetic analyses of genetic and fossil evidence suggest that around 76 
million yeai's ago the solenodons - small, buiTOwing insectivores from the West Indies 
- diverged from other insectivores rather than from the tenrecs or the rodents. This 
date coincides with the separation of the islands from mainland North America due to 
tectonic movement and/or rising sea levels, supporting the hypothesis of divergence 
due to geogiaphical separation.
3.3.3.2 Culture.
The geographical distiibution of cultural traits is shaped, at least in part, by 
similar factors to those affecting the distribution of organisms. Just as the past 
distribution of organisms can help to explain the present distribution due to biological 
inheritance, cultural traits can also persist through time due to trans-generational 
cultural transmission. While organisms can disperse to new environments, cultural 
traits can spread by the movement of culture-bearing people and the diffusion of ideas 
and technology among non-kin. Cultural traits may also arise as adaptations to local 
ecological conditions.
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The field of social science most equivalent to biogeography is again 
antlnopology. One of the main goals of cultural anthropology has been to document 
and map the worldwide distribution of cultural traits, resembling the descriptive 
methods of bio geography. This has resulted in databases such as Murdock’s 
Etlmographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967), the Human Relations Area Files (Murdock et 
a l, 1987) and, for languages, the Etlinologue (Grimes, 2002).
More recently, evolutionarily-infoimed analytical models have been developed 
to attempt to account for the distributions of cultural ti'aits captured by these 
databases. The field of human behavioural ecology (see section 3.4.4.2) operates, with 
some success, on the premise of a correspondence between cultural and ecological 
variation (Smith & Winterhalder, 1992). Other researchers have endeavoured to 
distinguish ecological fiom ‘inlierited tradition’ explanations. Guglielmino et al 
(1995), for example, used the Ethnographic Atlas to analyse the distribution of 47 
cultural traits in 277 African societies. Most of the traits, particularly family and 
kinship traits, correlated with linguistic group, suggesting vertical transmission. A 
minority of tiaits were distributed according to geographical proximity, consistent 
with horizontal diffusion between gioups, while the distribution of none of the traits 
could be explained by ecology alone.
Similaiiy, Hewlett, de Silvestri and Guglielmino (2002) combined data from the 
Ethnographic Atlas and the Ethnologue with newly emerging genetic data to study the 
distribution of cultural traits in 36 African populations. Twenty of these traits were 
distiibuted according to language and/or genes, suggesting vertical cultural
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ti'ansmission, twelve traits correlated with geographical proximity, suggesting 
diffusion, and four followed ecology, suggesting independent adaptation to local 
conditions.
A further parallel with biogeography lies in the use of cladistic methods to help 
explain the present distribution of cultural tiaits, which we have already seen, for 
example, for AMcan and Austronesian languages (Gray & Jordan, 2000; Holden, 
2002). Yet another parallel lies in the value of physical barriers in studying the spatial 
distribution of culture. For example, Cavalli-Sforza and Wang (1986) applied a 
‘stepping-stone’ model, developed within biology to study genetic distributions, to 
linguistic data from 17 Micronesian islands, finding that the degree to which 
languages shared words declined with the negative exponential of the distance 
between those islands, just as has been found for biological tiaits.
Another example of the use of islands to study cultural evolution involves the 
case of the prehistoric inhabitants of Tasmania, whose cultural repertoire significantly 
decreased in size and complexity since their isolation from mainland Australia 
(Diamond, 1978; McGrew, 1987). Hemich (2004) developed a model showing that 
the reduction in population size caused by this physical separation was sufficient to 
cause the breakdown and loss of relatively complex cumulative skills and tools, due to 
the paucity of models from whom to leam such skills. Henrich’s (2004) analysis 
demonsfrates the interactive effects of demography and geography on the distribution 
of cultural traits.
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3.3.3.3 Conclusions.
There is a clear parallel in the aims, methods and findings of biogeogi'aphy and 
anthropology. Both disciplines aim to explain the spatial distribution of traits, and do 
this descriptively by documenting spatial variation in fonns, and analytically by 
developing theoretical models to account for patterns in this variation. While the 
descriptive stage has been earned out by anthropologists for decades mdependently of 
a Daiivinian model of cultural evolution, analytical models have benefited fi*om 
biological tools such as the methods of cladistics and fitness maximisation models. 
Similar factors have moreover been found to influence the distribution of biological 
and cultural traits, such as transmission dynamics (e.g. vertical/descent or 
horizontal/diffusion), geographical phenomena (e.g. physical bamers) and ecological 
factors.
There is also much potential here for the science of cultural evolution to become 
more predictive, along the lines of evolutionary biology, by specifying a priori which 
traits should follow these different evolutionary dynamics and under which 
conditions. For example, Boyd and Richerson (1985) predict that cultural traits which 
constitute adaptations to relatively rapidly changing environmental conditions should 
be transmitted horizontally, whereas cultural traits that constitute adaptations to 
environmental conditions that are stable across biological generations (although not 
stable enough to have become genetically specified) should show evidence of 
conservative vertical transmission. Further predictions are given in Section 3.4.3.
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5.3.4 Macroevolution: General Conclusions
The evidence concerning macroevolutionary patterns reveals a broad fit 
between the methods and approaches of evolutionary biology and those of the social 
sciences. This is primarily because a number of anthropologists and archaeologists are 
already importing biological metliods and models into their fields, with considerable 
success. Phylogenetic methods have been used by anthropologists to explain the 
spatial distribution of various cultmal traits, and by evolutionary archaeologists to 
reconstinct evolutionary lineages of material artifacts. As this suggests, there is 
already considerable cross-fertilisation of ideas and methods in these disciplines, 
which is a key benefit of adopting a unified evolutionary framework. We have also 
seen cases where the evolutionary methods have proved significantly more effective 
than traditional non-evolutionary methods, such as the adoption of evolutionary 
‘population thinldng’ in archaeology, or the cladistic solution to Galton^s problem.
3.4  M ic r o e v o l u t io n
One of the central principles of the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s was that 
large-scale macroevolutionary patterns of change are the result of small-scale 
microevolutionary changes in gene frequencies within populations (Mayr*, 1982). A 
complete theory of cultmal evolution would therefore require studies of small-scale 
changes in populations of cultural traits. The following sections outline the 
approaches to microevolution developed by evolutionary biologists -  population 
genetics (theoretical, experimental and field), evolutionary ecology and molecular 
genetics -  along with corresponding methods in the study of cultural evolution.
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3Â J Theoretical Population Genetics
3.4.1.1 Biology.
Significant advances were made in the study of biological evolution before its 
molecular' basis was understood, in no small part through the use of simplified 
mathematical models, pioneered by Fisher (1930), Wright (1931) and Haldane (1932). 
In the simplest models, sexually reproducing individuals in a large (‘infinite-sized’) 
population each contribute to an aggregate gene-pool. Under the assumptions of 
random mating, and with no migration, selection or mutation, allele frequencies will 
remain constant over successive generations (the Hardy-Weinberg principle). 
Deviations from this simple case can be incorporated into population genetic models, 
such as mutation, non-random (e.g. assortative) mating, or the impact of processes 
such as natural selection or random genetic drift. Overall allele or genotype 
frequencies in successive generations can be tracked mathematically to simulate the 
process of evolution, often to find out whether a particular genetic trait can invade and 
spread through a population and, if so, to explore the possible evolutionary 
consequences of this invasion.
For example, McKone and Halpem (2003) developed a population genetic 
model of androgenesis, a rare phenomenon seen in freshwater clams, Saharan cypress 
trees and stick insects, where the offspring acquire nuclear DNA from the male parent 
only. The model predicted that mutations causing androgenesis will often spread 
rapidly to fixation in an initially nonandiogenetic population, and in some cases cause 
extinction of that population due to the loss of females, perhaps explaining its rarity.
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3.4.1.2 Culture.
Models of gene-culture co-evolution (sometimes also referred to as dual­
inheritance theory) adopt essentially the same methods as above, incorporating 
cultmal inheritance into population genetic models (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976; Laland, Kumm, & 
Feldman, 1995). These models exploit parallels in the demograpliic consequences of 
biological and cultural change with, for instance, differential adoption and innovation 
in culture modelled as equivalent to natural selection and mutation within biology, 
and with other processes such as drift, migration and assoriative mating operating 
equivalently in both cases.
hi gene-culture coevolution models, each individual is often described in terms 
of a combination of genetic and cultural tr aits, or their ‘phenogenotype’. This requires 
that transmission rules for both genes and cultiue must be considered, with selection 
on genes affecting the adoption of cultural traits and vice versa. As well as adopting 
the same general methods and principles as population genetics, in many cases gene- 
culture coevolution researchers have adapted specific established population genetic 
models to render them suitable to features of cultur e that are not directly analogous to 
their biological counterpart.
Researchers in these fields recognise that cultural transmission can be very 
different to biological transmission. While the latter is primarily vertical (from parent 
to offspring), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) have modelled the consequences of 
horizontal (within-generation) and oblique (from unrelated members of the parental
65
generation) cultural transmission. Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Henrich and Boyd 
(1998) have demonstrated mathematically that a ‘conformist’ cultural bias, in which 
individuals are predisposed to adopt the most popular cultural ti'ait in a group, can 
evolve in a wide variety of environmental conditions and leads to stable differences 
between cultural groups, potentially leading to cultural group selection (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). Other models consider a variety of other forms of transmission 
biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & 
Cavalli-Sforza, 1976). Importantly, many of these biases are unique to cultmal 
transmission and will generate evolutionary dynamics with no obvious parallel in 
biology. Such differences do not, however, invalidate an evolutionary analysis of 
culture.
Models have also been developed for specific cases of gene-culture coevolution. 
For example, Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1989) modelled the coevolution of genes 
for lactose absorption and the cultural trait of dairy farming, finding that the allele for 
lactose absorption will spread provided there is a high probability that the offspring of 
dairy farmers themselves become dairy farmers, but not otherwise, even with a 
significant viability advantage. Another case study examined the evolution of 
handedness (Laland, Kumm, Vanhorn, & Feldman, 1995), proposing a model that 
gave a better fit to patterns of handedness in families and among twins than leading 
pmely genetic models.
As well as population genetic methods, biological models of neutral genetic 
drift (Crow & Kimma, 1970) have been adapted to study the evolution of cultmal
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tiaits such as names and patents (Bentley et al., 2004), demonstrating that the 
distribution of such traits can be accounted for by chance events. Boyd and Richerson 
(1985), meanwhile, have developed a model of runaway cultural selection similar to 
runaway sexual selection, which they argue can account for oversized yams in 
Ponapae and extensive tattooing in Polynesia (paralleling elaborate sexually selected 
biological traits such as the peacock’s tail).
Mathematical models such as these are often treated with suspicion and even 
hostility by some social scientists, who consider them to be gioss oversimplifications 
of reality (see Laland, Kiunm, & Feldman, 1995 and associated comments). The 
alternatives to gene-culture coevolutionary analyses, however, are usually either 
analyses at a single (purely genetic or purely cultural) level or vague verbal accounts 
of ‘complex interactions’, neither of which are productive. Gene-culture analyses 
have repeatedly revealed circumstances under which the interactions between genetic 
and cultural processes lead populations to different equilibria than those predicted by 
single-level models, or anticipated in verbal accounts (Laland, Kumm, & Feldman, 
1995), as illustr ated by the examples of dairy fanning and handedness.
Interestingly, fifty years ago the same reservations about simplifying 
assumptions were voiced about the use of population genetic models in biology by the 
prominent evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayi* (1963). He argued that using such 
models was akin to tr eating genetics as pulling colour ed beans from a bag (coining the 
plrrase ‘beanbag genetics’), ignoring complex physiological and developmental 
processes that lead to interactions between genes, hr his classic article “A defense of
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beaiibag genetics”, J.B.S. Haldane (1964) countered that the simplification of reality 
embodied in these models is the very reason for their usefulness. Such simplification 
can significantly aid oui* understanding of processes that are too complex to be 
considered through verbal arguments alone, because mathematical models force their 
authors to explicitly and exactly specify all of then assumptions, to focus on major 
factors, and to generate logically sound conclusions. Indeed, such conclusions are 
often counterintuitive to human minds relying solely on informal verbal reasoning. 
Haldane (1964) provided several examples where empirical facts follow the 
predictions of population genetic models in spite of their simplifying assumptions, 
and noted that models can often highlight the kind of data that need to be collected to 
evaluate a particular theory.
Ultimately, Haldane (1964) won the argument and population genetic modelling 
is now an established and invaluable tool in evolutionary biology (Crow, 2001). The 
same arguments apply to the use of similar mathematical models in the social sciences 
(see also Laland, 1993; Laland, Kumm, & Feldman, 1995; Mace & Pagel, 1994; Pagel 
& Mace, 2004).
3.4.1.3 Conclusions.
A number of researchers have imported the methods of theoretical population 
genetics to study the coevolution of genes and culture, and the dynamics of cultural 
change over time. These methods have provided a rigorous analysis of many cultural 
evolutionary processes and case studies. The differences between biological and 
cultural inheritance are not ignored and do not invalidate such models, while many of
68
the criticisms of the use of such analytical models in the social sciences have been 
addressed in a parallel debate within evolutionary biology.
3.4.2 Experimental Population Genetics
3.4.2.1 Biology.
As well as using the theoretical models described above, population geneticists 
have studied microevolutionary processes experimentally by breeding multiple 
generations of study organisms in the laboratory, in order to simulate evolution under 
controlled conditions. Laboratory-based experiments have been used to estimate the 
rate and effect of mutation, detect adaptation to experimentally induced 
environmental conditions (e.g. different temperatures), and measure responses to the 
artificial selection of single or multiple traits (Futuyma, 1998; Hartl & Clark, 1997).
hr a typical artificial selection experiment, a population of a species, such as E. 
coli or Drosophila, is measured for some desired trait (e.g. temperatme resistance). In 
each generation only a subset of the population is allowed to reproduce, with the 
reproducing individuals chosen according to the desired trait (e.g. those most resistant 
to high temperatures). After a number of generations the population is again tested for 
the trait to estimate the response to this selection regime.
For example, Torres-Vila et al. (2002) employed a laboratory-based artificial 
selection paradigm to investigate the genetic basis of polyandry (females mating with 
more than one male) in a normally non-polyandrous species of moth, hiitially 150 
pairs of moths were allowed to mate fi'eely, and all of the fertilised females were
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assessed for their tendency to solicit further matings. In five subsequent generations 
only females displaying polyandrous behaviour were allowed to mate, resulting in a 
significant increase in the frequency of polyandry and indicating the successful 
aitificial selection of this trait.
Natural selection can also be simulated more directly by manipulating 
environmental conditions and allowing the population members to compete natmally 
amongst themselves, with those individuals best suited to the imposed conditions out- 
breeding less suited individuals. After a number of generations the population is 
tested for adaptation to the imposed conditions. Kennington et al. (2003), for 
example, experimentally simulated the natural selection of body size in Drosophila in 
response to humidity. Separate populations were maintained at either high or low 
hmnidity and were allowed to breed freely. After 20 weeks (5-10 generations) it was 
foimd that the low humidity lines were significantly smaller than the high humidity 
lines, which Kennington et al. (2003) argued occurred because large flies have a low 
sru'face area relative to weight, lose less water and so are better adapted to low 
humidity. This experimental result also helps to explain the geographical distribution 
of Drosophila in the wild, with large body sizes found at high latitudes with low 
humidity.
3.4.2.2 Culture.
One parallel with this work lies in laboratory based psychological experiments 
simulating cultural transmission. Where population genetic experiments simulate 
biological evolution by studying the tr*ansmission of genetic information from
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generation to generation through the reproduction of individuals, psychological 
experiments can potentially simulate cultural evolution by studying the transmission 
of cultural information (e.g. texts or behavioural rules) from one individual to another 
through social learning.
One method for simulating cultural evolution was developed by Gerard, 
Klucldiohn and Rapoport (1956) and Jacobs and Campbell (1961). This involves 
establishing a norm or bias in a gr oup of participants, usually by using confederates. 
One by one these participants are replaced with new, imtrained participants. The 
degr ee to which the norm or bias remains in the group after all of the original group 
members have been replaced represents a measure of its transmission to the new 
members.
For example, Baum et a l (2004) studied the transmission of traditions using a 
task in which participants received financial rewards for solving anagrams. Groups of 
individuals could choose to solve an anagram printed on either red or blue card: the 
red anagr ams gave a small immediate payment, while the blue anagrams gave a larger 
payoff but were followed by a ‘time-out’ during which no anagrams could be solved. 
By manipulating the length of this time-out, the experimenters were able to determine 
which of the two anagr ams gave the highest overall payoff (i.e. where the blue time­
out was short, blue was optimal, and where the blue time-out was long, red was 
optimal). Every 12 minutes one member of the group was replaced with a new 
participant. It was found that traditions of the optimal choice emerged under each 
experimental condition, with existing gr oup members instructing new members in this
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optimal tradition by transmitting either accurate or inaccurate information about 
payoffs, or tlrrough coercion.
Key similarities exist between this study and the experimental simulations of 
natural selection described above. In Kennington et aVs (2003) study with 
Drosophila, where the experimentally determined conditions of low humidity 
favoured small body size, smaller individuals out-reproduced larger individuals. 
Hence genetic information determining ‘small body size’ was more likely to be 
transmitted to the next generation through biological reproduction, and the average 
body size of the population became gradually smaller. In Baum et aVs (2004) study, 
where the experimentally determined conditions favomed red anagrams (when the 
blue time-out was relatively long), choosing red anagr ams gave a larger payoff to the 
participants. Hence the behaviomal rule ‘choose red’ was more likely to be 
transmitted to the new participants through cultural transmission, and the overall 
frequency of choosing red gradually increased.
Baum et a/.’s (2004) method could easily be adapted to study the cultural 
evolution of attitudes or beliefs. Groups of participants could be asked to discuss a 
contentious issue, then every generation the participant with the most extreme opinion 
in a certain direction removed and replaced with a random participant. After a number 
of generations the group should hold more extreme views (in the opposite direction to 
those of the removed participants) than average members of the larger population.
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Experimental economists have also recently begun to study the transmission of 
behavioural traditions that emerge when chains of successive participants play 
economic games. For example, Schotter and Sopher (2003) had successive pairs of 
participants play a game in which two players chose one of two options without 
communicating. If they chose different options, neither got any payoff, encouraging 
coordination. If both chose the first option then the first player benefited more than 
the second, while if both chose the second option the second player benefited more, 
creating conflict. Transmission was effected by allowing each player to view the 
behavioural history of all previous players and/or to receive explicit advice firom the 
preceding player in the chain. It was foimd that stable conventions emerged in which 
botli players consistently chose one option, and that these conventions were mainly 
due to explicit advice rather than behavioural histoiy.
A similar methodology exists within experimental psychology. The 
transmission chain method, as developed by Bartlett (1932), involves a text or picture 
being passed along a linear chain of participants (see Chapter 4). The first participant 
in such a chain reads or views the stimulus material and later recalls it. The resultant 
recall is then given to the next participant in the chain to recall, the result of which is 
given to the third, and so on along the chain. Studying how the material changes as it 
is transmitted, and comparing the degradation rates of different types of material, can 
reveal specific biases in cultural transmission.
For example. Chapter 6 (Mesoudi & Wliiten, 2004) used this method to study 
the cultural transmission of event knowledge. Everyday events, such as going to a
73
restaurant, aie thought to be represented in memory hierarchically, in which a global 
high-level proposition (e.g. ‘go to restaurant’) can be subdivided into lower-level 
propositions (e.g. ‘sit down’, ‘order’, ‘eat’, ‘pay’), each of which can be sub-divided 
further (e.g. ‘look at menu’, ‘select food’, ‘call waiter’). It foimd that when 
descriptions of such events expressed entirely at a low hierarchical level were passed 
along multiple chains of participants, they were spontaneously transformed into 
higher hierarchical levels.
Linear transmission chain studies such as those of Schotter and Sopher (2003) 
and Mesoudi and Wliiten (2004) bear less similarity to the experimental paradigms of 
population genetics. Nevertheless, Schotter and Sopher’s (2003) study provides 
important data on the mode of cultural transmission (explicit advice versus 
behavioiual history), data which might be needed as a preliminary to more advanced 
experimental manipulations. Studies such as Bartlett (1932) and Mesoudi and Whiten
(2004), while not imposing a selection regime on the tr ansmission of cultural traits, 
are in a sense simulating selection ‘in the wild’ (see Section 3.4.3.2), as cultural 
infonnation is being shaped by the minds of the participants it passes tlrrough. In 
Mesoudi and Whiten (2004), the implicit hierarchical structure of memory causes the 
selection of event knowledge at high hierarchical levels; hence, there is selection due 
to evolved or implicit features of human cognition. A design more explicitly along the 
lines of a natural selection population genetic experiment might involve exposing 
different chains of people to different experimental conditions, or having each chain 
composed of different types of people with alternative pre-existing larowledge.
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Finally, as well as simply detecting the presence of directional selection, 
population geneticists may obtain quantitative estimates of the strength of selection. 
Cultural transmission experiments would benefit from the development of similar 
measures, and once again there are opportunities to boiTow usefully from biology. 
Stabilising selection might also be studied in this manner, by testing whether certain 
beliefs or ideas are converged upon following an experimentally induced deviation 
(see Section 3.4.3),
3.4.2.3 Conclusions,
Although laboratory based experiments are an established approach to the study 
of biological evolution, relatively little experimental work exists in psychology or 
economics that has studied the dynamics of cultural transmission. Such studies are 
essential for a full understanding of cultural evolution. Psychological studies of 
cultural transmission would benefit from explicitly drawing on the methods of 
experimental population genetics, both in the design of experiments and in the 
analysis of data.
3.4.3 Population Genetics Field Studies
3.4.3.1 Biology.
The third approach within population genetics is the study of evolution in 
naturally occurring populations. Observational studies or field experiments can give 
estimates of the heritability of traits by measuring parent-offspring correlations, and
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measui'es of mortality and reproductive success can be used to estimate the mode and 
strength of selection on those ti aits (Endler, 1986; Futuyma, 1998).
The mode of selection (Endler, 1986; Simpson, 1944) refers to whether 
selection is directional (i.e. individuals at one end of a distribution are favoured, 
causing a change in the mean trait value), stabilising (i.e. intermediate individuals are 
more successful than those at the extremes, decreasing variation in the trait) or 
disruptive (i.e. extreme individuals do better, increasing variation in the tr*ait).
The strength of selection is commonly represented by the selection gradient, a 
multiple regression-based measure of the relationship between relative fitness and 
variation (Arnold & Wade, 1984; Lande & Arnold, 1983). Selection gradients have 
become a common cmrency within evolutionary biology for estimating the strength 
and mode of selection, and for making comparisons between populations (e.g. Endler, 
1986; Hoekstra et a l, 2001; Kingsolver et a l, 2001). The actual methods used to 
obtain these measures are varied. Endler (1986) lists ten common methods for 
detecting natural selection in the wild, and the corresponding results that would 
suggest its operation, as summarised in Table 3.1.
There are literally himdreds of examples of natural selection being 
demonstrated in natmal populations of organisms by the above methods (Endler, 
1986). Recent examples include Donley et a/.’s (2004) analysis of similar 
morphological and biomechanical specialisations in lamnid sharks and tuna, such as a 
‘thumiifonn’ body shape, in both cases caused by selection for fast movement tlrrough
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water. This convergent evolution (Endler’s 3rd method) has occurred independently 
during the 400 million years since the two groups diverged from a common ancestor. 
Marko (2005), meanwhile, found evidence for character displacement (Endler’s 2nd 
method) in two closely related species of rocky-shore gastropods. Significant 
differences in shell shape were observed only where the two species overlapped, 
caused by divergent selection as a result of competition.
Method Result indicative o f selection
1 Exploring the relationship between a trait and an 
environmental factor (source of selection)
Conelation between the trait and an independent 
environmental (selective) factor
2 Comparing closely related species living in the 
same region
Homologous traits affected in same manner, e.g. 
divergence in similar traits due to competition 
(character displacement)
3 Comparing unrelated species living in similar 
habitats
Similarities in analogous traits due to convergent 
evolution
4 Comparing gene frequencies with those predicted 
by a null (no selection) model
Deviation of gene or genotype frequencies, 
mmiber of alleles, or disequilibrium, from the null 
model
5 Long-term study of trait distribution Long-term stability or regular directional change 
in the tr ait
6 Perturbation of natur al populations The trait diverges from tire rrew post-perturbation 
mean
7 Long-term study of demography (e.g. 
smwivorship, fecundity)
Particular demographic patterirs are associated 
with particular trait values over time
8 Comparing the trait distribution of different age- 
classes or life-history stages
Differences in trait frequency distributions 
between age classes
9 Using knowledge of fitness, genetics, physiology 
etc. to predict short-term change in a trait
Predictions confirmed
10 Using fitness-maximisation models to predict an 
observed trait frequency or distribution at 
equilibrium
Predictions confirmed
Table 3.1- Methods for the detection of natmal selection in the wild and results that 
would suggest the presence of selection as given by Endler (1986: chapter 3 esp.
Table 3.1).
3.4.3.2 Culture.
Cultural traits have similarly been studied in natural human populations, 
although mostly not within an explicit evolutionary framework and hence without the
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foiTualised hypotheses, methods and measures of selection employed within 
evolutionary biology as seen above. Three relevant research traditions - 
anthi'opological field studies, rumour research, and the diffusion of innovations - are 
now briefly discussed (more details can be found in Chapter 4), before outlining how 
more formal, theoretically-driven methods developed within biology might be applied 
to cultural data.
First, anthropological field studies have examined the acquisition of cultural 
loiowledge in ti aditional societies. Members of a community are typically interviewed 
to find out firom whom they acquired their loiowledge or skills. For example, Hewlett 
and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) interviewed members of the Aka of central Africa, finding 
that the majority (80.7%) of practical skills were said to be acquired from parents, 
5.2% fi-om other family members and 12.3% to unrelated individuals. Similarly, 
Aunger (2000a) found that food taboos are acquired predominantly from biological 
parents in a horiicultuial society from the Democratic Republic of Congo, with a 
subsequent less influential phase of learning firom non-kin.
Second, the field of social psychology devoted to lumour research (Rosnow, 
1980, 1991) has generated a number of field studies examining the transmission of 
rumours through naturally occuiring populations. A rumour is defined as a belief 
passed fi"om person to person without secure standards of evidence being present 
(Allport & Postman, 1947, p. ix). Studies have used questionnaires to track either 
naturally occurring or experimentally introduced rumours tlnough a small population. 
Jaeger, Anthony and Rosnow (1980), for example, used confederates to plant a
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mmour in a college that some students had been caught smoking marijuana during 
final exams, obtaining details of transmission using questionnaires. Bordia and 
Rosnow (1998) have more recently studied the transmission of a rumour through an 
internet community, with the electronic record of communications allowing the 
longitudinal study of all stages of tiansmission, rather than relying on retrospective 
accoimts.
Finally, research in sociology on the diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 1995) 
examines how new ideas and technologies are transmitted through naturally occumng 
populations. Typically, questionnaires or interviews are employed to assess the past 
and present use of the innovation by the respondent, and used to compile a picture of 
diffusion through the population. Classic studies have examined the diffusion of new 
types of seed amongst farmers (Ryan & Gross, 1943) and antibiotic amongst doctors 
(Coleman et a l, 1966). A recurring finding from over 3000 diffusion studies is an S- 
shaped cumulative adoption curve (Rogers, 1995), which indicates a slow initial 
uptalce, followed by a rapid increase in adoption, and finally another slow period as 
the population reaches satuiation. Similar sigmoidal dynamics characterise the 
diffusion of alleles.
Many of these diffusion studies, however, can be criticised for not clearly 
identifying a priori the putative selection pressuie responsible for the diffusion, and 
then testing this prediction in natural populations, as is commonly done in 
evolutionary biology (Endler’s method 1). Instead, diffusion of innovations research 
has produced a list of a posteriori and somewhat vague qualities that supposedly
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explain diffusion rates, such as ‘trialability’, or ‘complexity’ (Rogers, 1995). One 
recent study that did specify a priori a hypothesised selection pressuie is Bangerter 
and Heath’s (2004) study of the ‘Mozail effect’, the idea that exposine to classical 
music enhances intelligence, especially during childhood. While having veiy weak 
scientific support, this idea has gained wide currency in the U.S. mass media, which 
Bangerter and Heath (2004) hypothesised was because it offers a cheap and easy way 
of supposedly enhancing one’s child’s development. This hypothesis predicts that the 
Mozart effect should be more prevalent in the mass media of states where there is 
poor academic performance and low spending on education, which Bangerter and 
Heath (2004) showed to be the case.
3.43.3 Conclusions.
There are some weak similarities between the methods used by evolutionary 
biologists to study evolution in naturally occurring populations of organisms and 
those which have been used to study cultmal change ‘in the wild’. Rumours and 
innovations are studied as they colonise novel environments, while anthropological 
studies provide estimates of heritability. The shorter time scale of some cultural 
evolution and the ability of people to report its means of transmission suggest that 
cultural evolution might be easier to detect than biological evolution (although such 
verbal reports would need to be supplemented with obseiwational data).
The study of cultural evolution, however, is distinctly lacking in foimal tests for 
cultural selection, as opposed to other forms of cultural change such as drift. Laland 
and Brown (2002) have argued that each one of Endler’s (1986) methods for detecting
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natural selection in the wild (Table 3.1) can be adapted to study the selection of 
naturally occurring cultural traits. As mentioned above, sociological studies have 
successfully tracked changes in the frequencies of various traits following their 
natural or artificial introduction into a novel environment. The next step would be to 
demonstrate that these changes in fi'equency are the result of selection, for example by 
comparing a newly introduced idea with the same idea in the parent population fr om 
which it diffused, predicting directional change. An alternative approach would be to 
test whether stabilising selection was operating on the character prior to the 
perturbation by investigating whether it returns to the original equilibrium, as 
predicted. More studies are needed like Bangerter and Heath (2004), which identify a 
priori a putative selection pressure - anxiety over child development - responsible for 
the spread of a cultural trait, and successfully predict the distiibution of the trait fr om 
that selection pressure.
Another method is to investigate cultural character displacement, where two 
competing cultmal lineages in the same region diverge in order to reduce direct 
competition (Laland & Brown, 2002). We might, for example, predict that the 
religious beliefs of people who live side-by-side with people of different, opposing 
beliefs (e.g. Muslims and Jews in Palestine, or Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
heland) are more divergent and extreme than the beliefs of people not in immediate 
contact with competing beliefs (e.g. Muslims in neighboming Islamic comitries such 
as Syria and Jews in Jewish-only regions of Israel, or Catholics in the Republic of 
Ireland and Protestants in mainland Britain). Convergent cultmal evolution, 
meanwhile, might be detected where cultural lineages from distant yet similar
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environments have evolved similar features. History is likely to be littered with 
examples of similai', independently evolved solutions to common problems, such as 
the independent evolution of writing by the Sumerians around 3000 B.C., the Chinese 
ai'ound 1300 B.C. and the Mexican Indians around 600 B.C., all in response to a need 
for stocktaking (Diamond, 1998).
Studies of cultural evolution could also adapt the measures of selection strength 
developed by biologists, such as the selection gradient. Quantitative measures of the 
rate of microevolution, like the daiwin or the haldane (Hendry & Kinnison, 1999), 
might also be adapted to the cultmal case. There is much opportmiity here for the 
fertile transfer of good ideas from biology to the social sciences, with many of the 
methods cmrently being used by evolutionary biologists to investigate natural 
selection in the wild yet to be tried by researchers studying cultme.
3.4.4 Evolutionary Ecology
3.4.4.1 Biology.
Ecology is the study of interactions between organisms and their environments 
(Begon, Harper, & Townsend, 1996). Evolutionary ecology focuses on the 
evolutionary processes by which organisms have become adapted to their 
enviromnents (Cockbum, 1991; Futuyma, 1998). Such environmental features can be 
abiotic, such as temperatme or rainfall, or biotic, such as food somces, predators, 
parasites, competitors or helpers, of both the same and different species. Ecologists 
have adopted a range of methods to study these processes, including field studies.
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natmal and laboratory experiments and mathematical models. There is therefore a 
great deal of overlap with biogeography and population genetics.
For example, Korpimaki et al (2002) set out to determine whether predation 
was responsible for the 3-5 year cycles in population densities of voles in northern 
Emope. By experimentally reducing numbers of the voles’ predators, Korpimaki et al 
(2002) were able to show a corresponding increase in the population density of voles 
compared to non-manipulated vole populations. This response was supported by a 
demographically-based population model which predicted that reduced predation 
produces a shift from 3-5 year cycles of vole population density to 1-year cycles.
3.4.4.2 Culture.
Cultmal traits can also be said to interact with, and adapt to, their enviromnent. 
The environment in this case can be divided into three categories, two of which 
roughly correspond to the abiotic and biotic featmes that affect organisms. Hence 
cultmal traits may adapt to physical featmes of the environment such as temperature 
or rainfall. Cultural traits may also compete with, and adapt to, other cultural 
loiowledge, equivalent to the biotic environment. Finally, cultmal traits may adapt to 
biologically evolved or implicit featmes of human cognition. This has no exact 
equivalent in the biological world, although perhaps there is a loose parallel in genetic 
or developmental constraints on adaptation, or in the coevolution of symbionts and 
hosts (Demiett, 2001, 2002).
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As their names suggest, cultural ecologists (e.g. Steward, 1955) and human 
behavioural ecologists (e.g. Smith & Winterhalder, 1992; Winterhalder & Smith, 
2000) have studied the adaptation of cultural tiaits to the physical and social 
environment. The more rigorous and explicitly Darwinian human behavioural ecology 
is discussed here, which is directly equivalent to (and indeed emerged from) 
behavioural ecology within biology, usually using the same theoretical tools and 
models, such as optimal foraging theory (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). Although human 
behavioural ecologists often choose to downplay transmitted cultural processes, such 
work is valuable within a cultural evolutionary framework in specifying the 
microevolutionary process of adaptation which may (or may not) then be transmitted 
to subsequent generations.
The practical methods of human behavioural ecology, like those of 
anthiopology in general, involve obsemng and recording behaviour in natural 
enviromnents, typically in small communities within traditional societies. Unlike 
conventional antliropology, however, these observations are guided by the predictions 
of formal mathematical models. This freldwork, as well as the theoretical models it is 
designed to test, resemble the methods of evolutionary ecology. An example is the 
occurrence in Tibet of polyandry which has been shown to be functionally adaptive 
under the particularly harsh environmental conditions of the region (Crook & Crook, 
1988).
As well as adapting to the physical environment, cultural traits may also adapt 
to other pre-existing cultural infoimation. The study of this form of adaptation would
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incorporate competition between cultural traits, for which ecological concepts such as 
exploitation or interference might be useful. Mufwene (2001) has recently proposed a 
detailed ecological theoiy of Imiguage evolution along these lines.
Finally, because cultural traits predominantly rely on human minds for their 
storage and tiansmission, there is the possibility of adaptation to biologically evolved 
or developmentally acquired cognitive features of those minds. Hence transmission 
experiments and field studies can draw on findings from cognitive and developmental 
psychology concerning implicit memory structuies, such as Mesoudi and Whiten’s 
(2004) demonsfration that the hierarchical structure of memory shapes the cultural 
ti'ansmission of event knowledge. Evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barkow et a l, 1992) 
also provides a rich theoretical and empirical body of research on biologically evolved 
features of human cognition that might be predicted to bias cultural transmission in 
paiticular directions. Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) similarly ai'gue that the diversity 
of some cultmal traits, such as religious beliefs or classifications of animals and 
plants, are the result of adaptation to biologically evolved domain-specific cognitive 
capacities (e.g. folk-biology: Atran, 1998). There is also evidence that biomechanical 
properties of the human vocal apparatus significantly constrain the form of words 
(MacNeilage & Davis, 2000). The infant vocal tract, for example, favours simple 
consonant-vowel alternations such as ‘dada’ and ‘mama’ (MacNeilage & Davis, 
2000), which may explain why such word forms are used in many languages to 
denote parents.
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The aforementioned study by Bangerter and Heath (2004) concerning the 
‘Mozart effect’ also demonstrated that the content of this scientific myth adapted over 
time to fulfil the role of reducing anxiety about childhood education. Although the 
original scientific study used college students, media articles in the following eight 
years increasingly reported the effect as applying to children and babies.
Of course, cultural knowledge does not exist solely in human brains, and does 
not exclusively rely on face to face communication for transmission. It may also be 
fruitful to study the adaptation of cultural traits to alternative transmission media such 
as printed documents or the internet, and to examine whether such media are merely 
direct extensions of cognitive capacities or whether they generate their own novel 
transmission constraints (see Donald, 1991).
3.4A. 3 Conclusions.
Cultural traits may adapt to the physical enviromnent, to other cultural 
Icnowledge, or to biologically evolved or implicit features of cognition. While 
behavioural and cultural ecologists have produced a large body of work relating 
ecological factors to cultural beliefs, knowledge and skills, there is much less work on 
adaptation to the other two ‘cultural environments’. Anthropological field work and 
psychological experiments aie needed which measure features of these environments 
and make testable predictions regarding coixesponding features of culture.
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3,4.5 Molecular Genetics
3.4.5.1 Biology,
One of the major achievements of 20th century biology was the discovery that 
sequences of DNA comprise the major part of the molecular basis of biological 
inheritance. Considerable progiess has been made in biology as a result of this 
knowledge. The fields of molecular biology and genetics involve the study of the 
structure of DNA, RNA and proteins and the processes involved in their inheritance 
and expression (Futuyma, 1998; Watson, Hopkins, Roberts, & Weiner, 1987). 
Molecular genetics has a number of specific uses in evolutionary biology (Futuyma, 
1998). As mentioned above, molecular markers can be used to reconstinct and date 
phylogenetic relationships, as well as provide information on genetic variation, 
population structme and gene flow. Molecular tecliniques can also be used to 
investigate the fiinctions of specific genes in the development of biochemical, 
morphological or behavioural phenotypic features.
3.4.5.2 Culture.
One approach to culture that is explicitly analogous to genetics is memetics, hi 
order to illustrate the universality and substrate-neutiality of his replicator-centred 
theory of evolution, Dawkins (1976b) coined the term meme to describe a cultural 
replicator, or a unit of cultural transmission. Memetics has been developed ftnther by 
Hull (1982), Dermett (1995), Blackmore (1999) and Aunger (2002; 2000b), amongst 
others. A common assumption of memetics is that cultural Icnowledge is stored in 
brains as discrete packages of semantic information, comparable to how biological
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information is stored as genes. Once expressed in behaviom- or artifacts, these 
packages of learned information can be replicated in the heads of other individuals 
through social learning.
The recently burgeoning literature promoting memetics has attracted a number 
of criticisms (Laland & Brown, 2002). Some of these, such as the need to 
accommodate the merging of lineages, apply equally to any unified theory of cultural 
evolution and have been discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Specific to memetics, 
however, is the criticism that culture cannot be divided into discrete imits with clearly 
specified boimdaries (Bloch, 2000; Midgley, 2000).
However, the same putative ‘criticism’ could equally be levelled at modem 
concepts of the gene (Laland & Brown, 2002). As documented by Portin (1993;
2002), the concept of the gene has undergone significant changes over the last 150 
years. The classical view, held from Mendel (1866) until the 1930s, saw the gene as 
an indivisible unit of transmission, recombination, mutation and function. That is, a 
gene is a unit of infoiination that is transmitted whole, within which no recombination 
occurs, which mutates independently from other genes, and which produces a single 
moleculai* product (as captured by James Watson’s famous canon “DNA makes RNA 
makes protein”). This simple and dated gene concept seems to be the view of the gene 
held by many social anthropologists, including those critical of memetics.
Advances in genetics since the 1930s, however, have shown this unitary gene 
concept to be inadequate and overly restrictive. Reconceptualisation began in the
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1970s following the discoveries of such phenomena as overlapping genes, where the 
same sti'etch of DNA codes for more than one protein; movable genes, DNA 
sequences that move around the genome; and nested genes, which reside inside other 
genes. Such revised conceptions have continued in the wake of modem discoveries, 
such as altemative splicing, nuclear and messenger RNA editing, cellular protein 
modification and genomic imprinting.
In altemative splicing, for example, one of several alternative versions of an 
exon is transcribed into a coding segment. Depending on which one is chosen, 
different proteins can be produced from the same gene. It can even involve the 
splicing in of exons fr om other genes, and in some cases it produces not just one or 
two variants but hundreds or even thousands. Altemative splicing is not a rare or 
occasional event, and seems to occur in approximately half of all human genes 
(Modi'ek & Lee, 2002). Gone is the notion of ‘one gene - one protein’. In fact, genes 
seem much more like ideas - information that can be expressed in a multitude of 
different ways.
The modem concept of the gene is hence characterised as abstract, general and 
open, with fuzzy boundaries that change depending on the context in which the term 
is used (Portin, 1993, 2002). Indeed, there are now multiple, mutually incompatible 
gene concepts prevalent within biology (Stotz & Griffiths, 2004). So while the critics 
of memetics are probably correct in pointing out the vaguely and flexibly specified 
nature of the meme concept, exactly the same problem applies to the gene concept, 
which undoubtedly has been of enormous value in the study of biological evolution.
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The crucial point here is that both empirical and theoretical traditions within 
population biology have thrived in spite of tins biological complexity, by using 
simple, discrete gene concepts.
However, there is still a gap between the detailed understanding of the cellular 
and molecular bases of genetic inheritance and the somewhat informal ideas of 
memetics. A more detailed picture of the mechanisms of cultural transmission 
requires an understanding of how tlie brain processes relevant infoimation. Here, the 
most obvious analogy might be thought to be between molecular genetics and the 
molecular and cellulai' bases of social learning and memory. However, such learning 
can be usefully studied at levels other than the molecular, ranging from purely 
cognitive analyses which say little directly about underlying neural bases, to studies 
that explicitly focus on supra-cellular aspects of how imitative and related processes 
aie executed in the brain, studied through methods such as _/MRi. These 
considerations suggest that because the storage and transmission of culturally 
transmitted information is so physically different to the genetic, it is here that 
scientists studying cultural tiansmission will need to venture further beyond the 
analogies between cultural and biological evolution that have been considered so far. 
Already, one can perceive the beginnings of a ‘social cognitive neuroscience’ that will 
integrate all the required levels of analysis, but this prospect remains in its infancy. 
Here, there is space only to indicate the principal twigs on this branch of the scheme 
sketched in Figure 3.1.
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First, at the neural level, the social learning community (see Hurley & Chater, 
2005) has hailed as highly significant the discovery of ‘miiTor neurons’ in the 
prefrontal cortex of monkeys, which activate both when the monkey observes a 
specific goal-directed hand action, such as grasping an object, and also when the 
monkey performs that same action (Gallese et a l, 1996; Rizzolatti et a l, 1996). This 
match between observation and execution of motor actions has led some researchers 
to suggest that the minor neuron system forms the basis for imitation (Melzhoff & 
Decety, 2003; Rizzolatti et a l, 2002; Williams et a l, 2001), which is one possible 
cultm al transmission mechanism, and theory o f mind (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), 
which has also been argued to be important in human cultiual tiansmission 
(Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et a l, 1993).
However, it has long been argued that rather than single memories or functions 
being determined by single neurons, memory is more likely to be determined by 
patterns of activation within neiual circuits and the resulting connection strengths 
between neuions (Hebb, 1949). Phenomena such as long-term potentiation (Bliss & 
Lomo, 1973) and long-tenn depression (Dunwiddie & Lynch, 1978) offer potential 
electiophysiological mechanisms underpinning certain long-tenn memories (see 
Keysers & Perrett, 2004 for a Hebbian-based model of social cognition). These views 
of memory, in which single neurons are implicated in a range of functions and 
functions are deteimined by more than one neuion, resemble the complexity found in 
the genetic system discussed above, where one gene has a potentially wide range of 
functions and expressions.
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Aunger (2002) has recently attempted to integrate memetics with neuroscience, 
ai'guing that a robust conceptualisation of the ‘meme’ must specify its material basis 
in the brain. Aunger (2002) proposes that memes should be seen as electrochemical 
states of multiple neurons, and offers a definition of a ‘neuromeme’ as “a 
configuration in one node of a neuronal network that is able to induce the replication 
of its state in other nodes” (p. 197). As acknowledged by Aunger (2002), however, 
any attempt to provide a more detailed description and theory of a neuromeme is 
severely limited by the current lack of understanding within neuroscience concerning 
the precise neural and molecular basis of how learned infoimation is stored in the 
brain. One problem specific to the present discussion is that rat and monkey models 
may be limited in their relevance to studying culturally acquired infonnation given 
these species’ limited capacity for culture, while invasive single neuron recordings are 
not performed on humans and other great apes.
Second, the charting of imitation and related processes at the whole brain level 
has focused principally on humans, including the study of neiuological cases such as 
apraxia and its associated imitation deficits (Goldenberg & Heimsdorfer, 2002) and 
/MRi studies of imitation in noimal (lacoboni et al, 2001; Rumiati et a l, 2004) and 
other groups, such as autistic individuals who experience difficulties in imitation 
(Avikainen, Kulomaki, & Hari, 1999).
If neuronal studies have been largely restricted to monlceys, and whole brain 
studies to adult humans, it is research on social learning in great apes and, more 
recently, human childr en that has generated the richest current taxonomies of cultural
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learning, delineating such processes as program-level imitation, emulation and 
affordance learning (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Tomasello et a l, 1993; Want & Harris, 
2002; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Whiten, Homer, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004). 
Cognitive models that seek to explain how these operate have begim to proliferate, but 
remain few and quite crude in comparison to our understanding of genetic 
transmission mechanisms; they include Meltzoff and Moore’s (1997) Active 
Intermodal Matching (AIM), Heyes’ (2005) Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) 
and Byrne’s (1999) String Par sing models. Interestingly, all of these models appeal to 
a foundation of rnirror-neuron function, leading Whiten (2005) to question whether 
they really solve, or instead merely assume solved, the essential ‘correspondence 
problem’ (Nehaniv & Dautenhahn, 2002) of mapping between equivalent actions in a 
model and a cultural learner. Others have explicitly tackled this problem in offering 
neural network models proposed to be capable of learning the appropriate 
correspondences (Keysers & Perrett, 2004; Laland & Bateson, 2001). Keysers and 
Perrett (2004) review data consistent with their hypothesis that in monkeys this is 
achieved by circuits linking premotor area F5, inferior parietal cortex PF/PFG and the 
superior temporal sulcus, and by the homologues of these areas in humans.
3.4.53 Conclusions.
While genetic information is known to be represented in sequences of DNA 
molecules, cultural information is represerrted primarily in the brain. Viewing culture 
as comprised of discrete units of information, or memes, can potentially malce a 
complex system theoretically and empirically tractable, in the same way as the gene 
concept advanced biologists’ understanding of biological evolution. Although memes
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can be characterised as vague entities with flexible and fuzzy boundaries, so can the 
modem concept of the gene. It should be remembered that there was at least 50 years 
of productive investigation into biological microevolution before the molecular basis 
of genetic inlieritance was determined, and even now it is only partly understood. 
Moreover, even if it is revealed that cultural transmission is not particulate, cultural 
evolution may still occm* (Hemich & Boyd, 2002).
A deeper understanding of the neur al and molecular' basis of culturally acquired 
information must rely on technological advances such as neuroimaging techniques. 
However, we should also reserve the possibility that the same cultural infonnation is 
specified by different neural substrates in different brains, severely limiting such 
methods for studying cultural transmission. In this case there may be no cultural 
equivalent to molecular biology, although models and methods examining cultmal 
transmission at the behavioural and cognitive levels can still provide important 
insights.
Delineation of the neural basis of cultural information will also bear on an oft- 
cited disanalogy between biological and cultural evolution, that there is no clear 
equivalent to the genotype-phenotype (or replicator-interactor) distinction in culture. 
Loosely, we can speak of culturally acquired semantic information stored in brains as 
replicators and the expression of that information in behaviour or artifacts as their 
mteractors. However, without further advances in memetics and neuroscience such a 
division is somewhat speculative. It may prove that forcing cultural inheritance too 
tightly into the biological model is in this case improductive (Aunger (2002), for
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example, has developed an altemative model of cultural transmission based on signal 
theory).
The delineation of the genotype-phenotype distinction will also bear on whether 
cultural inheritance can be described as ‘Darwinian’ or ‘Lamarckian’, the former 
maintaining Weismaim’s bander between replicator and interactor, and the latter 
involving the inheritance of acquired phenotypic variation (see also Chapter 2). 
Ultimately, researchers should get too distracted by whether strict analogies to the 
replicator-interactor distinction can be drawn or whether cultural inheritance is 
Darwinian or Lamarckian, especially when the necessary neuropsychological 
evidence is lacking. Many of the methods described elsewhere in this chapter carr be 
pursued despite a poor understanding of cultural tr ansmission at the neural level.
3.4.6Microevolution: General Conclusions
The comparison between biological and cultural microevolution has produced 
mixed results. First, a well-developed body of theory exists which has dr awn on the 
mathematical population genetic models within biology to provide a rigorous and 
successfril analysis of cultmal evolution. This is predominantly the work of gene- 
culture coevolution, although neutral models of genetic drift have recently also been 
successfully applied to cultmal traits.
Second, there is curTently a poor cotTespondence between our imderstanding of 
molecular genetics and the molecular or nemal basis of cultmal inheritance. This is 
primarily due to limitations in the tools of neuroscience, such as imaging techniques,
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which cannot yet reveal exactly how information is acquired by and stored in the 
brain, nor the relationship between models of social learning and models of memory 
(although potential exists to develop fm-ther cognitive models of social learning).
Third, the comparison is also less successful with regard to experimental and 
field studies of cultural microevolution. This is not because of technological 
limitations, rather it is because explicit tests for selection, such as the aitificial 
selection paradigm of population genetics or Endler’s (1986) various tests for 
selection hr natural populations, and quantitative measures of the strength of that 
selection, such as selection gradients, have not been employed. A number of 
opportunities therefore exist for psychologists, field anthropologists, sociologists and 
experimental economists to adapt some of these tools and methods developed in 
biology to the study of cultural evolution.
3.5  D if f e r e n c e s  B e t w e e n  B io l o g ic a l  a n d  C u lt u r a l  E v o l u t io n
Despite the plethora of studies reviewed above, which have been argued can be 
viewed as part of a larger field of cultur al evolution, many of these studies, as well as 
the evolutionary approach in general, have yet to gain acceptance by mainstream 
cultural anthropology and related social sciences. One reason for this resistance is that 
many social scientists see a number of fundamental differences between biological 
and cultural change that they argue invalidate an evolutionary analysis of cultme. We 
have already seen in this and the previous chapter that a number of these purported 
differences, upon closer examination of either the biological or the cultural evidence, 
become either illusory or unimportant to the validity of the comparison (e.g. the
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horizontal transfer of cultural information causing cultural lineages to blend and 
merge (Section 2.5.1); the directed nature of cultural selection (Section 2.5.2); the 
apparent lack of species in culture (Section 2.5.3); the apparent lack of discrete 
particles in culture equivalent to genes (Section 3.4.5.2); and the lack of a clear 
equivalent to the genotype-phenotype distinction (Section 3.4.5.3)). Ultimately, critics 
have yet to empirically demonstrate that these purported differences do in fact 
invalidate an evolutionaiy account of human culture, and moreover explain why many 
of the evolutionary methods discussed above (e.g. the phylogenetic analyses) work 
equally well for both biological and cultural evolution despite such alleged 
differences.
One potentially valid criticism of accounts of cultmal evolution not yet 
addressed is the tieating of all cultural traits as equivalent. Chapters 2 and 3 have 
described beliefs, behaviom*, technological artifacts, languages and social systems as 
examples of a somewhat simplistic notion of the ‘cultural trait’. Undoubtedly, cultmal 
evolutionary processes will sometimes act differently on different fonns of cultmal 
variation, frequently generating distinct evolutionary dynamics for each. It is already 
well established that vertically and horizontally transmitted fraits, confoi*mist 
transmission, and direct and indirect biases will each exhibit different but 
characteristic dynamics (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). The pattern and intensity of 
selection acting on fads and fashions will undoubtedly be quite different from that 
acting on established norms and institutions, hi a sense, this is not too dissimilar to the 
biological case, where altemative tiaits may be subject to different forms of selection, 
and where multi-level selection models are commonplace.
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Plotkin (2002) has flirtheiinore argued that ‘social constructions’, cultural ti'aits 
such as justice or money that only exist because of shared agreement, require a 
fundamentally different explanation to concrete traits such as technological artifacts, 
and have no real equivalent in the biological domain. As ai'gued by Plotkin (2002), 
however, this does not invalidate an evolutionary approach to cultuie, rather it 
requires a different evolutionary treatment to the one developed within biology. An 
evolutionary consideration of social constructions, as well as a detailed taxonomy of 
cultural traits, are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. The important point is 
that deviations from the biological case such as this do not necessaiily invalidate an 
evolutionary approach to culture, they merely require novel treatments of cultural 
phenomena within a single evolutionary fr amework.
3.6  N o n h u m a n  C u l t u r e
This chapter ends by considering the burgeoning literature that has emerged in 
the last few years regarding non-human social learning and culture (see Avital & 
Jablonka, 2000; Byrne et a l, 2004; Fragaszy & Perry, 2003; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; 
Whiten et a l, 2003), which suggest parallels with the human work discussed above. 
Irrespective of the similaiities and differences between human and animal culture, 
here it is asked whether the above methods can fruitfully be employed to study the 
behavioural fraditions of other species.
First, there is evidence from a number of species of behavioural fraditions not 
obviously attributable to genetic or ecological differences, and hence thought to 
constitute socially learned cultural patterns. For example. Whiten et al (1999; 2001)
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documented thirty-nine putative cultmal traits in chimpanzees from various regions of 
Africa, such as tool usage or glooming behaviom*. Similar regional differences 
thought to be cultural in origin have been observed in orangutans (van Schaik et al,
2003) and capuchins (Fragaszy & Perry, 2003; Pen*y et a l, 2003), as well as in the 
vocalisations of birds (Catchpole & Slater, 1995) and mammals (especially cetaceans: 
Janik & Slater, 1997), and behavioural traditions in fishes (Helfrnan & Schultz, 1984; 
Warner, 1990). There are obvious parallels here with the databases compiled by 
cultural antliropologists documenting worldwide geographical variation in human 
culture.
Second, Mercader, Panger and Boesch (2002) have used tiaditional 
aichaeological techniques to excavate a site in Africa used by chimpanzees for at least 
the past 20 years to crack nuts using stone hammers and wooden anvils. Considerable 
evidence of past nut-cracking behaviour was imcovered, specifically nutshell and 
fr actured stone, the latter of which the authors claimed was indistinguishable fr om a 
subset of the earliest and simplest stone tool assemblages left by hominid ancestors. 
Although the finds were probably very recent compared with the cultural artifacts 
studied by archaeologists, this study suggests that the same methods can potentially 
be used to micover evidence of past non-human cultural behaviour.
Third, a number of studies have tracked the diffusion of imiovations within non­
human commimities, paralleling the reseaich tr adition of the same name for human 
technology (Rogers, 1995). The most famous case is the diffusion of potato washing 
in a community of Japanese macaques (Kawai, 1965). Lefebwe (1995) found that 16
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of 21 reported cases of the diffusion of foraging innovations in primates exhibit a 
rapid accelerating pattern of adoption characteristic of cultural transmission (an 
example of which is the S-shaped distribution reported by Rogers, 1995), although 
Laland and Kendal (2003) and Reader (2004) have expressed reservations about 
inferring learning mechanisms from diffusion cm*ves. Perhaps such studies could 
benefit from the refinements advocated above for the equivalent human work.
Fourth, population genetic modelling has been used to analyse patterns of non- 
hmnan culture, specifically bird song. Lynch and Baker (1993) found that the 
geographical distribution of chaffinch songs can be accounted for by a neutral model 
in which mutation, migration and drift are at equilibrium. Lachlan and Slater (1999) 
adopted a gene-cultiue coevolution technique devised by Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 
(1976) to find that vocal learning can be maintained in a ‘cultural trap’ formed by the 
interaction between genes (which specify the consfraints on songs) and culture (the 
songs themselves). Gene-culture coevolutionaiy methods have also been used to 
explore how song learning might affect spéciation (Beltman, Haccou, & ten Cate,
2004) and the evolution of brood pai asitism (Beltman, Haccou, & ten Cate, 2003).
Fifth, the experimental transmission chain method devised by Bartlett (1932) 
has been used to study the social learning of mobbing in blackbirds (Curio, Ernst, & 
Vieth, 1978b) and food preferences in rats (Laland & Plotkin, 1990, 1993). Jacobs 
and Campbell’s (1961) replacement method has been used to study the transmission 
of food preferences in rats (Galef & Allen, 1995) and route preference in guppies 
(Laland & Williams, 1997,1998).
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The above studies demonstrate that many of the same methods used to 
investigate biological evolution or human cultmal evolution can be applied to non­
human culture. Studying human and non-human culture within the same theoretical 
framework is likely to provide important insights into the evolutionary origins of, and 
psychological mechanisms miderpimiing, human culture.
3.7  C o n c l u sio n s
The evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that much potential exists for a 
comprehensive science of cultural evolution with broadly the same structure as the 
science of biological evolution, as outlined in Figure 3.1. This potential is aheady 
being realised for the study of cultmal macroevolution and the mathematical 
modelling of cultural microevolution, with methods developed within evolutionaiy 
biology, such as phylogenetic analyses and population genetic models, being applied 
to cultural data. One area, the study of the neural basis of cultural transmission, is 
dependent on further advances in nemoimaging and other new teclmologies. Finally, a 
number of opportunities exist for psychologists, sociologists and experimental 
economists to adopt the methods and tools developed in population genetics to 
experimentally simulate cultural microevolution, and detect cultural evolution ‘in the 
wild’.
We have also seen some examples where the explicit adoption of an 
evolutionary framework or evolutionary methods has provided significant advances 
over fraditional non-evolutionary methods. For example, phylogenetic analyses have 
provided a solution for Gabon’s problem when comparmg societies related by
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descent, and evolutionaiy ‘population thinking’ allows more accurate descriptions of 
aichaeological artifacts than does an essentialist perspective.
One reason why evolutionary biology has been relatively successful is that a 
unifying evolutionary framework encourages and stimulates cross-disciplinary work. 
Some cross-disciplinary boiTowing has already been seen in the study of cultural 
macroevolution, with phylogenetic methods increasingly used in both archaeology 
and cultmal antliropology. More such bonowing is anticipated as gieater numbers of 
researchers adopt the evolutionary framework outlined here. For example, 
experimental studies of cultural transmission would do well to explicitly test the 
predictions of theoretical models, and in tmn empirical findings should be used to 
infonn the assumptions of such models. Experimental work might also simulate the 
findings of archaeologists and antliropologists to detemiine the possible transmission 
mechanisms underlying certain historical and geographical macroevolutionary 
patterns.
In the above sections it has been argued that the study of culture would benefit 
fi’om the adoption of a number of methods and approaches developed within 
evolutionary biology. This should not be taken, however, as advocating the slavish 
and dogmatic imitation of evolutionary biology. Cultural inheritance is undoubtedly 
different in many respects from biological inheritance, and novel mathematical 
analyses and empirical investigations into cultmal dynamics that deviate from the 
biological case are necessaiy. As noted above, cultural phenomena such as social 
representations have yet to be dealt with in evolutionary tenus. At the same time.
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however, these deviations do not invalidate an evolutionaiy framework. For example, 
subtle refinements of ti aditional biological methods have been found to enhance the 
validity of the mathematical modelling tradition described in Section 3.4.1.2.
Furtheimore, despite the impression perhaps given in this chapter, we should 
also bear in mind that evolutionary biology is, like any other science, far from perfect 
and is continually changing and updating its methods. Indeed, evolutionary biologists 
may well benefit from considering altemative evolutionary systems to their own, or 
from utilising methods developed by social scientists.
hi short, the fact that culture exhibits a number of key Dai*winian properties 
allows us to use evolutionaiy biology as a model for integratmg a multitude of 
separate disciplines within the social sciences, and where appropriate bonow some of 
the methods developed by evolutionary biologists to solve similar problems. Putting 
dispaiate studies from presently unconnected disciplines together into a broad 
evolutionaiy context adds value to each of the individual studies, because it illustrates 
that the degiee of progress in this area is fai* more impressive that hitherto conceived. 
These studies could not yet be said to be aligned with a unified ‘movement’. 
Nonetheless, the above exercise implies that if such an evolutionary movement could 
be better co-ordinated, a more persuasive and important direction could be put on 
much work m the social sciences.
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Part B - Cultural Transmission
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In Part A it was argued that human cultuie evolves according to Darwinian 
principles, and that this evolutionary framework stimulates and integrates a number of 
diverse empirical lines of investigation. Parts B and C represent two of these 
empirical approaches - two of the branches of Figure 3.1. Part B concerns the 
experimental study of human cultural tiansmission, in which Bartlett’s (1932) 
transmission chain method is used to test for a number of hypothesised tiansmission 
biases. Such experiments roughly conespond to experimental population biologists’ 
attempts to simulate biological inheritance in laboratory populations of study species. 
Like these biologists’ experiments, the experiments presented in Part B are highly 
simplified compared with reality. Viewed within the context of a larger evolutionary 
framework, however, experimental studies of small-scale cultural transmission are 
essential for a full understanding of large-scale evolutionary change.
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CHAPTER 4 - L it e r a t u e e  R ev iew
4.1 In t r o d u c t io n
A key concept in Part A was cultural transmission, defined as the passing of 
some trait or characteristic from one individual to another through social learning. 
The evolutionary theory of culture presented in Chapter 2, like Darwin’s (1859) 
theory of biological evolution, is dependent on the transmission (or inheritance) of 
information from individual to individual (Section 2.4.3). Consequently, Chapter 3 
identified the experimental study of cultural tiansmission as a vital part of a complete 
science of cultural evolution (Section 3.4.2).
This relationship between cultmal transmission and evolution was also 
recognised by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), who noted that:
.. .theories of cultural transmission and evolution can, to some extent, 
be developed independently of each other, although for a complete 
theory of cultural evolution rules of cultural transmission are essential. 
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981, p.54)
The reason that “rules of cultural transmission are essential” is that, as 
recognised by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and also Boyd and Richerson 
(1985), cultural transmission can be very different from biological inheritance, with 
its own unique transmission rules that may produce very different evolutionary 
dynamics. This would therefore necessitate a body of data from which such 
transmission rules and biases can be inferred. Although these authors do attempt to 
draw on empirical studies where possible, they are hindered by first an overall lack of
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such data, and second the lack of a single discipline dedicated to the study of cultural 
transmission. As a result, researchers interested in cultmal transmission and evolution 
ai e forced to draw on isolated pockets of research that are disconnected both from one 
another and from a wider theory of human cultm e.
The aim of this literatme review is to bring together and critically evaluate 
studies of cultmal transmission from a nmnber of diverse disciplines (psychology, 
sociology, antliropology, economics, biology and archaeology) which use a nmnber of 
different methodologies. Section 4.2 concerns the simplest experimental paradigm, 
the ‘transmission chain method’, followed by a discussion of the more group-based 
‘replacement method’ (Section 4.3). We then examine the use of the transmission 
chain method within economics (Section 4.4) and with non-human species (Section 
4.5). This is followed by a discussion of the related fields of mmour transmission 
(Section 4.6) and the diffusion of imiovations (Section 4.7), both of which use a more 
natmalistic, less experimental approach to study cultmal transmission. Finally, in 
Section 4.8 archaeological data is reviewed which can be used to infer historical 
transmission chains. The review concludes in Section 4.9 by identifying potentially 
fruitful lines of investigation that have arisen from these studies, some of which are 
then pursued in subsequent chapters.
4.2 T he  T r a n sm issio n  C h a in  M e t h o d
The transmission chain method represents the simplest experimental procedure 
for studying cultmal tiansmission. The method is similar to the children’s games 
‘Chinese Whispers’ or ‘Broken Telephone’, and is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The first
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participant in the chain reads or hears some material, and then attempts to recall it. 
This recall is then given to the second participant, who does the same. Their recall is 
passed on to the third participant, and so on along the chain. The changes that occur in 
the material can then be studied, as well as comparisons of the rates at which different 
material degrades. Although highly simplified compared with real human culture, the 
tiansmission chain method affords a high degree of experimental control and, as will 
be seen below, has the potential to provide important contributions to the study of 
human cultural transmission. Indeed, it has been described by Plotkin (1995) as “close 
to an experiment tailor-made for those interested in cultuie” (p. 219).
O  = 1 participant
Original
material
Generation
A
Chain
Figure 4.1 - A schematic representation of the transmission chain design. Each circle 
represents one participant. In this design, the original stimulus material is passed 
along four replicate chains (A-D), each comprising four generations (F1-F4)
4.2.1 Sir Frederic Bartlett
The transmission chain method has its origin in the work of Bartlett (1932), 
who, in his classic book Remembering, devised the transmission chain method (which 
he called the ‘method of serial reproduction’) and described a series of ti*ansmission
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chain studies. One of Bartlett’s (1932) main objectives was to move away from the 
abstract, asocial methods of studying memory at that time, such as having pailicipants 
memorise sequences of numbers or nonsense letter strings, and towards a more 
ecologically valid method. He therefore used more meaningful stimulus material,, such 
as stories, and devised the transmission chain method to study the social aspects of 
memory. Bartlett (1932) was also aware, however, of the wider implications of his 
ti ansmission chain method for studying human cultui'e:
Elements of culture, or cultural complexes, pass from person to person 
within a gi'oup, or from group to group, and, eventually reaching a 
thoroughly conventionalised form, may take an established place in the 
general mass of culture possessed by a specific group. (Bartlett, 1932,
p. 118)
Bai tlett’s (1932) precise method consisted of a participant reading the material 
through twice at normal reading speed, then performing a distractor task for 15-30 
minutes before recalling the material. That material was then taken by Bartlett (1932) 
and given to the next participant in the chain, who went thiough the same procedure, 
as did each participant in the chain. The material that Bartlett (1932) reports results 
for are two folk tales, The Wai* of the Ghosts’ (from native American culture) and 
The Son who Tried to Outwit his Father’ (from the Congo); passages describing a 
cricket match, an air raid and how to play tennis; a joke; two arguments; and a series 
of pictures. The participants were predominantly Cambridge undergiaduates, with 
some replications with undergi aduates fr om India.
A general finding for all of the material and participants was that the material 
rapidly became considerably shorter in length and lost much of its detail, with only
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the overall gist being preserved. A second general finding was that participants tended 
to distort the material to make it more coherent and consistent with their own pre­
existing knowledge. The War of the Ghosts, for example, contained many 
snpematnial elements that were nonsensical to the English participants, and were 
subsequently removed or replaced with more familiar events. These two processes, 
loss of detail and rationalisation, led Bartlett (1932) to propose that remembering is 
primarily a reconstructive process, and hai'dly ever a process of exact replication. 
Only the gist or overall impression of the material is preserved, and rebuilt around 
pre-existing knowledge structures, or schemas. It was also found that the folk stories 
were transmitted with greater accuracy than any of the other material, which Bartlett 
(1932) explained by arguing that people already possess story schemas, that contain 
the structm e of a typical folk tale, thus aiding recall.
Although Bartlett’s (1932) work was groimdbreaking, it can also be criticised 
on a number of grounds. First, his analyses are entirely subjective and qualitative, 
with no attempt at quantitative or statistical analyses. Second, details of the precise 
methodology that he used are sketchy at best. No detail of the distractor task is given, 
nor why it varied in length from 15-30 minutes. No mention is made of the 
instructions given to the participants, or whether they were standardised, despite the 
use of several different experimenters. Indeed, Gauld and Stephenson (1967) fomid 
that instructing participants to reproduce only information that they were absolutely 
certain was in the original led to significantly fewer eiTors in transmission of War of 
the Ghosts. Third, Bartlett’s (1932) conclusions were all drawn on single chains. He 
himself notes that “...the main turning points [in the reproductions] are the work of
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individual interests or idiosyncrasy, and in the total social product the outstanding 
individual can be shown to have played a crucial part.” (p. 126). Surely it is improper 
to draw general conclusions about human cultural transmission if the data are so 
susceptible to individual idiosyncrasies. Such idiosyncrasies also make independent 
replication of experimental findings impossible.
4.2.2 Early Transmission Chain Studies
Dming the 30 years following Bartlett’s (1932) Remembering, a series of 
transmission chain studies were published, primarily in the British Journal o f 
Psychology (probably due in part to Bartlett’s position as editor of that journal). These 
studies all shared Bartlett’s (1932) general methodology but varied in the material 
used or participants tested. A brief summary of these studies is now given.
Noithway (1936) studied the transmission of three stories tlirough chains of 10, 
14 and 15 year old children. Like Bartlett, Northway (1936) found that “the essential 
situation and broad outline of the story is preserved” (p. 21), and unfamiliar events 
were omitted or took a more familiar form. Unlike Bartlett (1932), there was an 
attempt to quantify the recall, although only gross differences between whole chains 
were examined, rather than within-chain generational changes, and statistical tests 
were not applied. Nevertheless, there were trends towards the younger children and 
children from state schools showing more invention and less accuracy than older 
children and children from private schools.
I l l
Maxwell (1936) investigated the transmission of a murder story containing 
several errors through chains of different participants, including students, priests, 
soldiers and children, with the intent that the different participants would respond 
differently to the mistakes. For example, the priests should be more likely to corxect 
an erxor concerning the time of Mass. All of the groups preserved the mur der incident, 
although from what can be ascertained without any quantitative or statistical analyses 
of the results, there seemed to be very few systematic differences between the groups. 
Talland (1956) similarly investigated whether participant differences affected the 
transmission of texts, this time comparing students from six different Western nations. 
There were some group differences, the strongest occurxing for a description of a 
cricket match, which all groups except the English reproduced extremely poorly, 
except the Americans who distorted it into baseball. Participants from Catholic 
countries transmitted a description of priesthood more accurately, although an 
historical account of the 15^^^  century French invasion of Italy showed little differential 
distortion by French and Italian participants, against the author’s prediction. Although 
Talland (1956) did attempt to quantify recall by dividing the texts into ‘units of 
content’, these were not accmately defined and were not subsequently used to 
statistically compare the groups.
Tresselt and Spragg (1941) examined whether previous experience of 
information increased its likelihood of later replication. Chains of participants were 
first presented with one of two anthropological texts concerning traditional pottery: 
half of the chains read Passage A, concerning technical aspects of how traditional 
societies made pottery, and half read Passage B, describing the religious significance
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of pottery. These were not recalled. All chains then received a novel Passage C that 
contained within it elements of both Passages A and B. This passage was recalled, and 
reproduced along the chain. It was found that, as predicted, elements from Passage A 
were preserved for more generations in the chains that had previously read Passage A, 
compared with controls who had read neither A or B, Reading Passage B, however, 
yielded no preference in transmission for B elements. Although the authors intended 
that the two passages would be identical in impact, it seems that the technological 
information (Passage A) had a greater priming effect than religious infoimation 
(Passage B), although this is somewhat speculative given the limited nature of this 
investigation. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that previously experienced infoimation is 
transmitted with greater fidelity than novel information wanants further investigation.
Ward (1949) attempted perhaps the most innovative use of the transmission 
chain method of this period, by experimentally simulating the actual transmission of 
an artefact through histoiy. Wai'd (1949) obtained a series of coin designs found 
across Bui'ope, whose dates suggested that the design originated in Macedonia in 
approximately 350 BC and proceeded to be copied through France and England, 
reaching Yorkshire circa 50 BC. The original Macedonian design was then used as the 
starting point in a series of laboratory transmission chains, the results of which were 
compared witli the historical artifact chain. Although Ward (1949) claimed that 
changes in his experimental reproductions did indeed minor actual changes in the 
historical artefacts, there was unfoitimately no quantitative analysis, and the few 
reproductions that were published in tlie paper are somewhat unconvincing.
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Nevertheless, the idea of experimentally simulating the actual hansmission of an 
artefact is intriguing, and warrants more detailed investigation.
Bartlett (1932) also studied the transmission of pictorial stimuli, concluding that 
the same process of loss of detail and confoimity to pre-existing knowledge that he 
found for verbal material applied equally to pictorial stimuli. He also found that the 
title or label of a picture can significantly affect its transmission. For example, an 
abstract squiggle that was labelled ‘portrait d’homme’ giadually acquired face-like 
qualities. These findings were replicated by Hall (1951) with different stimuli. For 
example, when a picture of a dog containing stars was labelled ‘dog’, it gradually lost 
the stars and retained the dog-like outline during transmission, but when labelled 
‘constellation’ the stars were retained and emphasised and it lost its dog-like shape.
Around the same time as these studies, a slightly modified version of the 
transmission chain method was being used by researchers in the United States who 
were interested in how rumours spread through societies. This work originated in 
attempts by the U.S. government during the Second World War* to control the spread 
of rumours that could potentially damage public morale and reduce support for the 
war. Allport and Postman (1947) presented the first participant, and only the first 
participant, with a picture or photograph, and instmcted them to describe what they 
could see to the second participant. The second participant then retold that description 
to the third participant, who told tire forrrth, and so on down the chain. Like Bartlett 
(1932), they found that the descriptions rapidly lost detail (‘leveling’), certain salient 
features were emphasised (‘sharpening’), and the descriptions were distorted
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according to the participants’ pre-existing expectations or prejudices (‘assimilation’). 
For example, in one trial a picture of a white man thr eatening a black man with a 
razor became distorted according to the white participants’ prejudicial notions of 
black people as criminal and dangerous, so that after a few generations the black man 
was holding the razor and threatening the white man. Again, however, only single 
chains were rnn, making it difficult to draw any general conclusions, and Allpori and 
Postman (1947) report performing their studies as part of their university lectures, 
with each reproduction relayed out loud in front of an audience, hardly ideal 
experimental conditions.
Brissey (1961) used a similar design to Allport and Postman (1947), except that 
instead of pictures, the first participant in the chain watched a film of a car crash, and 
then wrote a description of the film. This description was passed on to the second 
participant to recall, and so on down 36 chains of five participants each, representing 
a significant advance on the previous single-chain studies. Recall accuracy was scored 
at each point in the chains by participants rating as tnre or false a series of statements 
concerning the original film. It was found that both the number of corxect and 
incorxect trxie/false responses decreased with generation, due to a marked increase in 
omitted responses. There was a general effect, then, of omission rather than distortion. 
It was also found that items rated by non-participating independent judges as most 
important were least likely to be omitted during transmission than items rated less 
important.
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Several conclusions can be drawn from these early studies from the thirty-year 
period following Bartlett’s (1932) original experiments. First, there is universal 
confirmation of Bartlett’s (1932) original findings that there is a general reduction in 
the length of the material, that much of the detail is lost, and only the overall 
impression or gist of the text is preserved. Second, most of the studies also 
unfortunately inherited the flaws from Bartlett’s (1932) work, specifically a lack of 
quantitative or statistical analyses, poorly specified experimental proceduie, and a 
reliance on single chains that are vulnerable to individual idiosyncrasies or 
breakdowns. However, the fact that the general results just mentioned were found 
across all studies despite these shortcomings suggests that they are robust. These 
authors should also not be criticised too harshly for not adopting standards of 
scientific practice that seem obvious today but had yet to become standard practice 
when the studies were carried out. There were occasional attempts at quantitative 
, analysis (Talland, 1956) and the use of multiple chains (Brissey, 1961). Even in the 
absence of these, however, there remain many innovative ideas, such as Ward’s 
(1949) recreation of an actual historical transmission chain, or Tresselt and Spragg’s 
(1941) study of the effect of priming on transmission.
4.2.3 Recent Transmission Chain Studies
As time passed, tiansmission chain studies benefited from modem scientific 
standards, such as the reporting of standardised experimental procedures, the use of 
statistics, and sample sizes large enough to yield significant results. However, there 
was also a marked decline in the popularity of the transmission chain method, perhaps 
due to the rise of cognitive psychology during this period, which has tended to ignore
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social processes. Conversely, social psychologists are often suspicions or hostile of 
highly simplified simulations of reality, of which these experiments aie prime 
examples (see Chapter 12). Only in the last few years has the transmission chain 
method been used by a handful of reseai'chers interested in tlie experimental study of 
social tiansmission and culture.
Kurke, Weick and Ravlin (1989) introduced an innovative twist to the 
transmission chain method. Following transmission down a chain of participants, the 
final product was sent back up the same chain to see whether the infonnation that had 
been lost could be restored. The intention was to see whether the degradation that 
occurs to instructions when they are passed down organisational command chains can 
be reversed. In the first phase of the study, five participants, A-E, perfoimed the 
tiansmission chain method as per Bartlett (1932) using War of the Ghosts as the 
starting material. Participant E’s recall was then given back to participant D, who was 
instructed to use it to reconstruct the original version that he or she had read 
previously. This reconstinction was then passed on to participant C who did the same, 
and so on back to participant A. The result was that each generation restored a large 
part of the infoimation they had lost the first time around. This is illustrated by the 
mean numbers of ‘infonnation units’ (a measure of recall similar to Kintsch’s (1974) 
propositions: see below) recalled by each generation: moving down the chain 
produced means for A->B->C->D->E of 67.6—>49.7-^39.9—>30.9-^24.9, while 
moving back up E ->D ^C ^B ->A  gave means of 24.9-^29.7-^37.7->46.9->63.2. 
Despite this apparent restoration of infonnation, the final restored generation (63.2) 
contained significantly fewer units than the first (67.6), indicating that some
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information had been lost. The two did not significantly differ, however, in the 
number of themes (a more gross measure of recall, roughly defined as an important 
element of the plot). So although some of the finer details were not restored, it was 
possible to reconstmct the more general themes of the story by passing the recall back 
thi'ough the chain. It should be noted, however, that when the material was passed 
back up the chain, the participants had already read and recalled a previous version of 
the material, and the second reconstituted material would be acting as a cue for earlier 
recall.
Two other recent studies both used the transmission chain method to investigate 
gender stereotyping. Kashima (2000a) had twelve chains of five generations each 
transmit a single story containing both stereotype-consistent (SC) and stereotype- 
inconsistent (SI) behaviour. An example of the latter was a husband staying home to 
prepare dinner while his wife goes out chinking, hiterestingly, although the first two 
generations were more likely to recall SI than SC infonnation, in the final two 
generations this trend was reversed, with better recall of SC information. Kashima 
(2000) used this finding to argue that gender stereotyping only occurs ‘collectively’. 
The effect was in fact due to the different degmdation rates of the two types of 
material: although SI information was initially recalled more accurately, it then 
undeiwent faster degmdation than the SC infoimation, so that by the last two 
generations it had fallen below the SC recall level. It is not clear, however, why the 
two should have different rates of degradation, and whether they are independent of 
each other, that is, whether SI infoimation has a steep degradation curve in the 
absence of SC information, or whether both types of material must be present in the
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same chain. In any case, the process of cultural tiansmission shows effects that cannot 
be predicted by patterns of individual recall, demonstiating the benefit of the 
transmission chain method compaied with standard single-generation memory 
studies. It was also found that the instmctions given, either emphasising accuracy of 
recall or instructing the participant to reproduce the story as if they were telling 
someone else, had no effect on transmission.
Bangerter (2000) similarly used the transmission chain method to test whether 
participants’ gender stereotypes would distort a scientific text describing conception. 
Twenty chains each containing four participants were run. Two statistically 
significant effects were found. First, the spenn and ovum described in the text were 
anthropomoiphised, moving from the object to the subject position of sentences. 
Second, the spenn tended to be given an active role and the ovum a passive role, 
which Bangerter (2000) argued was the result of gender stereotyping. However, the 
link between descriptions of sex cells and gender stereotyping might be a little 
tenuous, and perhaps a more plausible explanation might be that the participants were 
applying their folk biological knowledge that ‘things with tails swim’, and ‘things 
with no appendages’ do not. This might also explain why Bangerter (2000) found no 
effect of individual differences in gender stereotypmg.
4.2.4 Tf'ansmission Chain Studies: Conclusions
These later studies demonstrate that the transmission chain method can be a 
valid means of testing hypotheses concerning human cultmal transmission. Bartlett’s 
(1932) original method can be updated to meet modem standards of scientific
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practice, specifically by the use of multiple parallel chains, quantitative and statistical 
analyses, and properly standardised and contiolled methodology. The modem studies 
also confrnn the earlier general findings of a reduction in length and loss of detail that 
occui'S during transmission. One general limitation of this method, however, lies in 
the linearity of the one-to-one chains. Actual cultmal transmission may frequently 
involve more than one model and more than one receiver, and to study these more 
group-based aspects of transmission a slightly different methodology is needed. 
Before moving on to discuss such a method, there are two general points to be made 
conceming the quantitative analysis and the distractor task.
Although one of the first results to be foimd using the transmission chain 
method was that only the gist or overall meaning of material is preserved, with the 
loss of surface detail, there is still no real consensus on how to represent this 
underlying meaning for the purposes of a quantitative mialysis. Text is usually divided 
into ‘idea units’ or ‘propositions’, although these are often defined differently from 
study to study. It is suggested here that the quantitative analysis of material should 
take advantage of Kintsch’s (1974) prepositional analysis that seems ideally suited to 
the task. Kintsch (1974) proposed that the underlying meaning of text can be 
represented by propositions, which consist of a single predicate and a series of 
ordered ai'guments. The predicate is a relational teim, such as a verb or adjective, that 
describes the linlcs between the arguments, which are the agents, objects or other 
propositions in the text. For example, the sentence “Mary balces a cake” would be 
written as
(BAKE, MARY, CAKE)
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where BAKE is the predicator and MARY and CAKE are the arguments. 
Because the precise wording of the proposition as written in Standard English is 
unimportant for the prepositional representation, the proposition above could equally 
represent “Maiy is baking a cake” or “A cake is being baked by Mary”, as well as 
“Mary bakes a cake”.
Evidence for the psychological reality of propositions was provided by 
Bransford and Franks (1971), who found that participants could not discriminate 
between sentences that they had and had not previously heard when those sentences 
were composed of the same underlying propositions, Kintsch and Keenan (1973), 
meanwhile, found that the number of propositions in a sentence determined its 
reading time, independently of the number of words in the sentence. Ratcliff and 
McKoon (1978) found a greater priming effect for two words taken from the same 
proposition than for two words from the same sentence but different propositions. 
This effect remained even when the two within-proposition words were further apart 
in the surface stmctuie of the sentence than the between-proposition word pair. 
Finally, Goetz, Anderson and Schallert (1981) found that when participants recalled 
sentences containing thr ee propositions, for over 90% of the words recalled, if one 
part of the proposition (the predicate or an argument) was recalled, the rest of the 
proposition was also recalled. That is, propositions tended to be recalled in an all-or- 
nothing or particulate fashion. Propositional analysis is, therefore, an empirically 
supported and theoretically ideal method of quantifying the information present at 
each generation of a transmission chain.
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Another general point concerns the distractor task. The studies described above 
all vary in whether they use a distiactor between reading and recalling the material, 
and if so, the type of distraction used and its duration, with no discernable effects on 
their results. For example, both Baitlett (1932) and Northway (1936) used the story 
The War of the Ghosts, the former using a 15-30 minute distractor, the latter using 
none, with reportedly identical results. Indeed, at no point in any of the studies is the 
purpose of the distractor mentioned. It could be that its purpose is to eliminate 
primacy or recency effects that have been shown to affect short term memory, but 
Northway (1936) found neither of these effects in her results, and Bartlett’s (1932) 
theory of memory predicts that simple effects apparent for lists of nonsense words, 
such as primacy or recency, will not apply to meaningful stimuli. Perhaps, then, the 
distractor task should be abandoned unless there is a clear rationale for including it.
4.3 T h e  R e p l a c e m e n t  M e t h o d
In the replacement method, originally proposed by Gerard et al. (1956), a norm 
or bias is established in a group of participants and one by one these participants are 
replaced with new, untrained participants (see Figure 4.2). Each replacement 
represents one ‘cultural generation’. The degree to which the norm remains in the 
population during successive replacements/generations hence represents a measure of 
its transmission to the new members.
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Figure 4.2 - A schematic representation of the replacement method. The first 
generation, comprising participants A-D, completes the experimental task. In the 
second generation participant A is replaced with a new participant E, and the group
(B-E) completes the task again. This replacement is repeated for each generation.
Jacobs and Campbell (1961) used the replacement method to study the 
persistence of an artificially exaggerated perceptual judgement of the ‘auto-kinetic 
effect’. The auto-kinetic effect is a perceptual illusion in which a stationary point of 
light is perceived as constantly moving a few centimetres when viewed in an 
otherwise pitch-black room. In earlier work by Sherif (1936), a group of participants 
were all shown this illusion, and asked one by one to estimate how much they thought 
the light was moving. The group was in fact composed of only one genuine 
participant, the rest being confederates of the experimenter who had been instructed to 
give unrealistically exaggerated estimates of the light’s movement. Sherif s (1936) 
now-classic finding was that the majority of the participants he tested gave similar 
estimates to the confederates despite that estimate being obviously false, illustrating 
the powerful effect of conformity in group settings. Jacobs and Campbell (1961)
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repeated Shérifs (1936) experiment with the addition that, after each round of 
estimating, one group member was replaced with a new naïve participant. Significant 
evidence of the inculcated noim was found for about four or five generations after the 
replacement of all of the confederates, after which the perceptual judgement returned 
to that exhibited by naïve control groups. A follow-up investigation by Zucker (1977), 
using the same methodology, found that transmission of the arbitrary norm increased 
in fidelity when the participants were given instmctions emphasising membership of 
an institution or organisation.
Weick and Gilfillan (1971) used the replacement method with a different task. 
Participants in a group had to individually call out numbers, without being able to 
hear the other members’ numbers, so that the sum total of all group members’ 
numbers equalled a specified target value. Groups were taught either hard or easy 
strategies for coordinating their responses, and members were replaced in the normal 
way after each trial. As predicted, Weick and Gilfillan (1971) found that the easy 
strategies persisted for about eight generations after the last trained member had been 
replaced, while the difficult strategies were hardly tr ansmitted at all, demonstrating 
that high fidelity tr ansmission of problem-solving strategies is possible when the 
strategy is both effective and easy to implement.
Insko et a l (1980), meanwhile, used the replacement method to study the 
trading of goods. Three groups of four participants each were taught to produce 
different products, specifically paper models, and earnings would be maximised if 
these different products were combined, encouraging trade. One group was placed in
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a position of economic and communicative superiority: its products were more 
valuable than the other two groups, and all trade had to be conducted thr ough it. After 
each round of trading, one member of each group was replaced with a new 
participant, with a total of nine replacements (generations). The results showed that 
while the dominant group earned more than the other two groups, all groups increased 
their earnings over the generations. This increased productivity can be attributed to 
increasingly efficient trading and division of labour, rules conceming which were 
being transmitted to each new generation, hrsko et al (1980) also noted that seniority 
rxiles for leadership (i.e. that the member who had been in the group the longest took 
charge of trading and production) were also transmitted to each new generation.
In a follow-up study, Insko et al. (1983) found that the trading model 
implemented above was more productive than a situation in which the central 
advantaged group was additionally allowed to confiscate the products of the other two 
groups. Productivity was gr*eater both for the two subordinate groups and for the 
central group. A key feature of both of these studies is that imlike the studies 
described above, the transmitted cultiue was not arbitrary or introduced by the 
experimenter, it was a functional response to enviromnental conditions produced and 
maintained by the participants themselves. This introduction of selection pressures 
also resulted in an increase in complexity that is characteristic of some aspects of 
long-term evolutionary change in biological species, in contrast to the degradation or
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loss of complexity that has been repeatedly found by the transmission chain studies 
described above^.
A slightly different version of the replacement method was adopted by Rose 
and Felton (1955), who had three groups of tlrree participants discuss their 
interpretation of two Rorschach ink-blots in nine successive 16 minute sessions 
(‘generations’). Between each generation participants were swapped from group to 
group in order to see how cultural transmission, in this case of ink-blot interpretations, 
occurred under conditions of migration. The somewhat surprising result was that 
closed societies in which no participant migration occurxed were significantly more 
productive in generating interpretations than open societies in which members 
frequently switched groups.
More recently, Baum et al. (2004) have used the replacement method to study 
the transmission of traditions in an anagram-solving task. Groups of participants could 
choose to solve an anagram printed on either red or blue card. The red anagrams gave 
a small immediate payoff, while the blue anagrams gave a larger payoff but were 
followed by a ‘time-out’ during which no anagrams could be solved. By manipulating 
the length of this time-out, the experimenters were able to determine which of the two
 ^ Note that an increase in complexity in biological evolution is meant only in a broad 
sense, such as the successive transitional stages o f Szathmary and Maynard Smith (1995), and 
in no way implies that an increase in complexity is inevitable or ineversible.
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anagrams gave the highest overall payoff (i.e. where the blue time-out was short, blue 
was optimal, and where the blue time-out was long, red was optimal). Every 12 
minutes one member of the group was replaced with a new participant. It was found 
that traditions emerged, defined by whichever choice gave the highest payoff under 
each experimental condition (the optimal choice), with existing group members 
instructing new members in this optimal tradition by transmitting either accurate or 
inaccurate information about payoffs, or through coercion.
The replacement method offers a useful complement to the transmission chain 
method. Whereas the transmission chain method has been mainly used to study the 
transmission of complex verbal material along one-to-one chains, the replacement 
method has been used to study the emergence and persistence of group-wide 
behavioural traditions. The replacement method is therefore more suited to 
investigating the effects of social/interpersonal factors on cultmal tiansmission, such 
as confoimity (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961) and power (Insko et a l, 1980).
4.4  INTERGENERATIONAL ECONOMIC GAMES
A recent development in the field of experimental economics is the use of 
intergenerational games to study the transmission of behavioural traditions along 
chains of participants, much like the transmission chain method employed by 
psychologists.
For example, Schotter and Sopher (2003) had successive pairs of participants 
play the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ game, in which two players must choose one of two
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possible options without communication. The payoffs were determined by two rales. 
First, if the players chose different options, then neither player got any payoff, while 
if both players chose the same option, then they both got a payoff. Second, the two 
options differed in their payoffs to the two players: if both players chose the first 
option, then Player 1 got a larger payoff than Player 2, wliile if both players chose the 
second option, then Player 2 got the lar ger payoff. Hence the first rale encouraged the 
players to cooperate in coordinating tlieir responses, while the second rule created a 
conflict in that one player will always get a lar ger payoff than the other. Transmission 
between successive generations was effected by giving each pair two sources of 
information from the previous pair(s) in the transmission chain. This was either a 
behavioural history of every previous generation (i.e. which option was chosen by 
previous players and what outcomes they received) or explicit verbal advice given by 
the previous generation as to which option they should choose and why. After 
approximately 50 generations one of these two sour ces of information was removed, 
to assess their independent effects.
Schotter and Sopher (2003) foimd that the repeated games exhibited clear 
conventions, which the authors likened to the pattern of punctuated equilibrium seen 
in the fossil record. Hence there were long periods during which both players chose 
one of the options, followed by a brief period of instability and rapid change, followed 
by a long period dming which both players again chose a single option. This tendency 
to coordinate over many generations was attributed to the role of advice: removing the 
option to view the behavioural history of previous generations had no significant 
effect, while removing the explicit advice from the previous generation significantly
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disrupted the stable conventions. Schotter and Sopher (2003) also obtained players’ 
guesses of which option their paitner would choose, and hence which option the 
player should choose to maximise their payoff. In those cases where this rational 
choice conflicted with the choice recommended in the advice, half of the players 
selected the latter. These results suggest that conformity to explicitly provided social 
norms plays a powerful role in developing cultural traditions. In general, this study 
highlights the usefulness of the transmission chain method in the field of experimental 
economics, which has traditionally neglected social influences in favour of a non­
social ‘rational actor’ model of human behaviour.
4.5 A n im a l  St u d ie s
Although originally developed to study human cultur e, the transmission chain 
method is equally suited to the study of socially learned traditions in animal 
populations. Curio, Ernst and Vieth (1978a; 1978b), for example, used the 
transmission chain method to show that European blackbirds culturally transmit 
information conceming enemy recognition. Observer birds saw a conspecifrc exhibit a 
mobbing response toward a novel species of bird, a stuffed Australian honeyeater. 
The observer consequently exhibited a mobbing response towards the honeyeater 
comparable to that exhibited toward a genuine predator, and greater than control 
blackbirds that had not observed the model. That obseiwer then acted as a model for 
the next blackbird in the chain, who in turn demonstrated for the next bird, and so on 
down the chain. The mobbing response was transmitted with no reduction in str ength 
through a total of six birds. The ti ansmission of a mobbing response to a plastic bottle
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was also demonstrated, but with less fidelity, suggesting biological constraints on 
tiansmission.
Laland and Plotkin (1990), meanwhile, set up transmission chains in Noiway 
rats for a socially learned foraging behaviour, digging for food items. The first rat was 
explicitly trained in digging, and then observed by the second rat in the chain. The 
second rat subsequently acted as a demonstrator to the third rat, which demonstrated 
for the foui'th, and so on up to the eighth and final rat. Eight parallel chains were mn 
in total. As only the first rat was explicitly trained in digging, any improved digging 
ability after this first demonstrator must be attributed to social transmission. This was 
indeed found, with rats in the transmission chain digging up significantly more food 
items than rats in a no-transmission control condition. A follow-up study by Laland 
and Plotkin (1993) also involving transmission chains of Noiway rats showed 
successful transmission of a food preference via excretory deposits and/or gustatory 
cues.
The replacement method has also been applied to non-human species. Galef and 
Allen (1995) taught an arbitrary food preference to groups of Norway rats, and then 
replaced the group members one-by-one with naïve rats. Three generations after the 
last tiained rat had been replaced there was still significant evidence of the arbitrary 
preference, indicating that the preference had been tiansmitted to each new member. 
Similaidy, Laland and Williams (1997) tiained groups of guppies to take one of two 
routes to a food source, and gradually replaced the gioup members with naïve, 
untrained fish. Three days after all of the original members had been removed, there
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was still a significant preference for the route the founder members had been trained 
to take, suggesting that the route preference had been culturally transmitted. Laland 
and Williams (1997) concluded that this tiansmission was driven by the guppies’ 
tendency to shoal, where individuals follow conspecifics in order to reduce the risk of 
predation.
The results of these studies demonstrate that some non-human species can 
transmit behaviours along chains of several individuals. This is not too surprising 
given that social learning allows the acquisition of information about the environment 
that changes too fast for genetic adaptation (such as the edibility or location of novel 
foods or the characteristics of novel predators), yet without the cost of individual 
learning (Aoki, Wakano, & Feldman, 2005; Boyd & Richerson, 1985).
Such findings suggest that some culturally transmitted behaviours may spread 
and eventually fixate in a population, and generate distinct cultural traditions within 
species. Such behavioural traditions have been proposed for chimpanzees (Whiten et 
al, 1999, 2001), orangutans (van Schailc et a l, 2003) and capuchins (Perry et al, 
2003), as well as in the vocalisations of birds (Catchpole & Slater, 1995) and 
cetaceans (Janik & Slater, 1997). The results of the tr ansmission studies additionally 
demonstrate that, in the species so far experimented with, such traditions might be 
maintained by very simple social learning mechanisms, such as via the odoms of 
excretory deposits (as in Laland & Plotkin’s rats) or as a by-product of shoaling 
behaviour (as in Laland & Williams’ guppies).
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Although these social learaiug mechanisms and behaviours may be much 
simpler than the complex verbal information that is commonly transmitted along 
human chains, this does not mean that the results of the animal studies have no 
bearing on the human studies. One such result is the finding of biological constr aints 
on transmission. Curio et a l (1978a; 1978b) noted that transmission of the mobbing 
response was stronger for a stuffed bird, which resembles the observers’ natiual 
predators, than for a plastic bottle. Laland and Plotkin (1993), meanwhile, found that 
an innate preference for one food over another in rats prevented the transmission of 
the unfavoured food. Similar biological constraints on transmission can also be tested 
in humans (e.g. Chapter 5). Indeed, the burgeoning fields of evolutionary psychology 
and human behavioural ecology provide a wealtli of hypotheses pertaining to 
biologically evolved constraints on cognition that can be adapted for use in 
transmission chain studies.
4.6  R u m o u r  T r a n sm iss io n
Allport and Postman’s (1947) use of the transmission chain method to study the 
spread of rumour led other researchers to modify the methodology to more accurately 
capture the dynamics of real life rumour transmission. Rather than a laboratory-based 
approach, the transmission of either genuine or planted rumours through a naturally 
occmxing population was studied, in examples of what can be called the naturalistic 
approach. Allport and Postman (1947) defined rumour as “a specific (or topical) 
proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, 
without secure standards of evidence being present” (p. ix). This definition thus 
asserts that rumour concerns the cognitive rather than the behavioural aspects of
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cultmal transmission (‘proposition for belief), then emphasises that ramour is 
cultmally transmitted (‘passed from person to person’), suggests a medium for that 
transmission (‘word of mouth’), and finally asserts that ramour is characterised by a 
lack of evidence. Although rumour researchers often used the terms ‘ramour’ and 
‘gossip’ interchangeably, gossip is defined here as ‘cultmally transmitted information 
conceming complex third party social relationships’ (see Chapter 5 for the theoretical 
justification of this definition). Gossip may (or may not) be classified as ramour, 
depending on the quality of the supporting evidence, while rumom* may (or may not) 
be gossip, depending on the content of the rumour.
Schachter and Burdick (1955), for example, introduced a ramour into a girls’ 
school and measured its uncontiolled spread through the population in a single day. 
The rumour, that some exam papers had been stolen, was planted by teachers in an 
offhand mamier during what were ostensibly routine morning meetings with eight 
pupils. Transmission of the rumour was then measured at the end of the day by 
interviewing each girl. It was found that all but one of the 96 girls had heard the 
rumom*, with no distortion. Furthermore, there was more frequent transmission and 
more invention of novel rumours under conditions of ‘cognitive unclarity’, when, 
before the rumour was planted, one girl fi*om each class was removed by the 
headteacher without explanation. Schachter and Burdick (1955) went on to argue that 
the lack of distortion of the ramour contradicts Bartlett’s (1932) findings of 
infoimation loss and distortion. This is somewhat unfounded, however, as Bartlett 
(1932) and the subsequent transmission chain studies described above all used lengthy 
and complex prose passages, rather than a simple fact. No doubt if an experimental
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transmission chain study were performed with the sentence “Some exam papers have 
been stolen”, very little distortion would occur, or conversely, if complex material had 
been used by Schachter and Burdick (1955), there would have been considerable 
distortion.
In a similar study, Jaeger, Anthony and Rosnow (1980) used confederates to 
plant a nmiour in college classes that some students had been caught smoking 
marijuana during a final exam, measuring a week later whether they had heard, passed 
on or believed the rumour. It was found that rumour transmission was less frequent 
when the confederate who introduced the rumour was immediately discredited by a 
second confederate, and that the rumour was more likely to be transmitted by 
participants rated high in anxiety, and who rated drug use as of little importance. A 
similar effect of anxiety was found by Anthony (1973), measiuing the spread of a 
iiimoui- about the axing of a school club amongst pupils.
Rosnow, Yost and Esposito (1986), instead of planting a rumour, studied 
naturally occumng rumours that arose during intense labour negotiations at a 
university. Questionnaires were used to obtain any rumours that participants had 
heard, their confidence in the tinth of those rumours, and whether they had 
tiansmitted the rumoui". It was found that rumours rated as most believable were more 
likely to be passed on. A similar study tracking the tiansmission of ramours 
conceming the murder of a student (Rosnow, Esposito, & Gibney, 1988) replicated 
these findings, and also replicated the earlier findings that cognitive unclarity and 
high anxiety levels fostered transmission.
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More recently, Bordia and Rosnow (1998) studied the transmission of a rumour 
through an internet community. The rumour* emerged naturally in an internet 
discussion group and alleged that an internet service provider was secretly accessing 
the hard drives of its subscribers. Content analyses on the contributions to the 
discussion group revealed similar findings to the studies outlined above, with the 
rumour characterised by conditions of credulity, uncertainty and anxiety. The major 
advantage of studying rumour on the internet, however, was that the entire history of 
every contribution to the discussion was perfectly preseiwed, and every conti*ibutor 
could be identified. This allowed the identification of individual differences in the 
contributors to the discussion board. For example, some contr ibutors tended to malce 
predominantly ‘apprehensive’ statements, while others made predominantly 
‘disbelieving’ statements. The preser*vation of contributions also allowed examination 
of the history or development of the rumour over time. Bordia and Rosnow (1998) 
identified several ‘developmental stages’ in the transmission of the rumour, such as an 
initial period of conflict followed by more cohesive group-solving activity, although 
these stages were somewhat descriptive and vague.
To summarise, there have been general findings in the rumour literature that 
rumour transmission is more likely to occur rmder conditions of anxiety, rmcertainty 
and credulity (Rosnow, 1980, 1991). Experiments on rumour offer the advantage of 
studying cultural transmission as it occurs naturally tlnough a population, with none 
of the artificiality of the laboratory. An important point is that participants can choose 
not to transmit the information, imlike the experimental transmission chain situation, 
in which transmission is a necessary condition of participating. The naturalistic
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approach is also ideal for investigating factors such as anxiety, which would be hard 
to induce in an experimental situation. The analysis of internet-based mmour, as 
pioneered by Bordia and Rosnow (1998), additionally allows the study of individual 
differences in transmission and an examination of the time-course of the rumour by 
preserving a record of all contributions to the rumour.
However, as noted above, with increased ecological validity comes a decrease 
in experimental conti'ol. Except for the internet study, there is a reliance on 
participants’ retrospective recall of whether they transmitted the rumour. There are 
also limitations on the complexity of the material used, which tends to be limited to 
single propositions or statements. It would be huitless to plant a 300 word story as, if 
it is transmitted at all, it would rapidly degrade to a single statement with no means of 
recording and measuring that degradation. The field of rumour tiansmission also 
suffers from a vague and descriptive sociological perspective, and would benefit fiom 
an integiation with the other work cited in this chapter.
4.7 D if f u sio n  o f  In n o v a t io n s
The naturalistic approach adopted in the mmour literature has also been used 
within the ‘diffusion of innovations’ literatme, which is thoroughly reviewed by 
Rogers (1995). Diffusion of innovation studies examine how new ideas and 
technologies are transmitted through populations. For example, Ryan and Gross 
(1943) traced the diffusion of hybrid seed com use tluough a community of Iowan 
fanners, finding that there was a considerable gap between a farmer learning of the 
seed and using it, and that neighbouring farmers were most influential in adoption of
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the seed. Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966) examined the diffusion of a new 
antibiotic amongst doctors in 1953, finding that early adopters tended to be more 
educated, of higher social status and have a wider social network than late adopters.
Rogers (1995) also describes cases in which an innovation fails to diffuse, such 
as the resistance met by health workers in Peru when they tried to get villagers to boil 
their water. This basic health practice failed to spread because the health workers’ 
germ theory of illness conflicted with the villagers’ beliefs linking illness to hot food. 
It was also argued that diffusion is most likely when the model and the adopter are 
similar, not the case for Western health workers and Peruvian villagers. As well as 
failure to diffuse, other studies have found that diffusion often has unexpected and 
unpredictable consequences. For example. Sharp (1952) studied the introduction by 
missionaries of steel axes to Australian aborigines to replace their traditional stone 
axes. Although the steel axes were more efficient as cutting and chopping 
instruments, stone axes could no longer be used as status symbols, leading to 
disruption of the status hierarchy and the trading system, eventually causing men to 
prostitute their wives and daughters for the steel axes. This example demonstrates not 
only the unpredictable outcome of introducing an irmovation, but also the complex 
inter-linking of technology, beliefs and social systems that affects cultural 
transmission.
A recurring finding in these studies and over 3000 others fiom the diffusion of 
innovation literature is an S-shaped cumulative adoption curve (Rogers, 1995). That 
is, there is an initial slow uptake of the innovation, followed by a rapid increase in
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adoption, followed by another period of slower uptake. Rogers (1995) argued that this 
represents a few influential and high-status ‘opinion leaders’ initially adopting the 
innovation, then rapid diffusion through the population, followed by a slowing in the 
diffusion as the population becomes saturated. Lefebvre (1995) foimd that an S- 
shaped cumulative adoption curve is also characteristic of the diffusion of food 
washing and diet preferences through macaque and chimpanzee populations.
Rogers (1995) also identified several features of innovations which made them 
more or less likely to be adopted and transmitted. In general, imiovations were more 
likely to be adopted and transmitted if they were (1) perceived to be better than 
existing ideas or practices {relative advantage), (2) consistent with existing values and 
past experiences {compatibility), (3) simple to understand and use {complexity), (4) 
easy to try out and experiment with {trialahility) and (5) visible to others 
{observability).
The diffusion of imiovations literature is almost identical to the rumour 
literatme in its naturalistic study of cultural tiansmission, in this case in the foim of 
behavioural practices or new technologies, as they are transmitted freely through a 
naturally occuning population. As such, the same advantages and disadvantages 
apply: whilst there is greater ecological validity than the experimental approaches 
described earlier, there is a coiresponding decrease in experimental control. 
Nevertheless, innovations research reinforces the mmour studies’ findings on 
individual differences (people of high-status and wider social networks are more 
likely to transmit culture), and adds important new findings such as the S-shaped
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adoption cuive and the disassociation between knowledge and behaviour, as shown by 
the delay between the farmers learning of and using the hybrid seed.
4.8 H ist o r ic a l  T r a n s m is s io n  C h a in s
Long before experimental psychologists started running their own simulated 
tiansmission chains, archaeologists were collecting evidence of actual cultural 
tiansmission fiom historical artifacts. This was achieved through the method of 
sériation, in which a collection of artifacts is ordered according to their similarity: the 
more features two aitifacts share, the closer they are in the order; the fewer they share, 
the further apart they aie placed. As noted by O’Brien and Lyman (2000), the use of 
sériation rests on two assumptions: firstly that similaiity of features coiresponds to 
closeness in historical time, so that a sequence of gradually changing artifacts is also a 
chronological sequence of artifacts. This is the assumption of historical continuity. 
The second assumption is that the reason why similaiity of features corresponds with 
closeness in time is that the artifacts in the sequence are pait of a lineage of inherited 
information, causally connected by cultuial transmission. O’Brien and Lyman (2000) 
therefore named this heritable continuity. As only heritable continuity involves 
cultmal transmission, it is this that we are interested in here.
Although the existence of historical continuity often denotes heritable 
continuity, it is possible that the former could occur without the latter. An example of 
historical continuity without heritable continuity is the anti-Darwinian progiessive 
cultuie stages of anthi'opologists such as Service (1962), in which all human societies 
develop tluough a sequence of fixed and inevitable stages, such as band, tribe,
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chiefdom and state. Another example of historical continuity without heritable 
continuity is the case of convergence, in which the same trait emerges more than once 
independently, with no connection through transmission.
O’Brien and Lyman (2000) argue that heritable continuity can be demonstrated 
by showing that the different types of artifacts in the sériation overlap in time. For 
example, type A might occur duiing periods 1-3, type B during periods 2-4, and type 
C during periods 4-6. Types A, B and C therefore show heritable continuity: their 
similarities are due to inheritance tluough cultural transmission. In general, however, 
if the change is continuous and gradual, then heritable continuity can be assumed.
The earliest recorded use of sériation was probably Evans’ (1850) sequence of 
gold coins found in Britain, dating back to before the Roman invasion of 54 B.C. This 
work is familiar as being the historical baseline for Ward’s (1949) experimental 
simulation described above. Evans’ (1850) sequence of artifacts begins with coins 
featuring the head of Phillip II of Macedon on one side and a horse-drawn chariot on 
the other. As the sériation progiesses, these images become less lifelike and more 
schematised, with the head of Phillip II eventually being lost altogether and replaced 
with an abstiact pattern. The horse-drawn chariot, meanwhile, lost the chariot and 
became either just a horse or a horse with a rider. This simplification closely 
resembles the changes that Bartlett (1932) observed in his experimental chains of 
stories and pictures (although in other lineages of Evans’ (1850) coins the 
simplification was reversed and the design again became naturalistic).
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Sériation was then used by Pitt-Rivers (1875) to reconstruct lineages of stone 
tools, muskets and copper and bronze axes, all demonstr ating gradual change in wliich 
each specimen can be seen as a slight modification on the one before. Petrie (1899) 
also used sériation to order approximately 4000 items of pottery excavated along the 
Nile in Egypt. Petrie’s (1899) sériation revealed firstly significant overlapping of 
features, confirming the assumption of heritable continuity. Second, various lineages 
of designs can be observed in the sériation, with some lineages becoming extinct, and 
others merging to form new lineages. Third, the sériation allowed Petrie (1899) to 
speculate that the handles on the pots, while originally serving a practical purpose, 
gradually became less functional and more decorative, eventually becoming vestigial. 
Kidder (1915) performed a similar sériation using pottery from New Mexico, finding 
that the decorative patterns on the pottery became gradually less intricate through 
time.
In a striking parallel with the transmission chain method in psychology, the 
method of sériation then fell out of favour with most archaeologists, and when it was 
used it was to determine a clironological time-line, rather than to denote heritable 
continuity. O’Brien and Lyman (2000) attribute this in large part as due to the 
widespread adoption of an essentialist stance, in which types are perceived as having 
‘essences’ and change occurs when one type suddenly transforms into another. This 
contrasts with a materialist viewpoint which focuses on the variation that naturally 
occurs within types, resulting in the ‘population thinking’ (Mayr, 1982) and gradual, 
continuous change that is essential to Darwinian evolution (see Chapter 2).
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Lipo et a l (1997) and O’Brien and Lyman (2000) have attempted to reintroduce 
the method of sériation as a means of identifying lineages in prehistoric artifacts, 
making explicit the assumption of heritable continuity, and hence cultural 
transmission. Lipo et a l (1997) used sériation to reconstruct lineages of ceramic 
sherds of the lower Mississippi Valley and help to explain the spatial distribution of 
these sherds. O’Brien and Lyman (2000), meanwhile, used sériation to analyse 
projectile points from south-western USA, which they show to exhibit continuous, 
gradually changing variation rather than a small number of distinct types as had been 
previously assumed.
hi summary, the method of sériation has been used by aichaeologists to 
reconstmct cultural tiansmission chains from prehistoric artifacts. Some of these 
sériations show similar changes as do the early transmission chain studies described 
above. Evans’ (1850) lineages of coins, for example, demonstrate the reduction of an 
image to a schematised form much as Bartlett’s (1932) studies with pictures showed. 
More recently, O’Brien and Lyman (2000) have made more explicit the assumption 
underlying the method of sériation, that it denotes heritable continuity and hence 
cultural transmission, and have used it as a starting point for full evolutionary 
explanations for prehistoric lineages of material artifacts.
4.9  C o n c l u sio n s
The literature reviewed above demonstrates how cultural transmission has been 
studied using diverse methodologies (experimental, observational, historical), witliin a 
number of diverse disciplines (psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics,
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biology, archaeology) and involving different types of transmitted information 
(written or spoken verbal material, technological artifacts, behaviour).
However, it is apparent that in many cases cultural transmission is being studied 
with little understanding of either the other disciplines and methods or a wider theory 
of human culture. The study of cultural transmission would benefit from a cross- 
fertilisation of methods and ideas across disciplines for a number of reasons. First, 
theories or models that are supported by more than one empirical method have 
inherently gieater validity. Furthermore, the different methods discussed above each 
have complementary strengths and weaknesses. For example, while the historical 
lineages of Section 4.8 are the result of actual cultural transmission in real 
populations, they are often incomplete and the mechanism that produced them is 
unknown. The experimental methods of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 might be used to 
simulate these historical lineages to get at those underlying tiansmission mechanisms, 
affording as they do all the advantages of experimental methods (control over 
variables, complete data etc.). Indeed, Ward’s (1949) attempt to simulate an historical 
lineage from the archaeological record using the transmission chain method (Section 
4.2.2) represents a sadly isolated and methodologically flawed example of such a 
cross-disciplinary integration which deserves to be pursued further.
Experimental work might also benefit from an integration with mathematical 
models such as those of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) or Boyd and Richerson 
(1985). Predictions derived from these models could be tested with experimental 
methods, the results of which can then be used to inform further models and theories.
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The non-huinan studies discussed in Section 4.5 highlight the importance of 
testing for the precise mechanisms of transmission. The wider literature on non­
human social learning (Whiten & Ham, 1992; Wliiten et a l, 2004) has identified a 
number of precisely defined mechanisms such as imitation, emulation and stimulus 
enhancement, each of which has different implications for larger-scale cultural change 
(Heyes, 1993). So far, however, psychologists have tended to ignore these distinctions 
(Want & Hanis, 2002). The experimental methods described above might be used to 
test the effects of these different mechanisms by having chains of participants transmit 
the same behaviour or material but only allowing certain forms of social learning (e.g. 
comparing an ‘imitation only’ condition, a ‘spoken language only’ condition and a 
‘written language only’ condition).
However, before pursuing these more advanced proposals for future work 
involving interdisciplinary integration and social learning mechanisms, it might be 
useful first to obtain more basic data on cultural transmission using simpler methods. 
This is particularly important given the paucity of such data at present and the fact 
that few psychologists are cmrently interested in cultural transmission. It was noted in 
Section 4.2 that the original Bartlett-style transmission chain method represents a 
potentially very effective yet under-used means of experimentally investigating 
human cultural tr ansmission. Although the early transmission chain studies featiued a 
nmnber of methodological flaws such as a lack of quantitative statistics or 
standardised procedures, the recent studies show that these issues can be resolved. 
Perhaps the main advantage of the transmission chain method is that it is quick and 
easy to implement yet can still generate theoretically interesting results.
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The general aim of Chapters 5-9 was therefore to demonstrate that the 
transmission chain method can be successfully used in the empirical study of human 
cultmal tr ansmission, the results of which can be used to inform the wider theory of 
cultural evolution outlined in Part A. The specific aim of each chapter was to test for 
the presence of a different transmission bias: a social bias (Chapter 5), a hierarchical 
bias (Chapter 6), a status bias (Chapter 7), an antliropomorphic bias (Chapter 8) and a 
neoteny bias (Chapter 9).
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CHAPTER 5 - A B ia s  f o r  S o c ia l  Inform ation"^
5.1 A bst r a c t
Evolutionary theories concerning the origins of human intelligence suggest that 
cultural transmission might be biased toward social over non-social information. This 
was tested by passing social and non-social information along multiple chains of 
participants. Experiment 5a found that gossip, defined as information about intense 
third-party social relationships, was transmitted with significantly greater accuracy 
and in significantly greater quantity than equivalent non-social information 
conceming individual behaviour or the physical environment. Experiment 5b 
replicated this finding controlling for narrative coherence, and additionally foimd that 
information concerning everyday non-gossip social interactions was transmitted just 
as well as the intense gossip interactions. It was therefore concluded that human 
cultural transmission is biased toward information concerning social interactions over 
equivalent non-social information.
Submitted to the British Journal of Psychology as Mesoudi, A,, Whiten, A. and 
Dunbar, R. A bias for social information in human cultural transmission.
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5,2 In t r o d u c t io n
In seeking to investigate the social nature of memory, Bartlett (1932) 
formulated the ‘transmission chain method’, in which material, typically a text, is 
passed through a chain of participants, in a manner similar to the children’s game 
‘Chinese Whispers’ or ‘Broken Telephone’. The first participant reads the material, 
and is later asked to recall it. The resultant recall is then given to the second 
participant to reproduce, whose recall is in turn given to the third, and so on along the 
chain. Using this method, Bartlett (1932) demonstrated that traditional folk tales were 
transmitted more fully than a range of other stimuli, such as a newspaper report, a 
description of a scene and a scientific text. In the following two decades a series of 
transmission chain studies were published in the British Journal o f Psychology 
investigating various hypotheses and participant groups (Hall, 1951; Klugman, 1944; 
Maxwell, 1936; Northway, 1936; Ward, 1949).
Following this initial period of research activity, the transmission chain method 
fell from favour within psychology, perhaps due to the rise of behaviourism, and then 
of cognitive psychology, both of which have tended to ignore social processes. 
However, a handful of recent studies have sought to reintroduce the transmission 
chain method, updating it according to modern standards of experimental psychology 
by reporting standardised instmctions, using multiple parallel chains and introducing 
the statistical analysis of quantifiable data (e.g. Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000a). 
These recent studies demonstiate that the transmission chain method can be uniquely 
effective in revealing cumulative and systematic biases in recall that affect cultural 
transmission.
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The present study used this method to investigate the cultur al transmission of 
information regarding third party social relationships, including what is commonly 
called ‘gossip’. As acknowledged by Emler (2001), there has been very little social 
psychological theory developed in this area, and even less systematic hypothesis 
testing. In contrast, the topic is here approached from an evolutionary and 
comparative perspective, in which there is a lar ge body of work devoted to the social 
function of human intelligence. Such an approach can add theoretical rigour to a 
traditionally underdeveloped and under-researched topic.
The Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Wliiten, 1988; Whiten, 1999b; 
Wliiten & Byrne, 1997) or Social Brain (Dunbar*, 1998, 2003) hypothesis asser*ts that 
primate intelligence evolved primatily to deal with complex social problems, rather 
than non-social ecological or technological problems such as locating food, extractive 
foraging or using tools. Support for the hypothesis comes from correlational analyses 
of a number of primate species showing a linlc between a proxy of intelligence, the 
ratio of neocoi*tex to the rest of the brain, and various measures of social complexity, 
such as group size (Barton & Dimbar, 1997), fr equency of tactical deception (Byrne 
& Corp, 2004) and frequency of social play (Lewis, 2001). Measures of non-social 
complexity, such as range size or foraging style, show no such correlation with 
neocortex ratio (R. I. M. Dunbar, 1995).
Although such analyses encompass the entire primate order, the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis should not be taken as excluding the evolution of human 
intelligence, and the studies cited above include data from several ancestral hominid
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species (as well as modem humans), hideed, Whiten (1999a) outlines how social 
factors may have shaped cognition during human evolution to produce what he terms 
a ‘deep social mind’, exliibiting faculties such as mind-reading and co-ordinated co­
operation. Dunbar’s (1993; 1996) social gossip theory ar gues that language evolved in 
humans in response to social selection pressures, in order to track complex social 
relationships and ensure their coherence in the unusually large social groups 
characteristic of modem humans.
The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis can also be taken to imply that, as a 
result of selection pressures in the past favouring social cognitive complexity, the 
cognition of modern-day humans should exhibit certain specialisations to deal with 
social problems (Whiten, 2000b). If modern-day human cognition is indeed moulded 
to deal with social problems, then people should preferentially attend to, recall and 
transmit social information over equivalent non-social mforination. Observational 
evidence consistent with this claim was provided by Dunbar, Duncan, and Marriott 
(1997), who found that freely forming conversational groups spent approximately 
two-thirds of their time discussing social topics (personal relationships, personal 
experiences or social activities) - more than work, leisiue, politics and the arts 
combined.
To date, there has been no equivalent experimental test of the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis with regar'd to cultural transmission. However, an earlier 
memory study by Owens, Bower, and Black (1979), while not intended to be such a 
test, can be considered relevant. Participants in Owens et a/.’s (1979) study read and
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recalled descriptions of a female student involved in five everyday events; making a 
cup of coffee, going to the doctor’s, buying some milk, attending a lecture and going 
to a party. The experimental group, but not the control group, was in addition told of a 
motive for the character (that she is pregnant by her professor) that could be used to 
make sense of and connect the five episodes, in effect turning the neutral events into 
gossip. The result was that the experimental group recalled significantly more 
episodes than the control group.
The aim of the present study was to expand upon and extend Owens et alls  
(1979) findings in two ways, in order to provide an explicit test of the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis with regard to human cultural transmission. First, rather than 
having single participants reading and recalling experimental material (i.e. social and 
non-social material), Bartlett’s (1932) transmission chain method was used to pass the 
material along chains of participants, in order to investigate the longer-term 
persistence of any ‘social bias’ in cultural transmission. If an effect can be 
demonstrated to have a degree of stability or persistence along chains of multiple 
participants, we can more confidently extrapolate from this necessarily simplified 
experimental setting to a larger group- or population-level and draw wider 
conclusions regarding hmnan culture as a whole.
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Information Definition Predicted by
Social
Gossip
Concerning intense 
third-party social 
relationships and 
interactions Machiavellian 
intelligence/social 
brain hypothesis
Strong Machiavellian 
intelligence 
hypothesis/Exploitative 
theories of language evolution
Social non­
gossip
Conceming everyday 
third-party social 
relationships and 
interactions
ion-social
Individual
Conceming interactions 
and relationships 
between a single person 
and the physical 
environment Ecological hypotheses of primate intelligence
Physical
Conceming interactions 
and relationships solely 
within the physical 
environment
Table 5.1 - Definitions of each category of infonnation tested in Chapter 5, with the 
theory which predicts the information to be favoured during transmission
Second, we explicitly draw on the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis in 
order to provide precise definitions of ‘social’ and ‘non-sociaT information, as shown 
in Table 5.1. The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis holds that it is not merely 
being ‘social’ in the sense of ‘living in groups’ that has been a key factor in the 
evolution of primate intelligence, but rather the degree of social complexity, 
characterised by frequently changing coalitions and alliances (Whiten, 1999b). Hence 
we define ‘social’ information as information conceming interactions and 
relationships between a number of third parties. This social category is sub-divided 
according to the quality of those interactions or relationships; "Gossip" involves
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particularly intense and salient social interactions and relationships, such as the illicit 
affair and the pregnancy of Owens et a/.’s (1979) material, while "Social Non-Gossip ’ 
involves more everyday interactions and relationships. This social category is 
contrasted with ‘non-sociaT infoimation, which we divide into information 
conceming a single individual’s interactions with the physical environment 
{"Individual") and infonnation solely conceming that physical environment 
{"Physical’).
The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis would predict that social infoimation 
(both Gossip and Social Non-Gossip) would be transmitted in greater quantity and 
with greater accuracy than the non-social infomiation (both Individual and Physical). 
Ecological hypotheses of the evolution of primate intelligence (e.g. Clutton-Brock & 
Haivey, 1980) might predict in contrast tliat the hidividual infoimation (how to do 
things) and the Physical infoimation (about the non-social environment) would be 
tiansmitted at least as well as the Social information. A stronger version of the 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis might additionally predict that social 
interactions which are more intensely ‘Machiavellian’ and gossip-like, featuring 
exploitative behaviour such as deception or infidelity, would elicit a stronger appeal 
than commonplace everyday social interactions. This stronger form would thus 
additionally predict that the Gossip infoimation would be transmitted in greater 
quantity and with greater accuracy than the Social Non-Gossip information.
This additional difference between the Gossip and the Social Non-Gossip 
information might also be predicted by theories which argue that tlie fimction of
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gossiping is to transmit information about other people's anti-social behaviour, in 
order to learn about their reputation and protect against exploitation. Enquist and 
Leimar (1993) argued that gossiping is a behavioural adaptation to protect against 
potential free-riders by spreading information about their past behaviour, preventing 
the free-riders fr om moving from population to population in order to find and exploit 
naïve individuals. Wilson, Wilczynski, Wells, and Weiser (2000), meanwhile, argued 
that gossiping acts as a means of preventing behaviour which acts to promote 
individual gain at the expense of the group. This argument was backed up by a series 
of experiments in which participants rated speakers of self-serving gossip more 
negatively than speakers of group-serving gossip. If these theories are conect, 
infoimation about exploitative or anti-social behaviour such as deception and 
infidelity (the Gossip material) should be favoured over simple everyday social 
interactions (the Social Non-Gossip material).
Note that these predictions are only intended to apply to information that is 
equivalent in dimensions other than the social/non-social comparison. The word 
‘equivalent’ here is intended to exclude non-social information that is particularly 
salient or significant to people for other specific reasons: it is not claimed that all 
social infoimation is always transmitted better than all non-social information, but 
rather that when the only difference between two pieces of information is the social 
component, then the social will be prefeiTed over the non-social.
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5.3 E x p e r im e n t  5a
In line with the theoretical predictions outlined above and in Table 5.1, in 
Experiment 5 a tluee paragraphs matched for number of words, sentences and 
propositions were constructed, each constituting a different class of information. The 
Gossip information featured an illicit affair and pregnancy (following Owens et al, 
1979), the Individual information comprised simple facts about a single character 
such as their age and occupation, and Physical information described the geography, 
history and commerce of a city. (Note that the social category is represented here 
solely by the Gossip material; a distinction between Gossip and Social Non-Gossip 
information is made in Experiment 5b.) These paragraphs were then transmitted along 
multiple chains of participants using the methodology developed by Bartlett (1932).
5.3.1 Materials and Methods
5.3.1.1 Design
A within-chain transmission chain design was adopted (Figure 5.1), in which 
the first participant in each of ten replicate chains was given material containing 
information representing all thr*ee categories (Gossip, Individual and Physical). Each 
of the ten chains comprised four participants, or ‘generations’. This within-chain 
design was intended to reduce random between-chain variation, which pilot studies 
with a between-chain design (Mesoudi, 2002) found obscured any differences 
between the material types.
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Figure 5.1 - The design of Experiment 5a. Each circle represents one participant, and 
the thr ee different patterns represent the three different types of material.
The independent variable was the transmission generation, of which there were 
four (F1-F4). The dependent variables were the total number of propositions recalled 
(recall quantity), and the nrmrber of propositions that were present in the original 
material (recall accuracy), as detailed in the Coding section below. It was predicted 
that Gossip would be transmitted in greater quantity and with greater accinacy than 
both the Individual and the Physical material.
Note that each chain of fom* participants was here treated as an independent unit 
of analysis, rather than each participant. This is because the focus of interest is the 
material and how that material changes as it passes tlnough the chain, rather than any
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single participant’s memory performance. Fm-thermore, the recall of second, third and 
fourth generation participants is constrained by each previous generation’s recall, with 
anything omitted in one generation miavailable to subsequent generations to recall. 
Hence the recalls of each participant within a single chain are not statistically 
independent of one another, and in the ANOVAs reported below each chain is treated 
as an independent imit of analysis, rather than each participant (e.g. ‘betweerr-groups’ 
implies ‘between-chains’ rather than ‘between-subjects’).
It was judged that four participants constituted an optimum chain length, i.e. 
this number was long enough to capture the long-tenn cumulative effects of cultural 
transmission, yet short enough to be practical in terms of recniiting par ticipants and 
performing replications. Previous transmission chain studies (e.g. Bangerter, 2000) 
have successfully demonstrated transmission effects using four* participants per chain.
5.3.1.2 Material
The original material given to the first participant in each chain was composed 
of tlnee paragraphs, each paragraph representing one of the three types of 
information: Gossip, Individual and Physical (although these labels were not given to 
the participants). These paragraphs are reproduced in Appendix A.I. Each of the 
paragraphs was matched for number of words, sentences and propositions.
The original material contained the three paragraphs in a fixed order: 
Individual, then Gossip, then Physical. The order was not counterbalanced, as it was 
felt that the material as a whole would make less sense to the participant if, for
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example, the Physical material came first. Pilot studies (Mesoudi, 2002) suggested 
that order of presentation has no effect on recall, and in any case any primacy or 
recency effect would favour either the Individual or the Physical material, against the 
main experimental hypothesis.
5.3.1.3 Participants
Forty participants of mean age 20.98 years (standard deviation = 3.30) 
performed the experiment. Seven of the chains were composed of female participants 
(n = 28) and three of the chains were composed of male participants (n = 12) to check 
for possible sex differences, although based on the results of Owens et al. (1979) and 
Dunbar et al. (1997), none were predicted. All participants were students, participated 
voluntarily, were unpaid and had normal reading and writing ability,
5.3.1.4 Procedure
The procedure adopted here involved the experimenter physically passing the 
material from individual to individual, rather than the participants directly 
transmitting the material (e.g. Bartlett, 1932). This allowed greater control over 
transmission, and removed the need to gather groups of participants together. 
Participants were thus run in groups of between one and five.
A booklet was produced which contained on the first page the instruction, 
“Please read the following text through once. When you have finished turn the page.” 
followed by the material. The second page contained the instrnction, “Now, without 
turning back, please write out as best you can the text you just read. Be as accurate as
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possible, but don’t worry if you can’t remember it all. When you have finished turn 
the page.” followed by a blank space for recall. A final sheet solicited the age and sex 
of the participant and thanked them for participating, whereupon the experimenter 
debriefed them as to the nature of the study. The recall was then typed up and inserted 
into the next participant’s booklet as appropriate.
No distractor task was perfomied, and no time Imiit was set. At no point in the 
procedure did either the printed instmctions or the experimenter state that the 
experiment was a memory test, that the material had come firom another participant, 
or that their recall would be passed on to another participant.
5.3.1.5 Coding
A prepositional analysis (Kintsch, 1974) was performed on each paificipants’ 
recall (see Chapter 4). This prepositional analysis was used to calculate the total 
number of propositions recalled, a measure of recall quantity, and the number of 
propositions also contained in the original material, a measure of recall accuracy. 
Note that recall in each generation was always compared with the original (FO) 
material, not the previous generation’s recall, as it is the gross cumulative changes 
that are important rather than any single individual’s memory achievement.
To assess inter-rater reliability, an independent coder blind to the hypothesis 
and to the material type coded two of the chains from Experiment 5a and thr ee of the 
chains fiom Experiment 5b (the same prepositional analysis was used in both
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experiments). The coding of the blind second coder and myself was highly consistent, 
with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.97.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.2.1 Recall quantity
A  mixed 2x3x4 ANOVA with sex as a between-groups factor and material and 
generation as within-groiips factors showed an overall effect of material (F(2,i6) = 
63.71, p < 0.01) and of generation (F(3,24) = 26.49, p < 0.01) but no effect of sex (F(i,8) 
= 2.37, ns). Planned comparisons were made between each pair of material types, 
using 2x4 withm-gioups ANOVAs at a Bonferroni conected significance level of a* 
= a  / n where n = no. of comparisons (hence a* = 0.05 / 3 = 0.017). Significant 
differences were found between Gossip and Individual (F(i,9) = 131.44, p < 0.01) and 
between Gossip and Physical material (F(i,9) = 112.46, p < 0.01), although there was 
no significant difference between hidividual and Physical (F(i,9) = 3.80, ns). The 
prediction that a larger quantity of the Gossip material is transmitted than the other 
material is therefore supported, and,can be observed in Fig. 5.2, with a larger quantity 
of the Gossip material transmitted in every generation than of the Individual and 
Physical material.
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Figure 5.2 - The total number of propositions recalled by each generation of 
Experiment 5a (iixespective of accuracy), BiTor bars show standard eiTors.
5.3.2.2 Recall accuracy
Fig. 5.3 suggests a similar pattern for the measure of recall accuracy to that 
shown in Fig. 5.2 for recall quantity. A mixed 2x3x4 ANOVA with sex as a 
between-groups factor and material and generation as within-groups factors showed 
an overall effect of material (F(2,i6) = 73.55, p < 0.01) and of generation (F(3,24) = 
26.91, p < 0.01) but no effect of sex (F(i,g) = 2.90, ns). There was a significant 
material x generation interaction (F(6,48) = 2.81, p < 0.05), probably due to the 
levelling off at base level shown by the Individual and Physical material, while the 
Gossip was still degiading at a steady rate. Planned comparisons showed significant 
differences between Gossip and Individual (F(i,9) = 151.22, p < 0.01) and between 
Gossip and Physical (F(i,g) = 117.36, p < 0.01), and no significant difference between
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Individual and Physical (F(i,g) = 8.05, ns). The prediction that Gossip is transmitted 
with greater acciuacy than the other material is therefore supported.
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Generation
Figure 5.3 - The proportion of propositions that were correctly recalled by each 
generation of Experiment 5a. Error bars show standaid enors.
The Gossip vs. Physical comparison additionally showed a significant material 
X generation interaction (F(3,2?) = 4.38, p < 0.017). Given that the Gossip material 
shows the steepest decline and the Physical material the shallowest, this supports the 
explanation given above for the overall material x generation interaction, i.e. that 
Physical is at base level while Gossip is steadily declining. Partial con*elation 
coefficients showed no effect of age on overall recall (rp=0.09, n=40, ns), 
conti'olling for generation, and none of the tests above violated the assumption of 
sphericity.
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5.3.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 a support the hypothesis that the Gossip material 
would be tr ansmitted in greater quantity and with gr eater accuracy than the non-social 
material (either Individual or Physical). However, a concern is that as well as 
differing in informational content, the three paragraphs could also be seen as differing 
in coherence. That is, the Gossip material may form a coherent narrative, with the 
character’s affair and pregnancy integrating the entire paragraph. The other two 
paragraphs perhaps showed a less coherent narrative, lacking an integrating theme and 
reading more like a list of unconnected facts. The reason that the Gossip was 
trarrsmitted with greater accuracy than the other two types of material could therefore 
have been due to its coherence, rather than the fact that it had gossip-like content. 
This issue was addressed in Experiment 5b.
5.4 E x p e r im e n t  5b
The aim of Experiment 5b was to equate conditions with respect to the 
integrating theme or coherent narrative. What, however, should cormt as an 
‘integrating theme’ or ‘cohererrt nanative’? Handler and Johnson (1977), Thorndyke 
(1977) and Rmnelhart (1977) developed the idea, originally put forward by Bartlett 
(1932), that stories are particularly easy to remember because they form coherent 
narratives that can be represented by a hierarchical schema structure. It is unlikely, 
however, that a paragraph of approximately sixty words would have such a complex 
hierarchical straictine, beyond a simple linear chain of events linked causally and 
temporally. For example, the pregnancy causes the professor to refuse to see Nancy, 
which then causes Nancy to threaten to tell his wife about the affair. In contrast, a
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chain tliat is linked temporally but not causally would simply be a list of uncomiected 
events and lack coherence, while a chain that is linked causally but not temporally 
would not foim a nairative. Each type of material used in Experiment 5b was 
therefore designed to constitute a comparable linear chain of events linked causally 
and temporally, so that superior recall of the Gossip material can be more definitely 
attributed to its gossip-like content rather than its greater structural coherence, as was 
possible in Experiment 5a.
Experiment 5b also featured the fourth type of material from Table 5.1, 
distinguished as Social Non-Gossip information (henceforih simply 'Social'). This 
material contained the same number of social interactions and social agents as the 
Gossip but with interactions that would not be considered as intense or salient. So 
Experiment 5b tested firstly the prediction of the broad Machiavellian intelligence 
hypothesis that both the Social and Gossip material would be transmitted in greater 
quantity and with greater accuracy than the non-social Individual and Physical 
material, and secondly the additional prediction of the strong Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis that the Gossip material would be transmitted better than the 
Social material.
5.4.1 Materials and Methods
The design of Experiment 5b was largely identical to that of Experiment 5a, 
with ten chains each comprising four participants agaiir transmitting all types of 
material. There were three minor differences: first, there were now fbiu' types of 
material (Gossip, Social, Individual and Physical) rather than three; second, the order
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in which this material was presented was now counterbalanced; and third, five of the 
chains were now female, and five were male. None of the paiticipants tested here took 
part in, or had any knowledge of, Experiment 5a. All forty participants were students, 
participated voluntarily, were unpaid and had rrormal reading and writing ability. 
Their mean age was 21.40 years (standard deviation = 3.83).
The original material given to the first participant in each chain is reproduced in 
Appendix A.2. The Gossip information again featured an affair arrd pregnancy as its 
theme, although the information that Nancy is lying to her friends did not fit into the 
single linear chain, so was replaced with extr a information at the end conceriiing the 
professor’s wife leaving him. The Social (non-gossip) information comprised a causal 
arrd temporal chain coirsisting of a series of social interactions and containing the 
same number of agents as the Gossip, but without gossip-like content such as 
deception, infidelity and pregnancy. Individual information featured a chain 
consisting of interactions between a single character and the inanimate world. Finally, 
Physical information contained no intentional agents in the chain, consisting entirely 
of interactions within a physical system.
To test whether each of the four types of material were comparable on 
dimensions other than the desired experimental manipulation of social content, ten 
additional participants not involved in the experiment proper were given the four 
paragr aphs (Gossip, Social, Individual and Physical) and asked to rate each of them 
on a 7-point scale for ‘coherence’, ‘familiarity’ and ‘realism’. No significant 
differences were found between the paragraphs on any of these dimensions.
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suggesting that any differences found in Experiment 5b aie unlikely to be due to 
differences in coherence, familiarity or realism, which had been a concern in 
Experiment 5 a.
5.4.2 Results and Discussion
5.4.2.1 Recall quantity
A  mixed 2x4x4 ANOVA with sex as a between-groups factor and material and 
generation as within-groups factors showed an overall effect of material (F(3,24) = 
15.29, p < 0.01) and of generation (F(2,i5) = 36.76, p < 0.01, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected) but no effect of sex (F(i,8) = 0.11, ns). Planned comparisons were again 
made between the pairs of material types predicted to differ, using 2x4 within-groups 
ANOVAs at a BonfeiToni coixected significance level of a* = a  / n where n = no. of 
comparisons (there are now five comparisons, hence a* = 0.05 / 5 = 0.01). There 
were significant differences between Gossip and Individual (F(i,9) = 25.72, p < 0.01) 
and Gossip and Physical (F(i,9) = 28.23, p < 0.01), demonstrating that a larger quantity 
of Gossip material was transmitted than of either the Individual or the Physical 
material, as was predicted. Also as predicted, a significantly larger quantity of the 
Social material was transmitted than of the non-social materials, as shown by 
significant differences between Social and Individual (F(i,9) ~ 15.43, p < 0.01) and 
Social and Physical = 21.49, p < 0.01). There was, however, no significant 
difference between Gossip and Social (F(i,9) = 0.16, ns). These effects are illustrated in 
Fig. 5.4.
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Figure 5.4 - The total number of propositions recalled by each generation of 
Experiment 5b (irrespective of accuracy). EiTor bars show standard error.
5.4,2.2 Recall accuracy
Fig. 5.5 suggests that the Gossip and the Social material were likewise 
transmitted with greater accuracy than the Individual and Physical material. 
Compared with the measure of quantity shown in Fig. 5.4, however, there is a larger 
difference between Gossip and Social, with the latter ti*ansmitted with slightly poorer 
accuracy than the former, especially at generations F2 and F4. A mixed 2x4x4 
ANOVA with sex as a between-groups factor and material and generation as within- 
groups factors showed an overall effect of material (F(3,24) = 12.99, p < 0.01) and of 
generation (F(2,i5) = 38.78, p < 0.01, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) but no effect of 
sex (F(i,8) = 0.08, ns).
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Figure 5.5 - The proportion of propositions that were correctly recalled by each 
generation of Experiment 5b. Error bars show standar d errors.
Planned comparisons showed significant differences between Gossip and 
Individual (F(i,9) = 43.34, p < 0.01) and Gossip and Physical (P(i,9) = 18.89, p < 0.01). 
The Gossip material was therefore transmitted with greater accuracy than the two 
non-social types of material, as was predicted. The comparisons between Social and 
Individual (F(i,9) = 10.19, p = 0.011) and Social and Physical (F(i,9) = 10.30, p=0.011) 
were both extremely close to significance at the Bonferroni corrected significance 
level of 0.01, and so will be treated as such. This confirms the second part of the 
hypothesis that the Social material would also be transmitted with greater accuracy 
than the two non-social material types (Individual and Physical).
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The additional prediction that the Gossip would be transmitted with greater 
accui'acy than the Social was not supported. There was no significant difference 
between the Gossip material and the Social material (F(i,9) = 2.40, ns). However, as 
can be seen in Fig. 5.5, there is a trend toward the Gossip being transmitted with 
greater accuracy than the Social material, and at generation F2  this difference is 
indeed significant (F(i,9) = 7.98, p<0.05). This difference is not strong, however, and 
there is no theoretical reason why generation F2 would be any more likely to show a 
difference than the other generations. Thus, while there seems to be a trend for the 
Gossip to be transmitted with greater accuracy than the Social, with the results 
certamly not as clear cut as for the measure of recall quantity, the hypothesis that the 
Gossip material is transmitted with greater accuracy than the Social material carniot 
be accepted.
Pai'tial correlation coefficients showed no effect of age on overall recall (ip = 
0.08, n=40, ns), controlling for generation. None of the statistical tests described 
above featured any interactions, and none violated the assumption of sphericity 
(except where the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected significance level is given).
5.5 C o n c l u sio n s
The aim of Chapter 5 was to investigate whether there is a bias for social 
information in human cultural tiansmission, as predicted by evolutionary theories that 
posit a social origin for human intelligence. Experiment 5 a found evidence that 
gossip-like social information is tiansmitted with significantly greater accuracy and in 
greater quantity than non-social infbimation. Experiment 5b replicated the finding of
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Experiment 5a using material equivalent in naiTative coherence, demonstrating that 
coherence was not responsible for the superior recall of the gossip. Experiment 5b 
also found that information concerning social interactions that would not be described 
as gossip was transmitted with an accuracy and in a quantity not significantly 
different from the gossip itself. That is, the gossip-lilce content of infidelity, deception 
and pregnancy was relatively unimportant; what mattered for superior transmission 
was that there were a number of third party social agents interacting with one another.
These results are therefore consistent with the Machiavellian intelligence 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten, 1999b; Wliiten & Byrne, 1997) or social brain 
(Dimbar, 1998, 2003) hypothesis, that primate intelligence evolved primarily to deal 
with social, rather than ecological, information. Here, this is reflected in a social bias 
in cultural transmission. The results aie also consistent with Dmibai*’s (1993, 1996) 
social gossip theory of language evolution, that language evolved to exchange social 
information. A stronger form of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, and 
theories which argue for a more negative, exploitative function of language, such as 
the control of free-riders (Enquist & Leimar, 1993) or the promotion of group 
interests (Wilson et a l, 2000), were not supported, in that infoiination commonly 
considered gossip-like in content was transmitted no better than equivalent non-gossip 
social information. Theories which argue that primate intelligence is the result of 
ecological selection pressures were also not supported, with information concerning 
the non-social environment transmitted poorly. Before considering the wider 
theoretical implications of these findings and possible directions for future research, 
we must examine a number of potential objections to this interpretation of the results.
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One possible objection might be that the Social material used in Experiment 5b 
(asking directions from strangers) was not ‘social’ in the sense of the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis. That is, the relationships between the characters were not 
very meaningful and the characters were not exchanging information about 
themselves or other people. However, it should be recognised that the broad 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis might predict that any social interactions 
should be memorable, whatever their content or quality. Even though the characters 
are exchanging non-social information, there are still many potentially important 
social cues that are present, such as the personality of the character (e.g. their 
helpfulness) or the reliability of the infoimation they give. This information might 
then be stored and used to negotiate friture social interactions, which may be more 
complex, hi any case, infoiination which is inteimediate between the Social and the 
Gossip material, featuring interactions more strongly Machiavellian than the Social 
material (but not as strong or negative as the Gossip material), would presumably be 
transmitted just as well as these two were in Experiment 5b, hence still supporting the 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis.
It might be argued that rather than being the result of a biologically evolved 
predisposition, the social bias seen here is the result of some related property of the 
material, such as its emotional impact or attentional salience. Various findings from 
the social psychological literatm*e concerning memory might also be used to account 
for some of the findings presented here, such as that people have better recall for 
descriptions of behavioui" that violates social noims (Wyer, Budesheim, Lambert, & 
Swan, 1994), for information that is incongment with social expectations (Stangor &
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McMillan, 1992), and for negative self-discrepant in-group behaviour (Gramzow, 
Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001). These two types of explanation should not, however, be 
seen as in opposition. Properties such as ‘arousing’, ‘salient’ or ‘memorable’ 
represent the proximate mechanisms by which an evolved bias may operate. The two 
levels of explanation, ultimate and proximate, should be seen as separate and 
complementary (Tinbergen, 1963). Indeed, a frill account of human cognition and 
behaviour requires empirical evidence from all explanatory levels.
As well as ultimate and proximate explanations, Tinbergen (1963) also 
specified a developmental level of explanation. From this perspective it could be 
ai'gued that information about social relationsliips becomes particularly salient duiing 
a child’s development, causing such a bias to be learned. Again, however, the 
likelihood that such learning might t^ce place does not contradict an ultimate 
evolutionary argument for a biologically evolved predisposition or bias to learn and 
transmit certain types of infoiination. To the contrary, the comparative evidence for 
the social brain hypothesis (R. I. M. Dunbai*, 1995; Joffe, 1997) makes it likely that 
such a bias does indeed have an evolutionary basis at some stage of development. 
Nevertheless, developmental investigations would be useful in further clarifying the 
nature and origin of the social bias observed here.
It might be argued that the transmission aspect of this study adds little to the 
findings of Owens et a l (1979) concerning recall at the individual level. Such an 
effect was already apparent in the first generation recall, where single participants 
recalled social information better than non-social infoimation. However, a bias in
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memory or recall and a bias in transmission should not be seen as alternative or 
opposing phenomena. The long-term transmission bias does of course reflect a 
memory bias, but its significance is that it uniquely documents the cumulative 
operation of that memory bias in successive participants, providing an experimental 
microcosm for the study of cultural, as opposed to merely cognitive (memoiy) 
processes. Fuithermore, the assumption that a consistent effect will be observed along 
an extended chain is just that: an assumption. In fact, other transmission chain studies 
(e.g. Kashima, 2000a; Chapter 6 ) have demonstrated cross-over effects in which later 
generations reverse a trend exhibited by earlier generations. Hence the assumption of 
persistence needs to be empirically tested, as was done here, rather than assumed a 
priori.
Data on persistence consequently allow us to draw conclusions regarding the 
wider effect of a social bias on human culture in general. As noted by Kashima 
(2000b), Bartlett (1932) was interested not only in cultural transmission but also 
large-scale cultui al change, and Kashima (2000b) suggests that the tiansmission chain 
method “provides one way of examining how micro-processes contribute to a macro­
phenomenon such as the maintenance of culture” (p. 394). We may speculate that the 
bias for social information found here can be extrapolated to the population level to 
explain the popularity of socially oriented mass media such as gossip magazines and 
television soap operas over non-social or factual journals and television 
documentaries. There are a number of theoretical frameworks that might be used to 
make this Ihilc more formally, such as Moscovici’s (1984) social representation 
theory, Sperber’s (1996) epidemiological model of cultiual change, and theories of
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cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; 
Mesoudi et a l, 2004).
As noted by Emler (2001), there has been very little experimental work on 
gossip in the past. Hence this study was intended to be an initial investijgation of the 
phenomenon under very simplified conditions. There aie undoubtedly a number of 
factors not examined here that likely play an important role in the transmission of 
social information in the real world, and it is hoped that this study will provide the 
foundation for future work systematically examining such factors. For example, the 
participants in the present study were not instmcted that the experiment was a 
memory test, that the material had come from another participant, or that their recall 
would be passed on to another paiticipant. The third parties described in the material 
were also not known to the participants. Given that it is well established that people 
often tailor their messages to suit the intended receiver (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), 
providing such knowledge to the participants may well affect the content or accuracy 
of the recall. Similarly, having the participants transmit the material face-to-face 
rather than via anonymous written text would allow the investigation of interpersonal 
factors such as intonation of voice or non-verbal cues. More natuialistic methods, 
such as those used to study mmour transmission (Rosnow, 1980, 1991), might also be 
used to investigate such factors.
The conclusions drawn here aie of course dependent on the specific material 
used, and there is a need to replicate the study with alternative examples of the 
different types of infoiination. fri Experiment 5b an effort was made to ensure that the
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foui' material types contained equivalent underlying causal and temporal chains so 
that differences in transmission could be more confidently attiibuted to differences in 
content. However, this underlying structure was still somewhat informal, and future 
studies might use more advanced models of causal links in narratives (e.g. Trabasso & 
Speri'y’s (1985) causal network representation or Trabasso & van den Broek’s (1985) 
recui'sive transition network model) to more precisely equate the underlying stmcture 
of the different material.
There may also be an effect of varying the number of social agents or 
interactions. The Gossip and Social material in Experiment 5b featured three people 
(Nancy, the professor and his wife for the Gossip material; Nancy, the old man and 
the bus driver for the Social material), which is within the typical upper bound of four 
found in natuial conversational groups (Dunbar, Duncan, & Nettle, 1995). Perhaps 
material featuring interactions between more than four people would be transmitted 
less well.
There is also a need to replicate the study cross-culturally. Although condition- 
dependent biases might modulate outcomes according to ecological variations, the 
evolutionary theories outlined above would predict that people in many different 
societies would show the social bias found here. However, it should also be noted that 
the sample used in the present study is particularly useful in one respect in 
challenging the stereotypical and historical view of a ‘gossip’ as poorly educated, of 
low intelligence, and female (Emler, 2001, pp. 318-319). The present study found that
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highly educated and intelligent young people of both sexes exhibit a bias for gossip 
over non-social (‘factual’) information.
In summary, Chapter 5 has experimentally demonstrated the operation of a bias 
in hmnan cultural transmission toward social infoimation, defined as information 
concerning social interactions between a number of people. Such information was 
tiansmitted with greater accuracy and in greater quantity than both information about 
an individual person’s behaviour and non-human physical interactions. It was found 
that the quality of the social interactions was largely unimportant, insofar as 
information featuring gossip-like interactions was transmitted no better than 
information featuring commonplace eveiyday interactions. This social bias is argued 
to have evolutionary origins, consistent with theories positing emphasis on the social 
functions of human intelligence.
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CHAPTER 6 - T he H ie r a r c h ic a l  T r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  E v e n t
Kn o w led g e^
6.1 A bst r a c t
There is extensive evidence that adults, children, and some non-human species 
represent routine events in the fonn of hierarchically structured ‘action scripts’, and 
show superior recall and imitation of infoiination at relatively high-levels of this 
hierarchy. Chapter 6  investigated the hypothesis that a ‘hierarchical bias’ operates in 
human cultiual transmission, acting to impose a hierarchical structuie onto 
descriptions of everyday events, and to increasingly describe those events in terms of 
higher hierarchical levels. Descriptions of three everyday events (going to a 
restaurant, getting up and going shopping) expressed entirely in tenns of basic low- 
level actions were transmitted along ten chains each containing four adult human 
participants. It was found that the proportion of low-level infonnation showed a 
significant lineai* decrease with transmission generation, while the proportions of 
medium- and high-level information showed significant linear increases, consistent 
with the operation of a hierarchical bias. The findings additionally provide support for 
script theory in general, and are discussed in relation to hierarchical imitation in non­
human primates.
 ^ Reproduced with minor revisions from Mesoudi, A. and Whiten, A. (2004). The 
hierarchical transformation of event knowledge in human cultural transmission. Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, 4(1), 1-24.
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6.2 In t r o d u c t io n
Cultural tiansmission is the process by which learned information passes from 
individual to individual. This is contrasted with the transmission of information 
genetically, or information acquired through individual learning. The earliest 
experimental investigations into cultural transmission were carried out by Bartlett 
(1932) using his ‘method of serial reproduction’, in which a participant reads some 
stimulus material, then after a short delay recalls it. This recall is then presented to a 
second participant to recall, whose output is given to the third participant, and so on 
along a transmission chain. Bartlett (1932) was thus able to study the changes that 
occurred to the material as it passed along the chain, and compare the differential 
degradation rates of different types of material.
One of the key findings of Bartlett’s (1932) original studies was that folk tales 
were transmitted with gieater fidelity than any other text, such as a newspaper article, 
a description of a scene or a scientific argument. Bartlett (1932) argued that folk tales 
were more amenable to tiansmission because people possess ‘story schemas’, which 
represent the underlying structure of generic stories such as folk tales, around which 
the specific details of that particular story may be reconstmcted. Cognitive 
psychologists such as Mandler and Johnson (1977), Rumelhart (1977) and Thorndyke 
(1977) later expanded this concept of a ‘story schema’, characterising its structure as 
hierarchical, drawing on Chomsky’s (1957) argument that the giammatical structure 
of language is organised hierarchically (indeed, some of these were called ‘story 
grammars’). Specifically, folk stories are organised in branching tree-like structures, 
with the general theme or gist at the highest level of the hierarchy, which branches out
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into separate events, each of which in turn contain sub-goals, and finally down to the 
low-level constituent actions that are performed to achieve those sub-goals^. 
Consistent with tliis theory, Thorndyke (1977) found that stories with such an 
underlying hierarchical organisation were rated as easier to comprehend and recalled 
better than stories similar in content but without a hierarchical organisation. 
Furthermore, the higher a fact was in the hieraichy, the more likely it was to be 
recalled.
Schanlc and Abelson (1977) similarly invoked the concept of an underlying 
hierarchical structure in their script theory. A script is defined as a stereotypical 
knowledge structure for an everyday routine event, such as going to a restaurant or 
visiting the doctor, around which specific instances of that event aie built. For 
example, going to a restauiant would contain several sub-goals, such as being seated, 
ordering food, eating, and paying the bill. Each of these in tmn contains a series of 
actions that must be performed in order to achieve the sub-goal. ‘Ordering’, for 
example, contains actions such as reading the menu, deciding what to have, signalling 
to the waitress and so on. Ultimately, each sub-goal must be completed before the
 ^ This is, therefore, a partonomic hierarchy, based on ‘p^i't-of relations (i.e. each 
action forms ‘part of a sub-goal, which in tiirn is ‘part of the gist), rather than a taxonomic 
hierarchy, such as taxonomies of species, which are based on ‘kind-of relations (Zacks & 
Tversky, 2001), Henceforth, discussion of hierarchies concerns partonomies rather than 
taxonomies.
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overall goal of eating at a restaurant can be achieved. An example of this hierarchical 
stmcture is displayed in Figure 6.1.
Go to restaurant
Sit down Order food Eat food Pay bill Leave
T
Open Look at Decide Call Tell waitress
menu menu on food waitress order
Ask Bill Takeout Leave Leave tip
for bill arrives wallet amount
Figure 6.1 -  An action script for going to a restaurant. The thiee levels correspond to 
the high-, medium- and low-levels used in this study. Not all of the low-level actions
aie displayed.
Consistent with script theory, Bower, Black, and Turner (1979) found that when 
presented with a series of actions fonning a script event, participants agieed on how 
to gi'oup those actions into higher level segments. Furtheraiore, when the usual order 
of a script was scrambled, participants tended to spontaneously reintioduce the 
original order, and in subsequent memory recognition tests, participants claimed to 
have read actions that were not in the original stimulus material but which could be 
infeiTed from higher levels of the script. Abbott, Black and Smith (1985) expanded 
upon this latter finding by showing that participants falsely infeiTed the presence of 
higher level sub-goals (e.g. ‘They ordered their meal’) when presented with lower 
level constituent actions (e.g. ‘They discussed what they wanted to eat’), but not vice
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versa. This asymmetry suggests the existence of a hierarchical organisation with 
increasing levels of abstraction.
More recently, Zacks, Tversky and Iyer (2001) found further evidence for the 
hierarchical stmcture of scripts using a slightly different methodology. Participants 
were shown videotapes of models performing routine activities, such as washing the 
dishes or making the bed, and were asked to segment these activities into either the 
smallest or the largest meaningful units. It was found that the large unit boundaries 
were significantly likely also to be small unit boundaiies, suggesting an underlying 
hierarchical stmcture. This was observed when segmentation was perfonned both 
while watching the video (by pressing a key when a segment boundary occurred) and 
when recalling the video from memory. An important point from this study is that it 
demonstrates that the hierarchical organisation of script events is not simply an 
artifact of representing such events linguistically, and so dispels the criticism that the 
effects described above may simply be a by-product of the hieraichical organisation 
of linguistic grammar.
That the hierarchical nature of event knowledge is independent of language is 
reinforced by studies of preverbal children and non-hiunan species. Developmental 
psychologists have shown that children also possess well organised and stable 
knowledge about familiar events that resembles action scripts, suggesting that scripts 
are a fundamental component of cognition. Nelson and Gmendel (1986) interviewed 
V/i to 6  year old childien for their verbal descriptions of everyday events such as 
eating lunch, getting dressed and going shopping. It was found firstly that there was
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general agreement across children on the acts that constituted each event, secondly 
that these acts resembled the sub-goals of an action script (e.g. sitting down, ordering, 
eating), and thirdly that these acts were produced more often than more specific low- 
level actions. Slackman, Hudson and Fivush (1986) reported that upon fuither 
prompting, children readily produced the constituent actions of each sub-goal, 
indicating an understanding of the lower levels of the hierarchy. Slaclonan et al 
(1986), also reported the use of increasingly more elaborate hierarchical organisation 
between the ages of 4 to 6  years, with both the number of elements (e.g. sub-goals and 
actions), and the children’s understanding of how those elements can be placed in the 
hierarchy (e.g. whether they are necessaiy or optional, or conditional upon another 
element), increasing with age and experience. More recently, van den Broek, Lorch 
and Thurlow (1996) similarly found that 4 and 6  year olds showed better memory for 
events at a higher hierarchical level than at a lower level when recalling stories from 
television programmes.
There is also evidence that a precursor to hierarchical action scripts is present in 
children under two years of age. Bauer and Mandler (1989) modelled a series of 
causally related actions resembling a simple script (such as ‘remove bear’s shirt, put 
bear in bath, wash bear’) for 16 and 20 month olds. When subsequently encomaged to
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imitate these actions, sequences with causal (or enabling^) relations were reproduced 
more accurately than arbitrarily connected sequences lacking causal relations. Bauer 
and Mandler (1989) also found that irrelevant actions within otherwise causally 
connected action sequences tended to be displaced or omitted, resembling the 
spontaneous réintroduction of order found by Bower et ah (1979). Evidence from 
developmental psychology, therefore, shows that from a very early age childien 
understand and use causal relations to organise their recall of events, an ability that 
may act as a precursor to frilly formed hierarchically organised scripts that emerge 
around tliree years of age.
The concept of hierarchical organisation has also been used in the study of 
animal behaviour. Dawkins (1976a) has argued that hieraichical stmcture constitutes 
‘good design’, and so would be expected to have been favouied by natural selection. 
Indeed, one example of hierarchically organised behaviour given by Dawkins (1976a, 
pp. 42-43), that of a predator catching prey, bears a striking resemblance to Schanlc 
and Abelson’s (1977) restaurant script: the overall goal of ‘catching prey’ is broken 
down into lower level components (‘searching’, ‘puisuit’, ‘killing’ and ‘eating’), each 
of which contain further lower level action mles. While this example was
 ^ Strictly, many of the links described here are enabling rather than causal. For 
example, the act of opening a door enables, but does not in itself cause, the subsequent act of 
passing through the door. For simplicity of expression, however, further references to ‘causal 
connections’ imply either causal or enabling relations.
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hypothetical, Dawkins (1976a) presents in more detail analyses of blowfly glooming 
and fish behaviour that demonstrate hierarchical organisation.
Recent work on social learning in primates has also focused on the hierarchical 
nature of what is learned. Byiiie and Russon (1998) have ai'gued that imitation can 
occur at two levels: the action level, which contains the basic constituent acts; and the 
progiam level, which constitutes the higher-level hierarchical organisation of those 
constituent acts. For example, the process by which mountain gorillas prepare the 
herb galium for consumption could potentially be imitated at any of several 
hierarchical levels, from the overall goal (‘eat galium’), to more detailed sub-goals 
(‘repeatedly pick green strands of galium with one hand...’), down to the fine motor 
details of the actions (‘pick out a strand of green galium from the mass with any 
precision grip of the left hand...). In Byrne and Russon’s (1998) tei-minology, 
program level imitation involves copying the second of these, at the sub-goal level. 
Using obsei'vational data concerning gorillas and orang-utans, they go on to argue that 
imitation in great apes is primarily at the progiam level, with occasional action level 
imitation occumng for social functions (although see Stoinksi, Wrate, Ure, & Whiten, 
2 0 0 1  for experimental evidence that failed to find progiam level imitation in gorillas).
Whiten (2002), meanwhile, has investigated imitation of similar hierarchical 
stmctures experimentally. Thiee-year-old childien observed an adult opening an 
artificial fruit in one of two hierarchically different ways, row-wise or column-wise. 
The children were statistically more likely to adopt the hierarchical organisation that 
they obsei'ved, while the sequential order within the subroutines of that liierarchy
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(within-rows or within-columns) was not copied. This thus represents an extension of 
Bauer and Mandler’s (1989) work on imitation in younger infants, demonstrating that 
by three years of age children can imitate high-level hierarchical information. 
Although these studies of primates and preverbal children are investigating the 
behaviouial execution of script events rather than the Imowledge of such events 
represented in memory, script theory would predict the two should match, insofar as 
the script knowledge is built up from previous behavioui al experiences of events.
To summarise, the evidence outlined above suggests that humans and some 
other species represent knowledge of routine events or stereotypical action sequences 
hierai’chically, and tend to show better memory for, and imitation of, actions that are 
represented at a relatively high level of that hierarchy. Chapter 6  was designed to 
systematically test for such a ‘hierarchical bias’ in human cultural tiansmission, by 
passing descriptions of events entirely in tenns of their low-level constituent actions 
along chains of participants. It was predicted that these low-level descriptions would 
gradually ‘move up the liierarchy’, that is, the low-level actions would be subsumed 
into their liigher level sub-goals, which would in turn be subsumed into the highest 
level overall goal. In essence, then, this study is coming full circle, updating Bartlett’s 
(1932) original transmission chain studies, from which the concept of the ‘schema’ 
first emerged, with the past seventy years of schema research, the main contribution 
of which has been the concept of the hierarchy.
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6,3 M et h o d s
â.S.I Design
The transmission chain design was adopted, in which the first participant in 
each chain recalls the original stimulus material, the output of wliich is then given to 
the second participant to recall, whose recall is in turn given to the third paiticipant, 
and so on down the chain. Ten chains each containing four participants were run, with 
the first participant in each chain given the material reproduced in Table 6.1 
constituting just the low-level actions of the hierarchy. The overall design is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. Each chain transmitted all three scripts, with the order m 
which they were presented on the page counterbalanced.
The independent variable was the transmission generation, of which there were 
five: the original (FO) stimulus material and foui' recall generations (F1-F4). The 
dependent variable was the proportion of the total number of propositions recalled at 
each generation that was categorised at each hierarchical level (low, medium, liigh or 
none). It was predicted that, as the material is transmitted along the chain, the 
proportion of propositions classed as at the low-level in the hierarchy would 
significantly decrease, while the proportions classed as at the medium- and high- 
levels would significantly increase.
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Going to a restaurant
Low-level (given to the first generation):
John and Nancy entered the restaurant and were shown to a table by the waitress. They sat down on the 
chairs and placed napkins on their laps. Then they looked at the menu and decided what food to have. 
They signalled to the waitress and told her their order, which the waitress wrote down. John and Nancy 
drank wine and talked until their food arrived. They ate the main course, then they had dessert, John 
asked for the bill, and the waiti'ess brought it over. John took out his wallet and left money, as well as a 
tip. Then they both stood up and went to the cloakroom to fetch their coats. Jolm and Nancy put on their 
coats and walked outside. (122 words, 10 sentences, 25 propositions)
Medium-level:
Jolm and Nancy sat down (1), ordered their food (2), ate their food (3), paid the bill (4) and left (5).
High-level:
John and Nancy went to a restaurant.
Grocery shopping
Low-level (given to the first generation):
Rachel parked her car outside the supermarket. She got out of her car, collected a trolley and wheeled it 
inside. She checked her list and went down the aisles. She put the items that were on her list into her 
trolley until she had them all. Then Rachel went to the checkout where she joined the fastest queue. She 
waited in the queue, and then unloaded her items onto the belt. The cashier rang up the items on the till 
and told Rachel the total. Rachel gave the cashier some money and the cashier gave Rachel her change. 
Rachel put the shopping into the bags and put the bags into the trolley. She wheeled the trolley out to her 
car and put the bags into the boot before driving away. (130 words, 10 sentences, 25 propositions)
Medium-level:
Rachel arrived at the supermarket (1), got items (2), queued (3), paid (4) and left (5).
High-level:
Rachel went shopping.
Getting up
Low-level (given to the first generation):
Ian woke up and switched off the alarm. He lay in bed and stretched, then stood up. Ian went into the 
bathi'oom and turned on the shower. He washed himself then dried off with a towel. Then Ian went back 
into the bedroom and picked out some clothes from his wardrobe. He put on the clothes and checked 
himself in the minor. Ian went downstairs and made some tea and some toast. He ate the toast while 
reading the newspaper. Then Ian got the books that he needed, put on his shoes and his coat and went 
outside. (98 words, 9 sentences, 25 propositions)
Medium-level:
Ian got out of bed (1), had a shower (2), got dressed (3), had breakfast (4) and left the house (5).
High-level: 
Ian got up.
Table 6.1 -  Descriptions of the action scripts at each hierarchical level. Only the low- 
level descriptions were given to the first participant in each chain.
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Generation( 3 )  =  1 participant
FO
material
( lo w  lev e l  
actions)
Figure 6.2 -  The transmission chain design of Chapter 6  
6.3.2 Materials
The material was derived from Bower et aVs (1979) Experiment 1, in which 
161 participants were asked to generate a sequence of actions that best describe a 
routine everyday event, specifically going to a restaurant, attending a lecture, getting 
up, grocery shopping and visiting a doctor. Table 2 in Bower et a l (1979) lists every 
action mentioned by at least 25% of participants, and these actions were used to 
construct the hierarchical descriptions shown in Table 6.1 here, concerning three of 
those action scripts: going to a restaurant, getting up, and going shopping.
The descriptions in Table 6.1 were designed to contain identical hierarchical 
structures in terms of their underlying propositions (see Coding section 6.3.3 below 
for details of propositions). Each script contained a single high-level proposition
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which branched out into five medium-level propositions, each of which in turn 
branched out into five low-level propositions (giving 25 low-level propositions in 
total), similai* to the stmcture shown in Figure 6.1. The low-level propositions roughly 
correspond to those actions generated by 25-50% of Bower et aVs (1979) 
pailicipants, the medium-level to actions generated by 50-75% of Bower et a/.’s 
(1979) participants, and the high-level proposition to the overall heading originally 
presented by Bower et al (1979) to their participants. No proposition was present at 
more than one level of the hierarchy. Note that the structure does not correspond 
exactly with every one of the actions in Bower et aVs (1979) Table 2 as it was 
necessary that each of the thi'ee scripts contained the same number of propositions at 
each hierarchical level. Minor changes were also made to make the text more easily 
understood by modem day British participants.
6.3.3 Coding
A prepositional analysis (Kintsch, 1974) was perfomied on each participant’s 
recall, where the text is divided into separate propositions (see Chapter 4). In the 
present analysis, the names of the characters and the tense were considered 
unimportant to the hypothesis, and so were ignored. The couple in the restaurant 
script was also considered as a single imit, rather than two separate people, in order to 
match the other two scripts. Once the prepositional analysis had been perfomied, the 
recall was then compared to the stiuctui’e presented in Table 6.1, with each 
proposition classed as either low-, medium- or high-level (or ‘none’ if not present at 
any level of the hieraichy).
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To assess inter-rater reliability, an independent coder blind to the nature and 
hypotheses of the study perfonned the entire coding procedure for three of the ten 
chains. That is, the second coder divided each recall into propositions and classed 
each as low, medium, high or none, although the terms low, medium and high were 
replaced with the nondescript labels A, B and C. The coding of the blind second coder 
and myself were highly correlated, with a Pearson’s coirelation coefficient of 0.93.
A problem that arose during coding concerned the high-level Getting Up 
proposition. Wliile this proposition (Tan got up’) was fiequently produced by the 
participants, it was obvious fiom the context that the intended meaning was closer to 
the first medium-level proposition (Tan got out of bed’), rather than the entire act of 
getting out of bed, showering, dressing, having breakfast and leaving the house. It was 
therefore decided to code each of these propositions as medium-level, in effect 
eliminating the Getting Up high-level proposition.
6.3.4 Participants
Nineteen male and twenty-one female participants, of mean age 20.59 years, 
were assigned randomly to one of the ten chains. All were students of the University 
of St. Andiuws and were unpaid. All participants spoke English as their first language 
(or had passed entry examinations demonstiating that their English was of a sufficient 
standard to study at a British university). All participants had noirnal reading and 
wilting skills.
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6.3.5 Procedure
Each participant was given a four-page booklet. The front page instmcted the 
participant to read the passage printed on the second page once at a comfortable 
reading speed. The second page contained the material to be recalled, as appropriate 
to that chain and generation. At no point in the printed instructions or by the 
experimenter were the participants informed that they would have to recall this 
material later. The third page contained the insti’uctions:
“In the space below, please write out the text you just read as best you 
can. Try to be as accurate as possible, but don’t wony if you can’t 
remember it all. Spelling is not important. When you have finished, 
turn the page.”
This was followed by a blanlc space for recall, for which no time limit was 
given. The final page solicited the participant’s age and gender, and thanlced them for 
taking part. The experimenter then debriefed them as to the nature of the study. Their 
recall was then typed up, correcting for spelling and giammar, and inserted into the 
next generation’s booklet as appropriate.
6.4 R e su l t s
6.4.1 General findings
As predicted for the tr ansmission chain design, the total number of propositions 
and words decreased with generation. One-way repeated-measures ANDVAs 
confirmed significant effects of generation on the total number of words (F(i,i3) = 
282.67, p < 0.01) and propositions (F(i,n) = 217.37, p < 0.01) contained in each recall 
(both of these tests violated the assumption of sphericity, therefore the Greenhouse-
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Geisser coiTected significance level is reported). Figure 6.3 shows the more 
meaningful of these two measures of recall, the number of propositions, broken down 
into the tlnee scripts. A 3 x 5 (story x generation) repeated measures ANOVA showed 
no significant differences between the three scripts (F(2 ,i8) = 0.85, ns). Data for the 
tliree scripts were therefore combined in subsequent analyses.
Restaurant
1
% 20 -I
• • - Getting up
-  -A- - Shopping
0 15 -
F4F2 F3FIFO
Generation
Figure 6.3 -  The total number of propositions recalled by each generation, broken
down into the three scripts.
Figure 6.4 shows the proportion of the recall of each generation that was 
classified as either low-, medium- or high-level in the script hierarchy, or ‘none’ if the 
proposition was not present at any level. Inspection of Figure 6.4 appears to confinn 
the prediction that the proportion of low-level information would decrease with 
generation and the proportion of medium- and high-level infoiination would increase.
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Iiifoiination not present at any level (‘none’) initially increased to around 0.2 of the 
total propositions recalled, then neither increased nor decreased in a linear fashion. To 
test these trends statistically, linear trend analyses were performed on each 
hierai'chical category separately.
None
■■—Low1II
‘SI
-  -A- - Medium
-  -X ■ - High
—
0 w
FO F4F3F2FI
Generation
Figure 6.4 -  The proportion of the total propositions recalled by each generation that 
was classed at each hierarchical level. Data horn the three scripts are combined. 
‘None’ refers to propositions not contained anywhere in the script hierarchy.
6.4.2 Trend analyses
Trend analyses were perfonned first including the original FO stimulus material 
(i.e. five generations F0-F4) and second excluding FO, including just the four recall 
generations (F1-F4). On the one hand, it was felt that excluding FO would lose the 
contribution of the first (FI) participant in each chain in initially transforming the FO
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material. On the other hand, it was also of interest whether the four recall generations 
(F1-F4) would alone show the predicted trends, as FO was in a sense engineered by 
the experimenter with the hypothesis in mind.
The following analyses were performed on all five generations, including the 
original FO stimulus material. Four separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs 
were performed, one for each hierarchical category (low, medium, high and none). 
Wliere the assumption of sphericity is violated, Greenhouse-Geisser connected 
significance levels aie reported. The ANOVAs revealed significant effects of 
generation at each of the four levels (Low: F(4,36) = 78.05, p < 0.01; Mediiun: F(i,n) = 
7.96, p < 0.05, Greenhouse-Geisser coiTected; High; F(i,n) = 7.40, p < 0.05, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected; None: F(2,2 i) = 4.18, p < 0.05, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). The trend analyses revealed that the low-level proportion showed a 
significant linear decrease with generation (F(i,g) = 175.92, p < 0.01), while the 
medium-level proportion (F(i,9) = 10.41, p < 0.01) and the high-level proportion (F(i,g) 
= 11.82, p < 0.01) showed separate significant linear increases with generation. The 
‘none’ proportion showed no significant linear trend (F(i,9) = 3.30, ns). These ti*end 
analyses therefore confinn the prediction that low-level information would 
significantly decrease with generation, and medium- and high-level information 
would significantly increase.
The following analyses were performed after excluding the original FO stimulus 
material, leaving the four recall generations (F1-F4). The low-level proportion again 
showed a significant effect of generation (F(3,2?) = 13.68, p < 0.01), and a trend
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analysis again revealed a significant linear decrease with generation (F(i,9) = 22.30, p 
< 0.01). The medium-level proportion, however, showed no significant effect of 
generation (F(i,n) = 1.55, ns, Greenhouse-Geisser coiTected) and thus no significant 
tiend. The high-level proportion showed no significant effect of generation using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser conection (F(i,n) = 4.60, ns), although this became significant 
with the less conservative Huynli-Feldt coixection (F(i,n) 4.60, p < 0.05). If the
latter conection is accepted, then there was a significant linear increase with 
generation (F(i,9) = 5.55, p < 0.05). Finally, there was no effect of generation for the 
‘none’ proportion (F(3,2?) = 0.87, ns).
One reason for the lack of a significant trend for the medium-level after the first 
generation may have been that while low-level propositions were being converted into 
medium-level propositions, medium-level propositions were in turn being converted 
into high-level propositions, with the net change at the medium-level being zero. An 
analysis was therefore perfonned on the combined proportion of medium- and high- 
level propositions, resulting in a significant effect of generation (F(2,i6) = 7.84, p < 
0.01, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) and a significant linear increase with generation 
(F(i,9) = 13.75, p <  0.01).
In summary, the trend analyses support the hypothesis that infoimation moves 
up the hierarchy as it is passed along the tiansmission chain. Including the original FO 
stimulus material in the analyses, there was a significant decrease in low-level 
infomiation and separate significant increases in both medium- and high-level 
inforaiation. As might be expected given that the FO material was specifically
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designed with the hypothesis in mind, excluding the FO material gave a somewhat less 
robust effect, although the hypothesis was still supported. There was again a 
significant decrease in low-level information, and a significant increase in medium- 
and high-level infomiation combined, although not separately. The fact that there was 
a significant effect despite removing the contribution of the first generation confimis 
the value of the transmission cham method over and above a standard single 
generation memory experiment. Finally, information not contained within the 
hierarchy showed no linear increase or decrease with generation, both with and 
without FO.
6.4.3 Deviations o f order
Abelson (1981) has argued that ‘strong’ scripts, such as the ones used in this 
study, contain implicit infomiation on the conect order of sub-goals, often dictated by 
causal or enabling relations between those sub-goals. For example, eating food in a 
restaurant can only be achieved once ordering is completed: ordering enables eating. 
The finding by Bower et al. (1979) that scrambled scripts were comected into their 
canonical order supports this assertion.
In line with this, the order of both medium- and low-level propositions was 
transmitted almost entirely intact in the present study. Only one of the 163 medium- 
level propositions recalled by all forty participants deviated from the original 
medium-level order in the stimulus FO material. This single violation occuiTed in a 
first generation recall of the Getting Up script, where the character was described as 
having a shower after getting dressed. Although this is possible, it is highly
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improbable, and a doser inspection revealed that the recall in fact reads more like a 
list of actions with no temporal or causal comiections: “He gets dressed and he has a 
shower” (italics added), rather than a temporally comiected narrative (which might 
use ‘then’ rather than ‘and’). It may be no coincidence, then, that the next generation 
in this chain lost the Getting Up script entirely, given that script-like nanatives should 
be more likely to be remembered than unconnected lists of events.
Similarly, only thi'ee of the 241 low-level propositions that were recalled 
deviated from the original low-level order. The first consisted of the couple in the 
restaurant drinking wine after eating their meal, rather than before. Such a deviation 
might be expected, as wine can be, and usually is, drunk before, during and after a 
meal. The other two deviations were identical but from different chains (a possible 
instance of ‘convergent cultui al evolution’), and consisted of the Getting Up character 
going downstairs before having a shower, rather than after. However, it should be 
noted that the student residences in which all of the participants lived have showers on 
the ground floor, perhaps explaining this change in order. If this is indeed the reason, 
then this is an interesting example of how recent experience shapes underlying scripts, 
and hence also shapes immediate recall of script-like descriptions.
6.4.4 Illustrative examples
A representative chain illustrating the ‘hiérarchisation’ of the original low-level 
material is reproduced in Table 6.2. Although the script shows a diastic reduction in 
length, there is an intuitive sense that the ‘gist’ or ‘core’ of the story has been 
presei'ved through every step of the chain. In terms of the theory presented here, this
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is the result of the script being described at progiessively higher hierarchical levels. 
This can also be observed, with low-level actions (e.g. giving money to the cashier 
and receiving change in return) gradually being subsumed into higher order sub-goals 
(e.g. ‘paying’).
Generation FO (original material):
Rachel pa.rked her car outside the supermarket. She got out of her car, collected a 
ti'olley and wheeled it inside. She checked her list and went down the aisles. She put 
the items that were on her list into her trolley until she had them all. Then Rachel 
went to the checkout where she joined the fastest queue. She waited in the queue, and 
then unloaded her items onto the belt. The cashier rang up the items on the till and 
told Rachel the total. Rachel gave the cashier some money and the cashier gave 
Rachel her change. Rachel put the shopping into the bags and put the bags into the 
trolley. She wheeled the trolley out to her car and put the bags into the boot before 
driving away.___________________________________________________________
Generation FI:
Rachel went shopping, parked her car at the supermai'ket, got out of the car, got a 
trolley, went into the supeimarket and collected the food she wanted. She went to pay 
for the goods, gave the cashier the money, he gave her change and a receipt. Then she 
took the trolley back and then drove off in her car._____________________________
Generation F2:
Rachel drove to a supemiarket, parked her car, got a tiolley and chose some food. 
Then she went to the cashier to pay for her food. The cashier gave her some change. 
Then she put back the trolley and drove away.________________________________
Generation F3:
Rachel drove to the supemiarket, parked her car, got a trolley and chose some food. 
She paid the cashier and drove home._______________________________________
Generation F4:
Rachel went to the supermarket, got some food and went home.
Table 6.2 - An illustrative example showing the changes in one of the episodes during
transmission
Two more specific examples illustrate the hierarchical bias further. First, in one 
of the chains the thi'ee separate scripts merged to form a single nan ative. For example, 
one fourth generation recall stated:
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‘Tan woke up and ate breakfast. Nancy went to the supermarket for 
shopping. Afteiwards they both met up and had lunch.”
Here, the two originally different chaiacters from the Getting Up and Shopping 
scripts became the two characters in the Restamant script, creating a single narrative 
of their day. Details of the restaurant are also lost, becoming ‘having lunch’. The 
second example comes from another fourth generation recall, in which a paiticipant 
forgets one of the stories (Getting Up) and invents a completely new one. While the 
content is forgotten, however, the hierai'chical level of description, roughly 
corresponding to the medium-level of the other scripts, is perfectly preserved:
“Peter went to the cinema and watched a movie and went home.”
These two phenom ena -  im posing links to turn tliree fragments into a single 
naiTative, and preserving the script-like stmcture despite entirely forgetting the 
content -  illustrate a seem ing com pulsion to describe actions and events in terms o f  
highly structuied script-like representations, and provide additional evidence for the 
psychological reality o f  script theory.
6.5 D is c u s s io n
The aim of Chapter 6 was to investigate the possible operation of a ‘hierarchical 
bias’ in the cultural transmission of event knowledge. This bias is hypothesised to 
impose a script-like hierarchical stmcture onto descriptions of such events, and 
progressively subsume low-level actions into their higher level goals as the 
descriptions are passed from person to person. This was tested by passing short 
descriptions of tliree scripts (going to a restaurant, getting up and going shopping)
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consisting entirely of infoimation at a relatively low hierarchical level along multiple 
chains of participants. The results confirmed that as these low-level descriptions were 
passed along the chains, there was a significant linear decrease in low-level 
infoimation, and a significant linear increase in medium- and high-level information.
These significant linear tiends, demonstiating a cumulative increase or decrease 
in information with generation at specific hierarchical levels, illusti ate the value of the 
tiansmission chain method over standard single generation memory experiments, and 
confinn that the effect is genuinely ‘cultural’. It can be hypothesised that this 
experimental finding of a hierarchical bias using the transmission chain method can 
be extrapolated to human cultural tiansmission more generally, and a similar process 
would be obsei-ved whenever infoimation concerning everyday events is passed fiom 
person to person in the population as a whole.
As well as elucidating a particular aspect of cultural transmission, this result 
also provides support for the psychological reality of script theory (Schanlc & 
Abelson, 1977), complementing studies such as Bower et al (1979) and Zacks et al 
(2001). In addition to the main finding, it was also found that the canonical order of 
the medium- and low-level actions was presei'ved in the vast majority of recalls, as 
predicted by Abelson (1981). It was further found that causal connections were 
imposed on script fragments to foim a single narrative, and that even where the 
content of a script was entirely forgotten the high-level hierarchical structure was 
retained, both of which suggest that events are represented in a highly stmctuied 
fashion.
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The demonstration of a hierarchical bias in human cultural transmission also 
adds plausibility to the prediction made by Byrne and Russon (1998) that non-human 
primates are most likely to successfully imitate actions at a relatively high (‘program’) 
level of the hieraichy. Although the present study examined verbally-expressed 
laiowledge of events rather than the behavioural execution of such acts, script theory 
predicts that the two would be matched, given that script knowledge is shaped by past 
behavioural experience of such events. Furthermore, Whiten (2002) has demonstiated 
hierarchical imitation in human children, suggesting that the hierarchical bias can be 
extiapolated to the perception of actions, and this begs testing in other primate 
species. Although initially it would be desirable to experimentally demonstrate the 
one-to-one imitation of hierarcliical stmctuie as suggested by Whiten (2002), 
ultimately it may be fruitful to adapt the method used in the present study, to see 
whether hierarchical stmcture can be transmitted along chains of non-human 
primates. Indeed, based on the results reported here, marked effects may not be 
obsei*ved for several generations.
The identification of hierarchical structure in human cultural transmission is 
also relevant to memetics, which aigues that human culture evolves thi'ough the 
differential transmission of discrete ‘cultural replicators’, or ‘memes’, loosely 
analogous to genes (Dawkins, 1976b; see Aunger, 2000 and Part A for further 
discussion of cultural evolution and memes). One major criticism of the memetics 
literature is that memes are too ephemeral to function as replicators, because the 
mutation rate is too high to provide sufficient copying fidelity (e.g. Dennett, 1995). 
However, Plotkin (1996; 2000) has suggested that if culturally transmitted
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infoimation is hierai'chically stmctnred, then although infoimation at the low or 
surface level of the liierarchy may not have sufficient copying fidelity, information 
higher up the hieraichy at a deeper level may change slowly enough to constitute 
genuine cultural replicators. The results of the present study suggest that this may be 
the case, with the core high-level infoimation (e.g. going to a restaurant) showing 
much greater copying fidelity than the low-level details. Memeticists looking to 
identify memes might therefore be advised to start with such high-level structures.
Extensive evidence was presented in the Introduction (Section 6.2) for the 
tendency of adults, children and non-human species to represent events hierarchically, 
and show superior recall and imitation of information at relatively high-levels of that 
hierarchy. The present study confirmed the operation of a hierarchical bias in human 
cultural tiansmission. What, however, is the functional significance of this 
hierarchical bias to cultuial transmission? The answer may lie in Bartlett’s (1932) 
explanation for his finding that folk tales, even unfamiliar folic tales, were transmitted 
with far greater fidelity than any other material, such as newspaper reports and 
scientific aiguments. Bartlett (1932) argued that this occuiTed because people already 
possessed story schemas, around which they could reconstruct the paificular story 
they had read. In the present case of action scripts, an even stronger argument can be 
made. As well as possessing the hierarchical structure of everyday events, the 
participants studied here would also possess the content of scripts such as going to a 
restaurant or getting up. Given that everyone in a society shares the same implicit 
script knowledge, then it is more efficient to transmit only the high-level goals or 
medium-level sub-goals, as it can be assumed that people can reconstruct for
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themselves the constituent low-level actions. In other words, the low-level 
information is redundant, and so can be removed without any loss in the intended 
message.
The evidence presented in the hitroduction (Section 6.2) suggests that the key 
assumption upon which this explanation rests -  that everyone in a society shares the 
implicit stmcture and content of action scripts -  is a good one. Bower et a l (1979) 
and Nelson and Gmendel (1986) found substantial agieement amongst adults and 
children respectively on the actions that make up common scripts and their 
hierarchical stmcture, while Bauer and Mandler (1989) foimd evidence for very early 
development of an understanding of causally linked script-like sequences of actions.
Two predictions follow from this explanation. First, if the low-level information 
is indeed redundant, then it should be possible for new participants to reconstmct an 
approximation of the original FO material fiom just the final F4 recalls produced in 
this study (given appropriate instmctions such as ‘make up a typical story based 
around the following sentence’). Second, if the low-level infoimation is made non- 
redundant, i.e. it cannot be reconstructed just from the high-level sub-goals, then it 
should be preserved as well as the higher levels. This would occur if the low-level 
infoimation were not part of the usual script. Just such an effect was observed by 
Bower et al (1979), who found that unexpected inti'usions to the script were more 
likely to be recalled than routine script actions. However, this only occiUTed for 
intmsions that constituted inteiTuptions in the causal stmcture of the script, such as an 
obstacle to a sub-goal (e.g. the menu is in French) or a distraction that sets up a new
202
goal (e.g. the waitress spills soup on the customer, requiring a trip to the bathroom). 
Intrusions that constituted simple errors that did not affect the causal structure were 
recalled less well than routine script actions. This resembles the finding by Bauer and 
Mandler (1989) that infants omitted causally-inelevant actions when imitating 
sequences of actions. Causally-relevant intmsions should, therefore, be preserved 
during transmission.
Alternatively, the participant could be instmcted to write out the story for an 
imaginary recipient who they laiow does not possess the implicit script, such as a 
hunter gatherer unfamiliar with restaurants or supermarkets. This latter test assumes, 
however, that the hierarchical bias is imder conscious or intentional contiol, rather 
than an imconscious constiaint on memory, in itself an interesting question that 
flufher experiments could investigate.
As well as altering the material, it may also be of interest to repeat the present 
study with different populations. Although non-Westem populations might not 
possess the scripts that have been studied by Western psychologists, such as visiting a 
restaurant or going shopping, they should possess just as higlily structured scripts for 
stereotyped routine events in their own societies, for which the hierarchical bias 
should operate. There is also evidence that autistic individuals show a difficulty in 
generating scripts (Trillingsgaard, 1999), suggesting that they would not show a 
hierarchical bias, hideed, this deficit might be predicted from the theory outlined 
above. Autistic individuals, who have difficulty representing other people’s mental 
states, might not be able to make the assumption that other people possess implicit
203
knowledge of script events, in which case the low-level information would not be 
redundant.
One final point concerns the relation between the hierarchical bias found here 
and what is colloquially known as ‘summarising’. Many of the fourth generation 
recalls obtained in the present study resemble summaiies of the original FO stimulus 
material (see, for example. Table 6.2), suggesting that the act of summarising a text 
entails the same process as hiérarchisation duiing transmission, i.e. the retention of 
the high-level information and the discarding of low-level details (see also Kintsch & 
van Dijk, 1978, who describe similar constructive and reproductive processes in both 
recall and summarization of texts in general). Indeed, it might be that if a single 
person is asked to summarise the material used here, the result would look similar to 
the cumulative product of asking four people to copy the material exactly. A specific 
instance of this might even be found at the beginning of this chapter: the abstract of a 
scientific paper represents the high-level hierarchical content of the entire report, 
containing the main rationale, findings and implications, and discarding the intricate 
methodological details (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Intriguingly, the results of the 
present study suggest that a summary in terms of high-level hierarchical information, 
such as a scientific abstract, should be highly conducive to cultural transmission. 
Given that a successfiil scientist is partly one whose ideas are disseminated the most 
widely, perhaps the role of abstract writing in science is being greatly underestimated.
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CHAPTER 7 - I n d i r e c t  B ias  a n d  t h e  E f f e c t  o f  S t a tu s  
7.1 A b st r a c t
Boyd and Richerson (1985) have proposed that human cultural transmission 
may exhibit what they call ‘indirect bias’, where cultural traits are preferentially 
copied from people who are of high social status. Two experiments used the 
transmission chain method to test whether the transmission of written arguments 
concerning contentious contemporary issues were affected by the status of the stated 
source, irrespective of the content of those argmnents. hi Experiment 7a the issue was 
whether fluoride should be added to the water supply and the high-status source was 
an academic expert. In Experiment 7b the issue was whether the UK should adopt the 
euro and the high-status somce was a famous celebrity. Neither experiment found any 
effect of status on the accuracy or quantity of transmission, and so failed to show 
evidence for an indirect bias. This implies that simply reporting that written 
infomiation originated fr om a high-status somce is not sufficient to elicit an indirect 
bias favouring that infoimation. Indirect bias may instead be restricted to the 
transmission of behaviom* in the presence of the high-status source.
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7.2 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Boyd and Richerson (1985) have argued that human culture exhibits 
transmission biases which are not present in biological inheritance but nevertheless 
have the potential to significantly affect the large scale dynamics of cultural change. 
Such biases would therefore necessitate the development of novel evolutionary 
models of cultural inlieritance. One such transmission bias is an indirect bias. Boyd 
and Richerson (1985) argued that when choosing between potential models firom 
whom to copy a cultuial trait, people often use indicator traits, or measuies of success 
or status that are not directly related to the copied trait. Examples they give of 
indicator traits are “number of cows, number of children, or number of publications” 
(p. 243). A more specific example of indirect bias might be the adoption of the haircut 
of a famous and successful footballer, despite that haircut having no connection with 
their ability to play football. Such a bias could represent a useful mle of thumb, 
especially when it is difficult or costly to personally evaluate different cultural 
variants.
Boyd and Richerson (1985) also went on to demonstrate mathematically how 
indirectly biased cultural tiansmission can lead to the spread of biologically non- 
adaptive or maladaptive cultuial traits through a population as a result of a runaway 
selection process. The existence of an indirect bias is, therefore, of considerable 
theoretical interest, first in demonstrating that cultural inheritance differs in important 
ways from biological inlieritance and hence merits its own methods of analysis, and 
second in the argument over whether culture is held on a ‘genetic leash’ (Lumsden & 
Wilson, 1981), or whether it can promote the spread of biologically maladaptive
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behavioui'. More recently, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) have extended Boyd and 
Richerson’s (1985) argument, proposing that an indirect bias will lead to the 
development of prestige hierarchies and deference displays, drawing on ethnographic 
data to support their case.
To support their hypothesised tiansmission bias, Boyd and Richerson (1985) 
cited three sources of evidence. First, social learning studies show that observers 
prefer to copy the behaviour of models who exhibited certain other characteristics. 
For example, Bandura, Ross and Ross (1963) found that children imitated incidental 
behaviours exhibited by powerful, contiolling adults more frequently than behaviours 
exhibited by more passive adults. Boyd and Richerson (1985) themselves, however, 
admitted that such studies are ‘only suggestive’ of indirect bias (p. 245), with very 
few indicator traits and transmission parameters investigated. Second, studies of the 
diffusion of imiovations (Rogers, 1995) have found that people report preferentially 
adopting innovations such as new technologies or health practices fr om high-status 
‘opinion leaders’. Third, evidence from socio-linguistics (e.g. Labov, 1972) suggests 
that dialect change is driven by people of high-status in the community. These latter 
two sources of evidence, however, are both observational, and so lack the degiee of 
control over other variables available in experimental studies.
The studies cited above examined the transmission of behaviour in the direct 
presence of sources of different status. The children in Bandura, Ross and Ross 
(1963), for example, acquired a series of behaviours such as hand gestures acquired 
directly from a souice experienced as being of high-status (having access to quality
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toys). The aim of Chapter 7 was to extend the hypothesis of an indirect bias to the 
transmission of verbal information reported to have originated from sources of 
different status.
In order to test this, two experiments used Bartlett’s (1932) transmission chain 
method to experimentally simulate the transmission of two arguments attributed to a 
source of either liigh- or low-status. If the transmission of verbal infomiation is 
guided by an indirect bias, then the aigument stated as originating fr om a high-status 
source should be transmitted with greater accuracy and in gieater quantity than the 
argument from a low-status source, irrespective of the content of the arguments.
This study represents a novel and important extension of the indirect bias 
hypothesis. First, most of the evidence cited above is observational, and the social 
learning experiments are limited in scope. It is important to verify such effects 
experimentally using an explicitly transmission-based paradigm. Second, whether 
infonnation originating from a high-status source continues to be preferentially 
transmitted in the absence of that source, as is hypothesised here, or whether it loses 
its preferential advantage when the source is no longer immediately present, may well 
affect the population-level dynamics of an indirectly biased trait. Third, much of 
human cultural transmission, perhaps the majority, involves either written or spoken 
verbal information rather than behaviour. Hence the overall impact of an indirect bias 
on human culture is likely to be much gieater if it extends to verbal infonnation such 
as that used in this study.
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7.3 E x p e r i m e n t  7 a
Experiment 7a involved the transmission of arguments for and against a health 
issue: whether fluoride should be added to the water supply. The high-status source 
was a (fictional) university professor with particular expertise in this issue.
7.3.1 Methods
7.3.1.1 Participants
Four chains each comprising four paificipants were run, giving a total of 16 
pai'ticipants. All participants were students at the University of St. Andrews and were 
unpaid volunteers. Their mean age was 22.79 years and 44% were female.
7.3.1.2 Materials
A booklet was produced with the relevant material printed on the front sheet, 
followed by a blank sheet for recall, and a final debriefing sheet. All material in all 
generations was prefaced with the following text:
“Following last Thuisday’s announcement by the government of a 
review of whether fluoride should be added to Scotland’s water supply. 
The Herald has received the following letters.”
There were then two arguments, each prefaced with a fictional somce. The 
high-status source was “Alan Peters, professor of dental health at Oxford University 
for over 20 years, and chair of the British Dental Council”, while the low-status 
source was “Herald reader Brian Phillips from East Fife”. Again, these did not change 
with generation, and if not reproduced in later generations were reintroduced.
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Following each of these soui'ces, there followed the transmitted material that was 
passed from generation to generation. The original arguments presented to the first 
generation concerned a topic of much recent debate - whether fluoride should be 
added to the public water supply. Several local and national newspapers were 
searched for articles on this topic, and a list made of all aiguments for and against. 
These were used to constmct two generic arguments, matched for number of words, 
arguments and propositions, that were presented to the first participant of each chain. 
These passages are reproduced in Appendix B. 1.
7.3.1.3 Design
The independent variable was the status of the source, either high or low. All 
participants recalled both high- and low-status material, making this a within-groups 
factor. A second within-gi'oups factor was generation, with foui* levels. The dependent 
variables were tln ee measures of recall. Word count represented a gross measure that 
was independent of actual content. The number of arguments from the original 
material that was recalled at each generation represented a gross measure but one that 
was based on content. The original material contained five arguments for and five 
arguments against, with an argument roughly defined as a single reason why fluoride 
should or should not be added to the water. Finally, the number of propositions 
(Kintsch, 1974) contained in the original material recalled by each generation was a 
more sensitive meaning-based measure (see Chapter 4). The original material 
contained 21 propositions for and 21 against. It should be noted that each recall is 
scored against the arguments or propositions contained in the original material, rather
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than the previous generation’s material, as it is the cumulative ‘cultural’ effects that 
we aie interested in here ratlier tlian any single participant’s perfoiTnance.
73.1.4 Procedure
Participants were told they would be participating in a psychology experiment 
(not a memory test) that would last approximately five minutes. They were seated and 
presented with the booklet and a pen. The fi*ont sheet instructed them to “Please read 
the following extiact fiom a local newspaper. When you have finished turn the page.” 
After reading the material, the next page contained the following instructions:
“N ow , without turning back, please write out as best you can the two 
letters you just read. B e as accuiate as possible, but don’t woiTy i f  you  
can’t remember it all. W hen you have finished turn the page.”
After a blanlc space for recall, the final page solicited their age, sex and whether 
they were personally for or against the presented argument. They were then thanked 
and debriefed by the experimenter. After each participant had finished, their recall 
was taken by the experimenter, typed up (coiTecting for spelling and grammar) and 
inserted as the material in the next generation’s booklet as appropriate.
7.3.1.5 Analyses
Two-within-factor ANOVAs were performed on each measure of recall, with 
status as the first repeated measure (with two levels: high and low) and generation as 
a second repeated measure (with four levels: FI, F2, F3 and F4). A power analysis 
was perfoimed using Potvin and Schütz’s (2000) Monte Carlo-derived formula for 
calculating the non-centrality parameter X and hence power of an ANOVA with two
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repeated measures (see Appendix B.2 for this formula and more details of the power 
analysis).
7.3.2 Results
A  two-within-factor ANOVA showed no effect of status on word count (F(i,s) =
0.37, ns), although there was an effect of generation (F(3,g) = 25.45, p < 0.001). That 
is, all of the material showed significant degiadation over the four generations, as 
expected, but the high- and low-status material did not differ in the rate of that 
degiadation, against the experimental hypothesis. A second two-within-factors 
ANOVA showed an identical result for the number of arguments correctly recalled, 
with no effect of status (F(i,3) = 4.86, ns) and a significant effect of generation (F(3,9) = 
15.40, p<0.001). A final ANOVA on the proportion of correctly recalled propositions 
again found no effect of status (F(i,3) = 0.66, ns) and a significant effect of generation 
(F(3,9) = 14.81, p < 0.001). Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate these effects giaphically, 
and show that if there is any trend, it is for the /ow-status material to be recalled better 
than the high-status material.
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Figure 7.1 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7a, as measmed by word count. Error bars show standard error.
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Figure 7.2 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7a, as measured by the number of arguments from the original material 
coiTectly recalled (out of 5). Error bars show standard errors.
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Figure 7.3 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7a, as measured by the proportion of propositions contained in the 
original material correctly recalled. EiTor bars show standard errors.
A power analysis for the measure of propositions (the data presented in Figure 
7.3) gave a non-centrality parameter of X = 0.75, giving a very low estimate of power 
(<0.17). It is therefore likely that this non-significant result was due to a small sample 
size. No effect was found of the order of presentation on propositions correctly 
recalled (F(i,3) = 0.12, ns), suggesting that primacy or recency effects were not 
responsible for the findings reported above. There was also no effect of whether the 
argument was for or against fluoridation on propositions coiTectly recalled (F(i,3) = 
2.22, ns). 68.7% of participants stated that they personally were against fluoridation, 
although given the small sample size it was not possible to coiTelate a participant’s 
personal opinion with which argument they recalled better. Finally, 62.5% of 
participants reproduced the status label in their recall (either ‘professor’ or ‘member
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of public’) despite not being told to, suggesting that the status labels were not 
forgotten, they simply had no effect on recall.
7.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 7a failed to find evidence for an indirect bias operating on verbal 
material using the transmission chain method. There was no significant difference in 
the copying fidelity of arguments stated as originating fiom a high- or a low-status 
source. Although a power analysis revealed that the sample size was too small to 
detect a significant difference, the fact that there was a trend in the opposite direction,
i.e. low-status arguments were transmitted slightly better than high-status arguments, 
suggests that the hypothesis would not have been supported even if the sample size 
was increased. Indeed, previous experiments (Chapters 5 and 6) that featured the same 
within-gi’oups design found a significant difference with just three or four chains.
There are a number of other possibilities aside fi'om sample size for the failure 
to find an effect. First, the material was health-based, with the arguments concerning 
the health benefits or risks of consuming fluoride. It may be that people do not tmst 
high-status authorities over health issues, as attested by recent public health scares 
over BSE, GM foods and the MMR vaccine.
Second, people may not in general view university professors as having high 
status. It may be that in today’s materialistic and media-driven society status is better 
indicated by wealth or fame, particularly for the yoimg people who participated here.
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Perhaps a rich and famous film actor or sports-person would be more likely to elicit 
an indirect bias.
Third, it may be that although the status of the source had no effect on recall of 
the material, there may have been an undetected effect on people’s beliefs or 
opinions, with high-status material seen as more reliable and having a greater effect 
on underlying beliefs than low-status material. In Experiment 7a the participants were 
asked after recalling the material for their personal opinion as to whether fluoride 
should be added to the water supply (yes or no), and although the sample size was too 
small to detect a significant effect, no effect of status on this opinion was apparent. 
However, perhaps a more accurate test of this prediction could be made if more 
sensitive and sophisticated methods are used to assess people’s underlying beliefs.
7.4 E x p e r im e n t  7b
Experiment 7b addressed the fom* concerns outlined above. First, the sample 
size was increased from four to twelve sepai ate chains. The power analysis of the data 
obtained in Expeiiment 7a suggested that a sample of n=12 would afford a modest 
power of approximately 0.6. Second, the material is no longer health-based, so will 
hopefully not be affected by a general public mistrust of sources over health issues. 
The material now concerns the debate over whetlier the UK should join the single 
European ciurency, the euro, which has gained significance since the government 
announced a potential referendum on joining. Despite this, however, most people in 
Britain seem to feel miinfomied and undecided on this issue.
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Third, the high-status source was now the actor Sean Connery. He was chosen 
because he has several potential indicator traits signalling his high-status: he is 
internationally well laiown, rich, has received awards for his acting including an 
Oscai* and a Knighthood, and he is Scottish so should have added identification for 
most of the participants here. The low-status source was an unlmown person with a 
low-status job in the same field (a cameraman) to ensure that the comparison is 
plausible.
Fourth, more sensitive methods were used to measure participants’ opinions and 
representations of the ai guments, to test more effectively the hypothesis that the status 
of the source affects underlying causal representations as well as (or instead of) recall. 
Rather than simply asking the participants whether they agree or disagree with the 
adoption of the euro, participants are now asked to rate their opinion on a 7-point 
scale, where 1 is ‘highly disagiee’ and 7 is ‘highly agree’.
Participants were also asked to di aw a network diagram of their opinions. This 
is based on the proposal by Green (1996; 2000) that the decisions that people reach 
and the beliefs that they hold result from a process of argumentation, both internally 
and with others. A person’s beliefs and opinions can therefore be represented in the 
foim of an ‘argument model’, which is derived fiom the more general concept of a 
mental model (Jolmson-Laird, 1983), in which mental tokens conespond to actual 
entities in the world. An argument model therefore comprises a number of claims 
made on the basis of certain data.
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Green and McManus (1995) measured people’s argument models by asking 
participants to draw a network diagram to represent their beliefs concerning the risk 
factors of coronary heart disease. The target issue, ‘coronary heart disease’, was 
placed in the centre of the diagi am, and around this the participants wrote a number of 
relevant risk factors (e.g. ‘fatty foods’, ‘smoking’, ‘exercise’). Lines were then drawn 
between each factor and the target phenomenon (e.g. fatty foods -> CHD), and also 
between factors (e.g. fatty foods -> cholesterol), according to whether the participant 
believed that the factor affected the target. The coimections could be either positive or 
negative, and the strength of each comiection was rated on a scale of 0-100. The total 
path strengths in these diagrams were found by Green and McManus (1995) to 
strongly correlate with the participants’ subsequent ratings of the effectiveness of 
modifying each factor in reducing coronary heart disease. Later studies used the same 
network diagiam method to predict people’s beliefs concerning unemployment 
(Green, McManus, & Deirick, 1998) and whether the UK should join a single 
European cuirency (Green, 2000), similar to the present study.
Such a method seems suitable for measming people’s mental representations of 
ai guments which contribute to their overt beliefs and opinions. Following recall of the 
material the participants were therefore asked to draw a network diagiam containing 
the arguments they just recalled, and to rate the sti ength of each coimection.
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7.4.1 Methods
7.4.1.1 Participants
Twelve chains each comprising three participants were i*un, giving a total of 36 
participants. All participants were students at the University of St. Andrews and were 
unpaid volunteers. Their mean age was 19.89 years and 58.3% were female.
7.4.1.2 Materials
The material concerns the debate over whether the UK should join the single 
European cunency, the euro. The inti'oductory text below established the context of 
the argument and was intended to make the material more believable and plausible to 
the participants.
“Following the recent announcement of a possible referendum on 
whether the UK should adopt the single Emopean currency (the euro), 
a leading newspaper asked 100 people connected to the Scottish film 
and television industiy to give their opinion on the issue. Two of the 
responses are reprinted below: one from Sir Sean Connery, the Oscar- 
winning film actor, and the other from a cameraman from the local 
Edinburgh news. Please read them through once at a comfortable 
reading speed. Wlien you have finished reading turn the page.”
The two aiguments were then printed, labelled as to the source: ‘Sir Sean 
Connery, Oscar-winning film actor’ or ‘Michael Jones, cameraman for the local 
Edinburgh news’. The original arguments given to the first participant in each chain 
are reproduced in Appendix B.3. These were constructed from the website 
www.theeurodebate.co.uk. Each side contains four constituent arguments (e.g. 
‘increase political unity’ or ‘lose economic control’), twenty propositions (each
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argument comprising one sentence and five propositions) and approximately 85 
words.
7.4.13 Design
The design of Experiment 7b was identical to Experiment 7a. Hence the soui'ce 
(high or low) and argument (for or against) were counterbalanced so that in half of the 
chains the ‘for’ argument was attributed to the high-status source and the ‘against’ 
argument to the low-status source, and in the other half of the chains the high-status 
source was attributed to the ‘against’ argument and the low-status to the ‘for’ 
argument. It was again predicted that the arguments attributed to the high-status 
source would be transmitted with gieater accuracy and in gi'eater quantity than the 
arguments attributed to the low-status source, irrespective of the nature of those 
arguments (for or against). It was additionally predicted that, in the network diagrams, 
the arguments attributed to the high-status source would have more connections and 
stronger connections to the target (adopting the euro) than the low-status argmnents.
Twelve chains were run, three for each permutation of high/low-status, 
for/against the euro and first/second order of presentation. Note that the chains in 
Experiment 7b only comprised thi'ee generations rather than four, as the material very 
quickly degraded to an average of less than two propositions after three generations.
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7.4.1.4 Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 7b was identical to that of Experiment 7a, with 
the addition of an extra sheet in the booklet asking the participant to list all of the 
constituent arguments in their recall, then to draw an argument diagram. This sheet 
comprised a box with ‘em*o’ printed inside, and the following instructions:
“The box printed below represents the UK adopting the euro. Write all 
of the argmnents you listed on the previous page (from both sources) in 
the space around this box. Then draw a line from each argument to the 
‘euro’ box if, in your opinion, you think that the argument is relevant 
to whether the UK should adopt the euro.
If you think the argument is a reason for adopting the euro, place a ‘+’ 
sign on the line. If, on the other hand, you think the argument is a 
reason against adopting the emo, place a sign on the line.
Then write a number on each line representing how strong or 
convincing you personally find that argument out of 100. For example, 
if you think that a particular* argmnent is a very strong reason for 
adopting the euro, you might write ‘+ 90’ on the line.
Ensure you have a sign and a number on every line. Wlien you have 
finished yom* diagram, turn the page.”
7.4.2 Results
Three separate two-within-factor ANOVAs were again performed on the 
measures of word count, correctly recalled propositions and correctly recalled 
arguments. For word comit, there was no effect of status (F(iji) = 0.01, ns) and a 
significant effect of generation (F(2,22) = 16.50, p < 0.001). For propositions, there was 
no effect of status (F(i,n) = 0.53, ns) and a significant effect of generation (F(2,22) = 
27.68, p < 0.001). For arguments, there was no effect of status (F(i.n) = 0.70, ns) and a 
significant effect of generation (F(2,22) = 13.73, p < 0.001). Figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
illustrate how the measures of word count, correctly recalled arguments and con ectly
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recalled propositions change with generation in each case, showing little difference 
between the high- and low-status material. Experiment 7b therefore replicated the 
findings of Experiment 7a, finding that the status of the source had no effect on either 
the quantity or accuracy of tiansmission.
Further analyses revealed no significant effect on the measure of propositions of 
whether the argument was for or against the euro (F(i,n) = 1.79, p > 0.05), nor 
whether the argument was presented first or second on the page (F(i,n) = 0.85, p > 
0.05). A power analysis performed on the measure of propositions gave similarly low 
values of noncentrality {X = 0.52) and power (<0.17) to those of Experiment 7a, 
despite the threefold increase in sample size.
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Figure 7.4 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7b, as measured by word count. Eixor bars show standard error.
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Figure 7.5 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7b, as measured by the number of arguments from the original material 
correctly recalled (out of 4). Error bars show standard eiTors.
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Figure 7.6 - Transmission of high- and low-status material by each generation of 
Experiment 7b, as measured by the proportion of propositions contained in the 
original material correctly recalled. Error bars show standard errors.
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There was also no effect of status on the personal opinion of the participant 
regarding the euro (on a seven-point scale), with an equal number of participants 
agreeing and disagreeing with the high-status source. After transforming these data so 
that positive values indicate agreement with the high-status model and negative values 
indicate disagreement, a one sample t-test showed that the opinions did not 
significantly differ from zero (t(3s) = 0.79, mean = 0.25, p > 0.05), indicating that the 
participants neither systematically agreed nor disagreed with the argument presented 
as originating from the high-status source. The same was found for the summed 
weights in the argument diagrams: these also did not significantly differ from zero 
according to a one-sample t-test (t(3s) = 0.86, mean = 15.14, p > 0.05), although the 
weights did correlate with the direct measure of opinion (r = 0.41, p < 0.015) 
supporting the validity of the diagram method.
7.5 G e n e r a l  D is c u s s io n
Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) proposed indirect bias in human cultural 
transmission implies that information from sources of high status is copied more 
reliably than information from low-status sources. Experiments 7a and 7b both failed 
to find any evidence that arguments attributed to high-status sources are transmitted 
with any greater accuracy or quantity than arguments attributed to low-status sources. 
Before discussing the implications of this negative result for the theoretical status of 
the indirect bias, we must first consider possible methodological problems.
Experiment 7b addressed a number of potential problems with Experiment 7a, 
which can now be reconsidered as to their influence on the non-significant findings.
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First, the estimated power of Experiment 7b was still very low. However, the fact that 
the sample size was increased threefold from Experiment 7a yet the difference 
between the high- and low-status material decreased, and the fact that the test for an 
effect of status was not approaching significance, suggest that increasing the sample 
size further would not reveal a significant difference. Furthermore, previous studies 
(Chapters 5 and 6) have yielded significant results with fewer chains. There are a 
number of reasons, then, for suspecting that the non-significant result was not due to a 
small sample size.
Second, the health arguments were replaced with economic arguments about 
whether the UK should adopt the euro. Although economic arguments might be 
considered less emotive than health issues, they were perhaps not emotive or 
interesting enough, and the material very quickly degraded to an average of less than 
two propositions after only the third generation. Consequently only three generations 
were rim, rather than the four that were planned. If the participants found it difficult to 
recall this kind of material, then any effect of source status may have been obscured 
by a floor effect.
Third, the high-status souice was changed from an academic expert to a rich 
and famous celebrity, with no discernible effect. This is consistent with the lack of an 
effect of source on tiansmission. However, future studies might systematically vary 
variables such as fame, wealth and expertise, as well as similarity to the participants. 
Both the diffusion of innovations literature (Rogers, 1995) and the literature on 
nunour tiansmission (Rosnow, 1991) have found that models who are too dissimilar
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to the recipient are unlikely to be copied. It may be that the high status of the Oxford 
professor and the international film star is coimteracted by their dissimilarity to the 
participants. The low-status source, meanwhile, despite being of low status, benefits 
fiom his similarity to the participants. Future studies might systematically vary the 
similarity of the source, perhaps comparing the transmission of information 
originating with fellow students and non-students.
If, on the other hand, this negative finding is assumed to be valid, it implies that 
an indirect bias does not operate when written verbal information is transmitted in the 
direct absence of the high- or low-status sour ce. Given that much of human culture in 
post-industrial societies is transmitted as verbal information through very large 
populations where direct first-hand experience of high-status individuals (e.g. Oxford 
professors or Oscar-wimiing film actors) is rare, this finding implies a more limited 
role of status in human culture than perhaps envisaged by Boyd and Richerson (1985).
However, two factors might counteract this limitation. First, if transmission is 
one-to-many rather than one-to-one (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981) then a high- 
status source can be directly experienced simultaneously by a large number of 
individuals. Second, mass media such as television can amplify this one-to-many 
transmission, greatly increasing the number of individuals than is possible with face- 
to-face transmission. In any case, the potency of indirect bias and whether it operates 
in the absence of the source are likely to be important factors in determining its large- 
scale population-level effects, factors which future mathematical models might 
explore.
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It is not possible to infer from the present results whether the failme to observe 
an indirect bias is because the stimulus was second-hand, or verbal, or both. Future 
studies might employ more complex experimental designs to explore this further. For 
example, a group of participants could be asked to perform a task for wliich they are 
rewarded by access to resour ces. The participant who shows the best performance (the 
‘high-status’ participant) and the participant who shows the worst performance (the 
‘low-status’ participant) would then both transmit verbal information to the other 
members along chains similar to those used here. If the indirect bias only operates in 
the presence of the source, then the first generation should exhibit a preference for the 
information fr om the high-status participant, and this preference would diminish with 
generation in the absence of the high-status participant. Information from the low- 
status participant would not show such a preference. A second version of the 
experiment might use behaviour rather than verbal information.
hr conclusion. Chapter 7 failed to find evidence that verbal material is indirectly 
biased when it is reported to have originated fiom sources of different status. This 
implies that Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) hypothesised indirect bias in cultural 
transmission may be more limited in its effect than originally assumed, although a 
number of modifications to the methodology and material of the present study would 
be rreeded to state this conclusively.
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CHAPTER 8 - A nthropomorphism  a n d  the A ttribution  of
INTENTIONALITY
8.1 A b st r a c t
There is extensive evidence that people attribute human mental states and 
human psychological or emotional dispositions to non-intentional, non-human 
behaviour'. It is hypothesised in Chapter 8 that this tendency translates into arr 
‘anthropomorphic bias’ in human cultural transmission, which is predicted to cause 
non-interrtional animal behaviour to be increasingly described in terms of mental state 
terms and human attributions. Two experiments used the transmission chain method 
to test this hypothesis. Descriptions of animal behavioiu' initially expressed entirely in 
non-intentional terms were passed along multiple chains of participants. Very few 
mental state terms or hrmian attributions were introduced during the course of 
transmission, failing to demonstr ate the operation of an anthropomorphic bias.
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8.2 I n t r o d u c t io n
Several researchers from a number of disciplines have proposed that people 
have a tendency to attribute human intentions and human mental states to non-human 
animals and inanimate objects, a tendency variously described as folk psychology, 
anthropomorphism (Kennedy, 1992), mind-reading (Baron Cohen, 1995) and 
adopting an intentional stance (Dennett, 1987). It is hypothesised that this tendency, 
here labelled an ‘anthropomorphic bias’, operates in human cultural transmission to 
cause information concerning the behaviour of non-human animals to be increasingly 
described in temis of human mental states as it is transmitted thr ough a population.
Coming from a philosophical standpoint, Dennett (1987) described the 
intentional stance as the attribution of human beliefs and desires to an object and the 
use of these attributions to predict its behaviour. This was contrasted with the 
‘physical stance’, in which behavioiu is interpreted in terms of the internal workings 
of the object, and the ‘design stance’, in which an object’s behaviour' is explained by 
appealing to the assumed function for which it was designed. Dennett (1987) argued 
that people predominantly adopt the intentional stance because in many cases the 
physical causes of a system ar e unknown, and its function is unclear', hr other words, 
the intentional stance is simply easier to use (although this does not really explain why 
it is easier, or why it is not also easier for other species). Psychologists have used the 
terms ‘theory of mind’ (Baron Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) or ‘mind-reading’ 
(Baron Cohen, 1995) to describe the same phenomenon.
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In the scientific study of animal behaviour, the term anthropomorphism is used 
to mean “the ascription of human mental experiences to animals” (Asquith, 1984, p. 
138). It is often used as a derogative term for unscientific and inaccurate writing (e.g. 
Kennedy, 1992); indeed, the APA publication manual specifically instincts that 
authors “do not attribute human char acteristics to non-human animals or to inanimate 
sources.” Others such as Asquith (1984) and Fisher (1996), however, argue the 
opposite, that anthropomorphism is a valuable heuristic for the miderstanding of 
animal behaviour. This study makes no judgement with regards to the validity of 
antliropomorphism in the study of animal behaviour, beyond simply noting that the 
existence of anthropomorphism, right or wrong, supports the presence of an 
intentionality bias. The fact that safeguards are needed against antluopomorphism in 
the study of animal behaviour, even amongst highly intelligent researchers, suggests 
that the attribution of human mental states is in fact the norm.
Indeed, some authors have claimed that attributing mental states is an evolved 
feature of human cognition. Witliin the framework of his social fLrnction of intellect 
hypothesis (that primate intelligence evolved in response to complex social problems: 
see also Byrne & Wliiten, 1988; Whiten & Byrne, 1997), Humphrey (1976) argued 
that there was consequently a “predisposition among men to try to fit non-social 
material into a social mould” (p. 312). More recently, Mithen (1996) has argued that 
anthr opomorphism is the result of an interaction between the once separate domains 
of natural history intelligence, concerning animal behaviour, and social intelligence, 
in which human behaviour is understood in terms of mental states and intentions. 
Reviewing evidence which suggests that anthropomorphic thinlcing is widespread in
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modem humans and appear ed somewhat abruptly in the archaeological record around 
40-30,000 years ago, Mithen (1996) proposed that this breakdown in the barrier 
between natural history and social intelligence marked a significant transition in 
human cognitive evolution, hr particular, antluopomorphic thinking allowed more 
acciuate prediction of animal behaviour, resulting in an improved ability to track the 
movement of prey and allowing the development of more advanced hunting 
techniques. As such, Mithen (1996) argued that anthropomorphism represents a 
fundamental cognitive feature of the modem human mind.
Similarly, Whiten (1999a) has proposed that mind-reading evolved as part of a 
suite of cognitive abilities that can be described as ‘deeply social’, where social 
cognition deals not only with complexities of the social world but is so well 
cognitively integrated that it impinges onto analysis of the non-social aspects also. 
These claims are supported by evidence that mind-reading is universal (Avis & 
HaiTis, 1991; Brown, 1991) and exhibits a specific pattern of breakdown (autism, or 
‘rnind-blindness’: Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Early experimental evidence for a tendency to attribute mental states to 
inanimate objects came from a classic study by Heider and Simmel (1944), who fomrd 
that participants interpreted the movement of simple geometric shapes in terms of 
human intentions (e.g. one shape ‘bullying’ another). More recently, Mitchell and 
Hamm (1997) presented brief descriptions of animal behavioiu to undergr aduates, and 
then asked them to evaluate to what degree various psychological states described that 
behaviour*. One of these descriptions is reproduced below.
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“Patricia Ekman studies nonverbal behavior of chimpanzees. She 
observed the following interaction in a natur e park:
B, a male, is with S, a female, comfortably stroking her. G, another 
male, moves to S, and begins to stroke her. B turns away from S and 
looks intently at his hand.”
(Mitchell and Hamm 1997; p. 187)
Mitchell and Hamm (1997) formd that participants who read descriptions of 
animal behaviour suggestive of jealousy or deception (but containing no mental state 
terms) later rated that behavioiu as evidence of those human psychological states. For 
the passage reproduced above, the chimpanzee staring at his hand was described as 
‘upset’, ‘jealous’, ‘thinldng about what to do next’ and ‘angry’. Similar ratings were 
given when different species were used in the description, with chimpanzees, 
elephants, bears, otters and dogs all yielding results comparable to humans. This 
indicates that it is the behavioural similarity to humans, rather than the phylogenetic 
or physical similarity, or familiarity with the species, which provokes 
anthropomorphism. That is, people tend to explain the human-like behaviour of a 
range of species in terms of human mental states.
There is also non-experimental evidence directly addr essing the transmission of 
information concerning mental states. Studies of the orally transmitted stories of 
hunter-gatherer societies show that animal behaviour* is frequently described in terms 
of human mental states and characteristics (see Scalise Sugiyama (2001) for a 
review). Such reports support the above argument that taking the intentional stance is 
adaptive, as attributing mental states to animals makes their behaviour easier to 
predict and hence easier to hunt or avoid. For example, personifying snalces as crafty
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and devious (as with the serpent in Genesis) highlights the fact that they are often well 
concealed and attack without warning. Experimental evidence for an anthropomorphic 
bias in human cultiual transmission comes from Bangerter (2000), who found that as 
a description of conception was transmitted along a chain of subjects the sex cells 
tended to move from the object position to the subject position of the sentences. 
While Bangerter (2000) argued that this antluopomorphism was a result of sex-role 
stereotyping, fiuther experiments using the tr ansmission chain method might reveal a 
more general anthropomorphic bias. Experiments 8a and 8b therefore combined the 
material from Mitchell and Hamm (1997) with the methodology of Bangerter (2000), 
tr'ansmitting a number of behavioiual episodes along multiple chains of participants.
8.3 E x p e r im e n t  8a
In Experiment 8a the brief descriptions of animal behavioiu" found by Mitchell 
and Hamm (1997) to elicit anthropomorphic attributions were transmitted along 
multiple chains of participants, with the prediction that the behaviour would be 
increasingly described in terms of human mental states and human emotions.
8.3.1 Methods
8.3.1.1 Design
The transmission chain design was adopted, in which the first participant in 
each chain recalls the original stimulus material, the output of which is then given to 
the second participant to recall, whose recall is in tur-n given to the third participant, 
and so on down the chain.
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Four chains each comprising four participants (or four ‘generations’) were rim. 
The first participant in each chain was given five paragraphs similar to those used by 
Mitchell and Hamm (1997), featuring a description of behaviom* containing no mental 
state terms, but that could potentially be described in teims of human mental states 
and intentions. Each chain tiansmitted the same five descriptions for a single species, 
although the species was varied between chains. The species varied in terms of their 
physical similarity and familiarity to humans: chimpanzees are similar but relatively 
unfamiliar; dogs are familiar but dissimilar; newts are neither familiar nor similar. 
Human behaviour was used as a control.
The independent variables were therefore transmission generation, with five 
levels (F0-F4), and species, with four levels (human, chimp, dog and newt). The 
dependent variables were measures of intentionality, specifically the fr equency of 
mental state teims and psychological attiibutions (see Analysis section 8.3.1.4 below). 
It was predicted that the fi*equency of such terms would increase with generation. 
Measures of recall quantity and accuracy were also assessed.
83.1.2 Participants
Four chains each comprising four participants were run, giving a total of 16 
participants. All participants were students of the University of St. Andiews and were 
unpaid volunteers. Their mean age was 18.73 years and 60% were female. Students of 
biology, zoology and psychology who may have been explicitly taught not to 
anthiopomorphise when describing animal behaviour were excluded fr om this study.
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8.3.LB Materials
The first participant in each chain was presented with five descriptions of a 
single species’ behaviour, although the species was varied between chains. The 
species were human children, chimpanzees, dogs and newts, with the same five 
behavioural descriptions adapted for each species. The descriptions were designed to 
contain no mental state tenns such as ‘want’ or ‘Icnow’, and to be as impersonal as 
possible, hence each animal was given a letter rather than a name. The five 
descriptions concerned deception, reconciliation, problem-solving, emotional 
concealment and jealousy (although these labels were not given to the subjects). The 
full descriptions are reproduced in Appendix C.l.
8.3 J  A  Analysis
It was predicted that as the descriptions of behaviour were passed along the 
chains, they would be increasingly described in tenns of human mental states and 
emotional dispositions. That is, the fi*equencies of mental state terms would show a 
significant effect of generation and trend analyses would show a significant increase 
with generation. Such an analysis is similar to that performed by Bartsch and 
Wellman (1995) on the conversations of childien in order to assess theory of mind 
development, the methods of which can be adapted for use here. Bartsch and 
Wellman (1995) examined eleven mental state terms, concerning either desires (want, 
hope, wish, care (about), afiaid (that)) or beliefs (thinlc, laiow, believe, expect, 
wonder, dr eam), although the vast majority concerned only three of these: want, think 
and Imow. A  term was also only counted if it refeiTcd to a genuine psychological state 
rather than a reference to overt behaviour. In addition to these mental state terms, the
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use of human psychological attributes, such as jealousy or anger, were also recorded, 
following Mitchell and Hamm (1997).
Additional measures of quantity and accuracy were also calculated for each 
participant’s recall. The number of words represents a gi*oss content-independent 
measure of recall. In order to measure accuracy, it was determined whether each of 
the five behavioural episodes (deception, reconciliation, problem-solving, emotional 
concealment and jealousy) was recalled and retained the gist of the original 
behaviour. For example, the ‘deception’ episode would require one individual to find 
a desirable item, a second individual to appear, and the first to ignore the item until 
the second leaves. This measure gives the total number of episodes that retained the 
gist (out of five) for each recall.
8,3.1.5 Procedure
Each participant performed the experiment on their own. They were presented 
witli a booklet containing the material appropriate to their chain and generation on the 
first page, witli written instructions to read the text through at a comfortable reading 
speed. The second page contained a blanlc space with the instructions:
“hi the space below, please write out the descriptions you just read as 
best you can. Try to be as accurate as possible, but don’t wony if you 
can’t remember it all. Wlien you have finished, turn the page”
The final page of the booklet solicited their age, sex and study subject, after 
which they were debriefed by the experimenter. The recall they produced was then
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typed up and inserted as the first page of the next booklet, and given to the next 
pai'ticipant in the chain as appropriate. No time limit was given for recall.
8.3.2 Results and Discussion
Table 8.1 shows the dependent variables (word count, the number of accurately 
recalled episodes and the number of human attiibutions) for each of the four chains. 
The main variable of interest, the number of human athibutions (either mental state 
ternis or human emotional attributions), showed very little increase with generation. 
The final tlnee generations of the human chain contained the following phi'ase with a 
mental state term:
“Child A wanted some biscuits...” (italics added)
while all four recall generations of the dog chain contained variations on the 
phi'ase:
“Dog A talks to Dog C” (italics added)
Only two human attributions in four chains each containing five episodes 
constitutes little evidence for an anthropomoiphic bias in these participants. As such, 
a within-groups ANOVA showed no significant effect of generation on this measure 
(F(4,i2) = 2.00, ns). Word count and accuracy both decreased with generation as would 
be expected, although there are too few chains in this initial study to meaningfully 
compare species.
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Generation
Measure Chain FO FI F2 F3 F4
Attributions
Human 0 0 1 1 1
Chimp 0 0 0 0 0
Dog 0 1 1 1 1
Newt 0 0 0 0 0
Word count
Human 209 91 75 82 70
Chimp 218 130 121 94 58
Dog 210 98 85 59 51
Newt 200 161 60 35 29
Accuracy
Human 5 3 3 3 1
Chimp 5 4 3 3 2
Dog 5 3 3 3 2
Newt 5 5 2 0 0
Table 8.1 -  The number of human attiibutions (mental state terms or emotional 
attributions), the word count, and the number of descriptions in which the gist was 
retained (out of 5) for each of the four species chains of Experiment 8a.
8.4 E x p e r im e n t  8 b
8.4,1 Introduction and Methods
Following the initial exploration of the anthropomorphism hypothesis in 
Experiment 8a, three changes were made to the material and methodology in 
Experiment 8b in order to provide a better test of the hypothesis. First, several of the 
participants in Experiment 8a reported difficulty keeping track of the letters used to 
label the individuals (e.g. “Chimp A” or “Newt B”). The material in Experiment 8b 
therefore removed the letters and used verbal descriptions (e.g. “a female chimp” or 
“a second male newt”). This new material is reproduced in Appendix C.2. Second, it 
is possible that the participants in Experiment 8a were in fact using human intentional 
states to understand and remember the behaviour that they read, but when writing out 
their recall they converted it back to the behaviouiist style of the original. Hence in 
Experiment 8b the instructions were changed from “Please write out the descriptions
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you just read as best you can. Try to be as accurate as possible” (Experiment 8a) to 
“Please write in your own words the descriptions you just read as best you can” 
(Experiment 8b). The addition of the phrase ‘in your own words’ was intended to 
encourage the participants to reproduce the material as they understood it, rather than 
as they thought it should be reported (without biasing their recall to confoim to the 
experimental hypothesis). Finally, the number of chains was increased to twelve, tlnee 
for each species, hi all other respects the method of Experiment 8b was identical to 
that of Experiment 8a. Forty-eight students of the University of St. Andrews 
participated in Experiment 8b, none of whom had participated in Experiment 8a. 
Their mean age was 20.94 years and 87.5% were female.
8.4.2 Results
Table 8.2 shows the mean values of the three dependent measuies for the foui* 
species, averaged across all tliree chains. Each dependent variable was analysed using 
a mixed 5 x 4  ANOVA with generation as a within-gioups factor and species as a 
between-groups factor. The variable directly related to the experimental hypothesis, 
the number of human attributions, again showed little increase with generation. None 
of the participants in Experiment 8b inti'oduced mental state terms. A small number of 
human psychological or emotional attributions were made; children were stated to be 
“jealous” of one another, one chimp was stated to “tell” another cliimp something, 
and dogs got “angiy”, “apologised” and “became friends”. However, these 
frequencies were very low given the total number of words produced, and thus there 
was no significant effect of generation on this measure (F(i,io) = 1.67, ns, Greenhouse- 
Geisser coixected). There was also no effect of generation on the number of
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attiibutions when the data from Experiments 8a and 8b were combined (F(i,i6) == 2.72, 
ns, Greenhouse-Geisser coixected).
Generation
Measure Chain FO FI F2 F3 F4
Attributions
Human 0 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Chimp 0 0 0 0 0.33
Dog 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.67
Newt 0 0 0 0 0
Word count
Human 224.00 113.00 97.33 63.00 64.00
Chimp 233.00 171.33 152.33 115.67 103.00
Dog 227.00 120.67 81.67 72.00 75.33
Newt 226.00 102.67 74.00 58.00 45.33
Accuracy
Human 5.00 3.33 3.00 2.67 2.33
Chimp 5.00 3.33 2.67 1.33 1.33
Dog 5.00 3.33 2.00 2.00 2.00
Newt 5.00 2.33 1.00 0.67 0.33
Table 8.2 -  The number of hmnan attributions (mental state terms or emotional 
attributions), the word count, and the number of descriptions in which the gist was 
retained (out of 5) for each of the chains of Experiment 8b. Each value is the mean of
three replicate chains.
As before, both word count (F(4,32) = 67.81, p < 0.001) and accuracy (F(4 ,s2) = 
70.52, p < 0.001) showed significant overall decreases with generation. The increased 
sample size now allows comparisons between species on these measures. Word count 
showed a significant effect of species (F(3,g) = 4.62, p < 0.05), with Tukey’s HSD 
post-hoc test showing that this was due to a significant difference between the chimp 
chains and the newt chains, with no other comparisons significant at p < 0.05. The 
change in word count with generation is shown in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1 -  Change in word count with generation in Experiment 8b, according to 
species. Error bars show standard eiTors.
The accuracy measure (the number of behavioural episodes correctly recalled, 
and with their gist preserved) also showed a significant effect of species (F(3,s) = 6.80, 
p < 0.015). Because the material from both Experiments 8a and 8b started with the 
same five behavioinal episodes, these data can be combined (imlike the word count 
measure, which had a greater FO starting value in Experiment 8b). For the combined 
data there was a significant effect of species on accuracy (F(3,i2) = 6.93, p < 0.01), 
with Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test showing that the newt chains had significantly lower 
accuiacy than each of the other three species chains at the 0.05 level of significance. 
The change in accuracy with generation is shown in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2 -  Change in accuracy with generation in Experiments 8a and 8b combined, 
according to species. En'or bars show standard errors.
8.5 G e n e r a l  D isc u ssio n
Experiments 8a and 8b combined failed to find experimental evidence for an 
anthropomorphic bias in human cultural transmission. There were isolated and very 
infrequent instances of mental state terms and human psychological or emotional 
attributions, with no cumulative increase in frequency with generation.
This result is surprising given the extensive evidence cited in the Introduction 
(Section 8.2) that people see non-intentional animal behaviour in intentional or 
anthropomoiphic terms. Mitchell and Hamm (1997) found evidence for 
anthropomoiphism using very similar material to that used here, while Bangerter 
(2000) found evidence for anthropomoiphism using the same transmission chain 
methodology.
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The only significant finding from the present study was that newt behaviom* 
was transmitted with poorer accuracy than the same behavioui' attiibuted to humans, 
chimpanzees and dogs. It could be that the participants simply found newt behaviour 
less interesting and harder to recall than the behaviour of more familiar or similar 
species. However, this finding might also be consistent with the operation of an 
anthi'opomoiphic bias. If the participants were in fact using human intentions and 
dispositions to understand and recall the behavioural episodes, and the participants 
found it easier to attribute those intentions and dispositions to humans, chimpanzees 
and dogs, then the newt behaviour would be recalled with poorer accuracy. The fact 
that not one of the four newt chains featured any human attributions (Tables 8.1 and 
8.2) supports this contention, although it remains speculative. It might be tested by 
encouraging the participants to report the behaviour as they understood it rather than 
in the style in which they originally read it, for example by asking them to write the 
material out as they would tell a friend, or by using a face-to-face rather tlian written 
version of the methodology.
Another aspect of the data suggestive of an anthropomorphic bias is that, 
although very few anthropomorphic teims were introduced, those that were 
introduced remained in the chain until the experiment was stopped. That is, an 
anthi'opomoiphic bias might not act to spontaneously generate anthropomorphic 
terms, but it might act to preserve antluoponiorphic tenns once they are intioduced. 
This could be tested by presenting the first participant in the chain with a mixture of 
anthropomoiphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions and comparing the
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persistence of each. It might also be useful to extend the number of generations that 
the material is transmitted thi ough to obtain a better measure of persistence.
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CHAPTER 9 - A P r e fe r e n c e  f o r  N e  o t e n y  a n d  t h e  E v o lu t io n  o f
THE Teddy  Bear
9.1 A b st r a c t
Hinde and Barden (1985) documented how teddy bears became steadily more 
neotenous, or baby-like, over an 80 year period. Chapter 9 used the transmission chain 
method to experimentally simulate this process of cultural evolution, hi Experiment 
9a, multiple chains of participants ti ansmitted pictures of a non-neotenous bear in a 
lecture theatie setting. Experiment 9b repeated this method controlling for overall face 
size and using a stimulus bear that was easier to draw. Finally, Experiment 9c adopted 
a more controlled, laboratory-based method. No convincing evidence for a ti*end 
toward neoteny was found in any of the tliree experiments. The most likely 
explanation for these negative results is that the passive perceptual preference for 
neotenous faces does not operate during the active reproduction of diawings from 
memory.
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9.2 In t r o d u c t io n
A fascinating example of cultural evolution was provided by Hinde and Barden i
(1985), who documented how the teddy bear has become steadily more neotenous^, or 
baby-like, since its invention at the turn of the 20^  ^century. Hinde and Barden (1985) 
measured the facial dimensions of teddy bears of various ages, dating from 1903 to 
1984, finding that the forehead became progressively larger and the snout became 
progressively shorter over this period. Such features (large forehead, small nose) are 
characteristic of neotenous faces. To explain this trend, Hinde and Barden (1985) 
appealed to Lorenz’s (1950) suggestion that neotenous features act as innate releasing 
mechanisms which elicit a reaction of nurturing and affection in adults. With respect 
to the bears, this innate preference for neotenous facial features would cause 
consumers to select and pmchase the most neotenous bear available at any particular 
time, with teddy bear makers responding by continuing production only of these best­
selling neotenous lines. The teddy bear population would thus giadually become more 
neotenous due to this artificial selection by successive consumers. Independent 
support for the cultuial evolution of aiTifacts in response to artificial selection for 
neoteny was provided by Gould (1980), who documented how the cartoon character 
Mickey Mouse has similarly evolved to be increasingly neotenous over roughly the 
same period as the bears.
® Strictly, the correct tenu should be ‘paedomorphic’, meaning baby-like (Gould, 
1977). ‘Neoteny’ refers to one of several quite different heterochionous processes that can 
produce paedomorphosis (Gould, 1977). The term ‘neotenous’ is used here to be consistent 
with other studies in this field.
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Support for the existence of a preference for neotenous facial featuies has been 
found by numerous studies examining what malces human faces attiactive (Ben*y & 
McArthur, 1985; Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee, Dmen, & Wu, 1995; Fullard & 
Reiling, 1976; Gardner & Wallach, 1965; Gross, 1997; Jones, 1995; Penett et al, 
1998; Stemglanz, Gray, & Mmakami, 1977). These studies found that a number of 
neotenous features increased the attractiveness of human faces, including a large 
forehead, lai'ge eyes, full lips, a small nose and a small chin. Several studies reported 
cross-cultural evidence for a preference for neoteny, finding significant effects with 
participants from the US, Brazil, Russia, and the isolated Ache and Hiwi gi'oups of 
South America (Jones, 1995), as well as Taiwan (Cunningham et al, 1995) and Japan 
(Penett et a l, 1998), lending support to Lorenz’s (1950) suggestion that such a 
preference is innate.
Other studies fomid that very young children show a reduced or absent 
preference for neoteny (e.g. Fullard & Reiling, 1976; Gross, 1997). This was 
confiimed by Morris, Reddy and Bunting (1995), who found that a preference for 
neotenous teddy bear faces only emerges at around five years of age. Tins suggests 
that it is parents and other adults who are driving the evolution of the teddy bear when 
they buy bears for infants, rather than the infants themselves selecting neotenous 
beai's. This is consistent with Lorenz’s (1950) argument that the preference for 
neoteny evolved because it encouraged niu*turing and care-taking behaviour by 
parents towards their offspring, thereby increasing the offspring’s chances of suiwival.
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The present study used the transmission chain method to experimentally 
simulate the process of cultmal evolution documented by Hinde and Barden (1985). 
An experimental simulation affords gieater control over the transmission process, and 
can overcome the limitations of an historical data set. For example, the majority of 
Hinde and Baiden’s (1985) bears were taken from a museum exhibit, which constitute 
a tiny subset of the total number of bears in the hypothesised evolutionaiy lineage, a 
subset that fui'theimore may have been biased in some way. An experimental 
simulation would ensure the direct ti ansmission of bears along chains of a deteimined 
length, and allows every step in the transmission chain to be examined.
The first participant in each chain was shown a picture of a non-neotenous beai* 
(roughly equivalent in facial dimensions to a 1903 teddy bear) and then instructed to 
draw it fiom memory. Their drawing was then passed to the second participant in the 
chain, who viewed it and drew it from memory, with their diawing in turn acting as 
the stimulus for the third participant, and so on down the chain. It was predicted that 
the sequence of drawings would show a similar increase in neoteny to that found by 
Hinde and Barden (1985) for teddy bears over an 80 year period. That is, the same 
imiate human preference for neotenous facial featuies that caused consumers to buy 
neotenous bears was also predicted to cause participants in the present study to distort 
their drawings in a neotenous manner. Experiment 9a constituted an initial test of this 
hypothesis using a face-to-face method of tiansmission. Experiment 9b repeated this 
method correcting for two potential methodological problems that arose from 
Experiment 9a. Finally, Experiment 9c adopted a more controlled, lab-based method 
of transmission.
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9.3 E x p e r im e n t  9a
9.3.1 Materials and Methods
The transmission chain design was adopted, in which the first participant in 
each chain views the original stimulus material and reproduces it fiom memory, the 
output of which is then given to the second participant to reproduce. This 
reproduction is in turn given to the third participant, and so on down the chain. Four 
separate chains were run each comprising 13 participants, giving 52 participants in 
total. All were undergraduate students of the University of St Andiews. The 
experiment was run as part of a practical class in Evolutionary Psychology, although 
at the time the participants were blind to the precise experimental aims and 
hypotheses.
The independent variable was the transmission generation, of which there were 
13, or 14 if the original stimulus bear is included. The dependent variables were 
measures of neoteny drawn fiom previous studies. From Hinde and Barden (1985) 
only forehead size could be calculated, as snout length was inapplicable to the two 
dimensional drawings obtained here. Forehead size (FS) was defined as the vertical 
distance between the top of the face (not including the ears) and the eyes, divided by 
the vertical distance between the eyes and the base of the head, to obtain a ratio 
conti'olling for overall face size. Where the eyes were large or lopsided, eye level was 
taken as the point equidistant between the centres of the two eyes. Early teddy bears 
in Hinde and Barden’s (1985) sequence had an FS of around 0.6 to 1.0, increasmg to 
around 1.6 in 1984 (with the FS of some 1984 bears exceeding 2.2).
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Four fm*ther measures of neoteny were used which have been shown both to be 
typical of neotenous (human) faces and to significantly conelate with judgements of 
attractiveness. From Jones (1995), eye width (EW) was defined as the mean width of 
the two eyes, and nose height (NH) was defined as the vertical distance from the top 
to the bottom of the nose. An additional measrne specific to the bear face was added, 
snout height (SH), defined as the vertical distance from the top to the bottom of the 
snout. From Cunningham et al (1995), distance between eyes (DE) was defined as 
the distance between the centre of each eye. Each of these measmes (EW, NH, SH 
and DE) were divided by the face height to obtain a ratio conti'olling for the overall 
size of the face. Based on the results of these and the other studies listed in the 
Introduction (Section 9.2), neoteny is indicated by large values of FS, EW and DE, 
and low values of NH and SH. It was therefore predicted that FS, EW and DE would 
increase with generation, and NH and SH would decrease.
The first teddy bears were originally made to resemble actual bears, so the 
original stimulus material given to the first participant in each chain was a schematic 
outline of an actual adult bear. A photograph was obtained from the internet showing 
an adult brown bear (Ursus arctos) looking directly at the camera. Photo-imaging 
software was then used to trace around the salient facial features of this photograph 
(the face outline, nose, snout, ears, eyes and mouth) to produce a schematic bear face, 
as shown in Figure 9.1. This image was presented to the first participant in each chain 
printed on an otherwise blank sheet of A4 paper, with an actual face height of 17 cm. 
As expected if the early teddy bears were modelled after actual bears, the FS of this
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picture (0.83) falls within the range of FS given by Hinde and Barden (1985) for their 
earliest beai's (0.6 -  1.0).
Figure 9.1 -  The original stimulus material given to the first participant in each chain
of Experiment 9 a.
Participants were seated in four rows of a lecture theatre, with an equal number 
of participants in each row. Each row constituted one transmission chain. The first 
participant in each chain, that is, the four participants seated at one end of each row, 
were given the original stimulus bear shown in Figme 9.1 and given 10s to examine 
the pictme. After 10s they were instructed to turn the picture face down and were 
given 30s to reproduce on a blanlc sheet of paper the stimulus beai" firom memory. 
They then passed their diawing to tlie person sitting next to them, who went tlirough 
the same procedure (viewing the diawing for 10s and reproducing it fiom memory for 
30s) with the first participant’s drawing as their stimulus. The second participant’s
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drawing was given to the third paiticipant in the row, who did the same, and so on 
along each row/chain. Participants were instincted not to look at any drawing other 
than the one they were supposed to see.
9.3.2 Results
Figure 9.2 shows how the various measures of neoteny changed with 
generation. There was little systematic change, with much seemingly random 
fluctuation. Indeed, what change there was did not conform to the predicted effects. 
For example, forehead size showed an initial decrease from 0.83 to values that 
fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.5, against the predicted increase that would indicate a 
tendency towards neoteny. A series of repeated measures ANOVAs with generation 
as a within-groups factor (with 13 levels after excluding the original FO stimulus bear) 
confirmed this observation, showing that for none of the measures was there a 
significant effect of generation.
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Figure 9.2 -  Changes in various measures of neoteny with generation (Experiment 
9a). Each data point is the mean measurement of all four chains.
The only clear effect that was observed is demonstrated in Figure 9.3, which 
shows the overall face height decreasing steadily with generation. This was confirmed 
by a repeated measures ANOVA showing a significant effect of generation (F(3 ,8) 
=16.47, p<0.001, Greenliouse-Geisser coiTected) and a significant linear downward 
trend (F(i,3)=56.51, p<0.005). To summarise, the bears in Experiment 9a showed no 
evidence of increasing in neoteny, the only significant effect being a decrease in 
overall face size.
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Figure 9.3 -  The decrease in face height with generation (Experiment 9a). Each data 
point is the mean measurement of all four chains.
P,3.3 Discussion
One obvious factor that may have obscured any effect of neoteny is the 
significant reduction in overall face size. Although all of the neoteny measiues were 
expressed as ratios to control for face size, there may not be a linear relationship 
between the overall face size and the positions of the facial featiues (similar to 
allometric growth patterns). A second problem was that many participants had 
difficulty reproducing the three-dimensional protruding snout, owing to the fact that 
the original stimulus bear was derived from a photograph. Indeed, the snout would 
often become entirely detached fiom the face, and in two of the four chains did not 
suiwive past the fifth generation. These two problems -  reduction in overall face size
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and difficulty in drawing a three-dimensional image -  were addressed in Experiment 
9b.
9.4 E x p e r im e n t  9b
9.4.1 Materials and Methods
Experiment 9b repeated the basic design of Experiment 9a but with two 
improvements to addiess the methodological problems discussed above. First, the 
overall face size was kept constant thioughout each generation by giving every 
participant a blanlc outline of the face shape and instructing them to reproduce only 
the internal facial features. Second, the stimulus bear given to the first participant in 
each chain was made easier to diaw, to prevent the difficulty with the three 
dimensional snout shown by the participants of Experiment 9a. The stimulus bear for 
Experiment 9b was drawn by hand using an early teddy bear as a model, and is shown 
in Figure 9.4. The actual face height of this image as presented to participants was 
10.7 cm, and the FS was 0.61. This was even less neotenous than the bear fiom 
Experiment 9a, although again fell within the range of FS given by Hinde and Barden 
(1985) for their earliest bears (0.6 -  1.0).
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 9a except that before the 
experiment began each participant was given a blank outline of the stimulus bear with 
the internal features missing. Six chains each comprising eight participants were run, 
givmg a total of 48 participants. Although all of the 48 participants perfoimed the 
experiment, nine of the reproductions were not returned to the experimenter, giving 
data fiom only 39 participants. The overall design is shown in Figure 9.5. The
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participants were xmdergraduate students of the University of Gloucestershire who 
performed the experiment as part of a course on Evolutionary Psychology. None of 
the participants who took pail in Experiment 9b had any knowledge of Experiment 9a.
Figure 9.4 -  The original stimulus material given to the first participant in each chain
of Experiment 9b.
O  =  1 participant 
Q = 1 participant, data missing Generation
FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
Stimulus
Figure 9.5 -  Design of Experiment 9b
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9.4.2 Results and Discussion
Figure 9.6 shows how the various measures of neoteny changed with 
generation. The results are roughly comparable to those from Experiment 9a 
(illustrated in Figure 9.1). FS again fluctuated around 0.5, indicating no increase in 
neoteny. DE showed a slight decrease, again indicating a decrease in neoteny, while 
NE and EW showed little change. The attempt to make the snout easier to draw 
seemed to be successfril, as the snout no longer detached itself from the rest of the 
face. Despite this, the snout still disappeared from four of the six chains (after the 
first, second, foiuth and sixth generations respectively). The steady decrease in SH, 
which would indicate an increase in neoteny, should therefore be tieated with caution.
Forehead size (FS)
Eye width (EW)
Distance between eyes (DE) 
Snout height (SH)
Nose height (NH)________0.7 -
0.6
0.4 •
0.2 7
0.0
S75 62 3 40
Generation
Figure 9.6 -  Changes in various measures of neoteny with generation (Experiment 
9b). Each data point is the mean measurement of all six chains.
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Repeated measmes ANOVAs were performed on all measures with generation 
as a within-groups factor, now with 8 levels. As can be seen in Figure 9.5, only one 
chain contained complete data for all eight generations. Excluding chains with 
missing values would therefore leave a sample size of n = 1 (where n = number of 
chains), so mean substitution was used to estimate the missing values, giving sample 
sizes of n = 6 (except SH, as noted above, for which n = 2).
FS, EW, DE and SH all showed no significant effect of generation. NH showed 
a significant effect of generation (F(3,i3)=8.28, p<0.005, Greenhouse-Geisser 
coiTected) and a significant linear decrease according to a trend analysis 
(F(i ,5)=11.96, p<0 .05), indicating an increase in neoteny as predicted. However, 
given the negative findings on the majority of the measures, including the measure 
used by Hinde and Barden (1985), the conclusion from Experiment 9b must be that 
there was no general tendency towards neoteny with generation in these teddy bear 
faces.
Figure 9,7 shows a bear whose facial dimensions (FS, EW, DE and NH) match 
the mean values of the final (eighth) generation reproductions. As the majority of 
chains lost the snout, the snout has been omitted in this composite bear. A comparison 
with the original stimulus bear in Figure 9.4 gives the impression that the eyes have 
moved closer together and the nose has become smaller, as would be expected if DE 
and NH both significantly decreased.
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Figure 9.7 -  Composite bear whose facial dimensions match the mean dimensions of 
the final (eighüi) generation bear s of Experiment 9b.
9.5  E x p e r im e n t  9 c
One remaining criticism of Experiments 9a and 9b might be that the 
experimental setting, a lecture theatre, is not conducive to transmission. It is possible 
that perfonning the procedure in firont of fellow students in some way inhibited or 
distracted the participants. Experiment 9c therefore repeated the basic design of 
Experiments 9a and 9b but in a more controlled laboratory setting. This opportunity 
was also taken to alter the stimulus bear again, to make the image easier still to draw 
and to rnalce the face as un-neotenous as possible, to maximise the chances of 
detecting any neotenous tendency.
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9.5.1 Materials and Methods
The standard transmission chain design was adopted, as originally employed by 
Baitlett (1932). Hence participants were tested one at a time, with the experimenter 
passing the material fiom generation to generation. Participants carried out the present 
study after participating in an unrelated transmission chain study involving verbal 
material (the anthropomorphism study of Chapter 8). Following completion of that 
study, participants were instructed that they would then go through the same 
procedure but with a picture instead of a text. The stimulus bear was then shown to 
the participant for approximately 5s and then removed, after which the par ticipant was 
instructed to reproduce the pictme fiorn ihemory in the blanlc outline provided. The 
resulting image was then taken by the experimenter and presented to the next 
participant in the chain at a later time.
Five separate chains each containing six generations were nm. Four chains 
comprised all female participmits, and one chain comprised all male participants. The 
mean age of all 30 participants was 21.34 years (standard deviation = 3.91), and all 
were students of the University of St. Andrews. Each participant was paid £2 to 
complete both this and the antlrropomorphism study.
The original stimulus bear face given to the first participant in each chain is 
shown in Figure 9.8, and was designed to be as low in neoteny as possible in order to 
maximise the chances of detecting a preference for neoteny. Hence this bear has a 
small forehead, small eyes close together, a large nose and a small chin. Given that 
several of the participants in Experiments 9a and 9b omitted the snout or had
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difficulty integi'ating it with the other facial featui'es, a snout was not included in the 
stimulus beai’ for Experiment 9c. Removing the snout now allows a new measure of 
chin height (CH), defined as the vertical distance from the base of the face to the 
lowest part of the mouth, which is predicted to increase with generation. The FS of 
this bear is 0.29, much lower (i.e. less neotenous) than the original bears used in 
Experiments 9a and 9b and also the bears measured by Hinde and Barden (1985).
Figure 9.8 -  The original stimulus bear given to the first participant in each chain of
Experiment 9c.
9.5,2 Results and Discussion
Figure 9.9 shows how the various measures of neoteny changed with 
generation. FS showed a slight increase, which would indicate a tendency toward 
neoteny, but the final generation value of around 0.5 is still not even at the least 
neotenous value of FS recorded by Hinde and Barden (1985) of 0.6. The other
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measures also showed little change with generation, although there were veiy small 
movements in the neotenous direction. Figure 9.10 shows a composite bear 
constructed with the facial dimensions (FS, DE, EW, NH, and CH) matching the 
mean values of the final (sixth) generation reproductions. This composite bear appears 
slightly more neotenous than the original bear (Figure 9.8), with slightly larger eyes 
further apart, a larger forehead and a smaller nose.
Forehead size (FS)
Distance between eyes (DE) 
Mean eye width (EW)
Nose height (NH)
Chin height (CH)
0.9 -
0.8 -
0.7 -
0.6 -
0.4 -
0.3
0.2 '
—e
0.0
F6F3 F4 F5F2FIFO
Generation
Figure 9.9 -  Changes in various measures of neoteny with generation (Experiment 
9c). Each data point is the mean measuiement of all five chains.
Repeated measures ANOVAs with generation as a 6-level within-groups factor 
showed no significant effect of generation for any of the five measures of neoteny. 
Given that there was a certain amount of fluctuation in the measures with generation, 
it may be that although there is no progressive trend toward neoteny, there is a
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significant difference between the first and final generations in the direction predicted. 
A paired-samples t-test indeed showed that for the FS measure the final (F6) 
generation values were significantly greater than the first (FI) generation values 
(t(4)=2.91, p<0.05), suggesting an increase in neoteny. This effect was not sti'ong, 
however, and equivalent t-tests for the other measures of neoteny were not significant. 
The overall conclusion from Experiment 9c must therefore echo that of Experiments 
9a and 9b in finding no significant overall tendency toward neoteny in the 
transmission of these bear faces.
<2> < £ >
Figure 9.10 -  Composite bear whose facial dimensions match the mean dimensions of 
the final (sixth) generation beai's of Experiment 9c.
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9.6 G e n e r a l  D isc u ssio n
Chapter 9 used the transmission chain method to experimentally simulate the 
cultural evolution of the teddy bear, as documented by Hinde and Barden (1985). It 
was predicted that bear faces would become more neotenous as they ai*e transmitted 
along chains of participants, just as teddy bears have become more neotenous over an 
SO year period. However, neither Experiments 9a or 9b, which used a face-to-face 
method of tiansmission, nor Experiment 9c, which adopted a more controlled Bartlett- 
style laboratory method of transmission, found any robust evidence of an increase in 
neoteny with generation. Making the drawing task easier by removing the three 
dimensional snout, presenting a blank outline to keep the face size constant, and 
making the stimulus hear as un-neotenous as possible all failed to elicit Hie predicted 
effect.
At least four potential explanations can be suggested for this negative result. 
First, the participants in this study might not possess a preference for neotenous facial 
features. However, given the large number of studies listed in the hitroduction 
(Section 9.2) that found significant correlations between measures of neoteny and 
judgements of attractiveness, across various cultures, stimuli and ages, this would 
seem unlikely. There is no reason to suspect that the participants who took part in this 
study are any different to the participants of those studies, or indeed to the teddy bear 
consumers responsible for Hinde and Barden’s (1985) data.
Second, it may be that the transmission chain method is in some general sense 
not suitable for studying the cultural transmission of pictorial stimuli, and no
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significant changes can be expected regardless of the theoretical preference or bias in 
question. However, the fact that some of the measures did show significant linear 
trends in Experiment 9b, albeit not in the manner that was predicted, suggests that the 
method is indeed potentially useful. Bartlett (1932), Allport and Postman (1947) and 
Hall (1951) also presented several successful transmission chain results using pictorial 
stimuli (see Chapter 4).
Third, it may be that the participants were attempting to exhibit a preference for 
neoteny in their reproductions, but their lack of skill at drawing prevented the 
preference from being expressed. However, it is hard to see how the stimulus bear 
used in Experiment 9c (shown in Figure 9,8) could be made any easier to diaw.
A final possibility is that although the participants do indeed possess a 
preference for neoteny, this particular preference does not affect the reproduction of 
pictures from memory. Perhaps the preference is exclusively perceptual, and is only 
exhibited when perceptual judgements are made, such as selecting a teddy bear or 
rating the attractiveness of a face. The active reconstruction of an image from 
memory, on the other hand, may be too fai* removed fr om this perceptual preference 
for any significant effect of neoteny to have been observed here.
These last two possibilities might be investigated by making the experimental 
procedure more passive and less reliant on actively drawing the faces. A computer 
program could generate a number of bear faces randomly varying in the dimensions 
measured above (FS, EW, NH, SH and DE), with the participant asked to select their
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favourite. The next participant in the chain would then he presented with a selection 
of bear faces with mean dimensions moved towards the values chosen by the previous 
participant. Repeating this process of artificial selection would allow the experimenter 
to test whether the mean dimensions of the bears gradually become more neotenous 
with generation, without relying on the drawing skills of the participants and more 
closely resembling the neotenous selection of real teddy bears as investigated by 
Hinde and Barden (1985). This design resembles the ‘artificial selection’ paradigm 
used by evolutionary biologists to detect the selection of biological traits (see Chapter 
3).
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CHAPTER 10 - D isc u ss io n  OF P a r t  B
One of the main conclusions that was drawn from the literature review 
regarding work on cultural transmission in Chapter 4 was that Baitlett’s (1932) 
transmission chain method constitutes an easily-implemented, potentially fruitful yet 
under-used means of empirically studying human cultural tiansmission. Hence the 
general aim of the following Chapters 5-9 was to demonstiate that this methodology 
can be successfully used for this purpose.
The specific aim of each chapter was to experimentally test for a different 
hypothesised bias in cultural transmission. Chapter 5 found evidence that social 
information is transmitted with greater accuracy and in greater quantity than 
equivalent non-social infoimation, in line with evolutionary theories positing a social 
origin for human intelligence. Chapter 6 found evidence for a ‘hierarchical bias’ that 
acts to convert knowledge of everyday events from a low hierarchical level to 
increasingly higher hierarchical levels. Chapter 7 failed to find evidence for an 
indirect bias in which information from high status sources is transmitted with gi eater 
accuiacy than the same information from low status sources. Chapter 8 failed to find 
evidence for an ‘ anthropomorphic bias’ which predicts that animal behaviour is 
increasingly described in terms of human mental states and intentions. Finally, 
Chapter 9 failed to demonstrate that teddy bear faces are made increasingly neotenous 
during transmission, hence failing to reproduce the equivalent historical tiend in 
actual teddy bears.
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Overall, I feel that the general aim of Section B has been achieved, and the 
transmission chain method has been shown to be an effective means of experimentally 
studying human cultural transmission. Chapters 5 and 6 hoth demonstrated significant 
effects predicted by the respective hypothesised transmission biases. An important 
finding was the cumulative multiple-generation effect observed in Chapter 6, where 
only after a number of generations did the ti'ansformation from low- to high-levels of 
the hierarchy become evident. This effect would therefore not have been observed in a 
standard single-generation memory experiment, and illustrates the contribution of the 
transmission chain method in comparison to these more traditional methods. Although 
only two of the five hypotheses were upheld, a negative result does not mean that the 
methodology was invalid, hi some cases there was perhaps a limitation of the precise 
design used, such as the reliance on drawing skill in Chapter 9 or the use of ‘second­
hand’ verbal information in Chapter 7, although these limitations may be overcome 
by using a different form of the transmission chain method (see below). Hopefully 
future work using the transmission chain method will produce evidence of more 
biases and result in a rich body of empirical data concerning human cultural 
tiansmission.
The results of these empirical studies can be used to inform the wider theory of 
cultiual evolution outlined in Part A. Indeed, Chapter 3 identified the experimental 
study of cultural transmission as an area which has been paiticularly neglected 
compared with the more well-developed theoretical work involving phylogenetic 
analyses or gene-culture coevolution modelling. On the basis of the above findings, 
we can speculate that at a population level (i.e. real-life society), information
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concerning third party social relationships should be more prevalent than non-social 
(‘factual’) information (Chapter 5), and information that describes events at a high 
hierarchical level should be more prevalent than information at a low hierarchical 
level (Chapter 6). Such phenomena remain to be explored, and more foimal tests of 
these claims will be needed to provide definitive support. An infoiinal example might 
be the much higher circulation of gossip magazines than factual journals (Table 10.1).
Publication UK circulation per issue
‘Sodal’
Heat magazine 539,983
OK! magazine 468,928
Hello! magazine 323,591
‘Non-social’
The Economist 153,184
New Scientist 91,100
The Spectator 48,004
Table 10.1 - UK circulation per issue (July-December 2004) of magazines that can 
infoimally be described as containing either ‘social’ or ‘non-social’ information
(Source: www.abc.org.uk)
All of the biases tested here except for the indirect bias of Chapter 7 are what 
Richerson and Boyd (2005) call ‘content-based’ biases, in which “the stmcture of 
cognition makes some variants easier to learn and remember” (p. 69). The indirect
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bias, on the other hand, involves the adoption of a trait according to the characteristics 
of its source rather than its inherent characteristics (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005). To date, theoretical models of cultural evolution have 
predominantly focused on indirect bias and the related ‘frequency-dependent’ bias 
(e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985) over content-based biases. Perhaps empirical studies 
such as those reported above might redress this imbalance.
Durham (1992) has fuilher argued that content-based biases can either be the 
result of biological evolution and acquired genetically (‘primary values’) or the result 
of other culturally acquired infoimation (‘secondary values’). In some of the previous 
chapters I have explicitly classed the bias under investigation as at least to some 
degree a biologically evolved primary value (e.g. the social bias of Chapter 5 or the 
neoteny bias of Chapter 9), while in other cases I have remained agnostic with regards 
to the origin of the bias. As noted by Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 72), however, this 
dichotomous primaiy-secondary distinction is somewhat simplistic and the time 
origins of the biases tested here are likely to involve a complex interaction between 
biologically and culturally acquired information. Generally, it is difficult without 
further developmental, cross-cultural or compaiative evidence, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, to draw specific conclusions regarding the relative influence of 
these two sources. Even where comparative (e.g. Chapter 5) or developmental (e.g. 
Chapter 9) evidence does suggest a biological origin, individual or social learning 
may still play an important role.
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A number of general methodological lessons can be learned from the above 
studies. First, the within-chain transmission chain design, in which all of the types of 
material to be compared (e.g. both social and non-social) are transmitted along each 
chain, is more effective than a between-chain design, in which each chain transmits 
only one type of material (e.g. separate ‘social’ chains vs. ‘non-social’ chains) and 
different chains are compared. This is because random between-chain differences are 
often large, and the within-chain design eliminates this error. This was specifically 
demonstrated by comparing Chapter 5 with Mesoudi (2002). While Mesoudi (2002) 
used a between-chain design and found equivocal evidence for a social bias. Chapter 
5 found much stronger evidence for the same hypothesis using a within-chain design. 
Consequently, the experiments reported here adopted the within-chain design where 
appropriate. Similar ly, where Mesoudi (2002) and previous transmission chain studies 
(e.g. Bartlett, 1932) used a distractor task between reading and recalling the stimulus, 
the experiments reported here did not use a distractor, as suggested in Section 4.2.4. 
Distractor tasks may, therefore, be urmecessary except where specifically theoretically 
justified. Also as suggested in Section 4.2.4, Kintsch’s (1974) propositional analysis 
was successfully used to divide the recalled texts into constituent units of meaning, 
allowing quantitative statistical analyses to be performed. Blind second coders 
showed high agreement on the propositional analyses carried out in Chapters 5 and 6, 
increasing confidence in its validity.
Chapters 5-9 also generated a number of suggestions for extending or 
modifying the transmission chain method. One possibility for the failure in Chapter 7 
to find an effect of status was that the indirect bias does not extend to second-hand
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written verbal material. It would be useful in this case and more generally to compare 
the transmission of written material as in Chapters 5-9 with face-to-face oral 
transmission. There may be important non-verbal interpersonal cues that affect 
transmission. Also arising from Chapter 7, it would be useful to study the 
transmission of behaviour rather than verbal material. Whiten and colleagues are 
cuiTently rumiing transmission chain studies in which children transmit different 
methods of opening ‘artificial fiirits’. Perhaps the behaviours studied by Bandura in 
his social learning experiments (e.g. Bandura et al, 1963) could also be transmitted 
along chains of participants to examine their longer-term persistence. Finally, Chapter 
9 gave rise to the idea of an ‘arrificial selection’ paradigm in which each successive 
participant chooses one of a number of variants on the basis of some experimental 
criteria. The stimuli presented to each new participant would then be shifted in the 
direction of the previous participant’s preference, and the long-term changes in the 
stimuli tracked. This method was also proposed in Chapter 3, drawing on similar- 
artificial selection experiments in evolutionary hiology. As argued in that chapter, 
there are a number of possibilities for importing methods and theories from biology 
into the empirical study of cultural transmission. In Part C I will turn to an area which 
has already heavily honowed from evolutionary biology with some success: the 
rnatliematical modelling of gene-culture coevolution.
272
Part C - Gene-culture coevolution
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Ill Part C we move from experimental simulations of cultural transmission to 
mathematical simulations of gene-culture coevolution, in which genes and cultme are 
modelled as separate but interacting inlieritance systems. Part C uses two 
mathematical modelling approaches - the population genetics based methods of 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) and an agent- 
based technique (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Kohler & Gumeiman, 2000) - to explore the 
gene-culture coevolution of genetic and cultural influences on mating behaviour, 
focusing on recent anthiopological data concerning ‘partible paternity’ beliefs (where 
children can have more than one ‘biological’ father). This approach constitutes 
another branch of Figure 3.1 (equivalent to theoretical population genetics), and 
another contribution to an overall evolutionary science of culture.
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CHAPTER 11 - P a r t ib le  P a t e r n i t y  a n d  t h e  E v o lu t io n  o f  H um an
M ating  B ehaviour
11.1 A b st r a c t
Recent anthropological work has shown that certain Lowland South American 
societies hold beliefs in ‘partible paternity’, the idea that children may have more than 
one ‘biological’ father. This contrasts with Western beliefs in singular paternity, and 
biological reality, where children may have only one true father. Here, mathematical 
models are used to explore the coevolution of paternity beliefs and the genetic 
variation underlying human mating beliavioui". A gene-culture co-evolutionary model 
(Model 1) found that populations exposed to a range of selection regimes typically 
converge on one of two simultaneously stable equilibria, one in which the population 
is monogamous and holds beliefs in singular paternity, and the other in which the 
population is polygamous and holds beliefs in partible paternity. A second agent- 
based model (Model 2), with alternative assumptions about the formation of mating 
consortships, broadly replicated this finding, but only for populations with a strongly 
female-biased sex ratio. This is consistent with evidence for high adult male mortality 
in the region. The analyses suggest that beliefs about paternity may have significantly 
affected the evolution of human mating behaviour, generating divergent selection that 
helps to explain vaiiation in mating behaviour and paternity beliefs among adjacent 
South American societies.
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11.2 In t r o d u c t io n
In our society it is frequently talcen for granted that every child has one, and 
only one, tme biological father. Indeed, this culturally tiansmitted belief in what is 
known as ‘singular paternity’ coincides with scientific evidence that only one sperm 
cell can fertilise an ovum, and hence childien inherit genes from only one male (and 
one female) parent. However, this match between our culturally transmitted folk 
beliefs regarding paternity and the scientific evidence regarding conception may just 
be a lucky accident. The Western folk belief in singular paternity has a long history: 
such a belief is evident in the writings of Aiistotle, is enshiined in a 451 B.C. Roman 
law, and is an assumption that runs through the Bible (Beckerman & Valentine, 
2002a, pp. 1-2). Scientific evidence for the one-sperm theory of fertilisation, however, 
was not obtained until the 1870s (Beckeiman & Valentine, 2002a, p. 2).
This dissociation between cultural belief on the one hand and scientific reality 
on the other has recently been highlighted further by anthropological studies of 
Lowland South American societies. Beckeiman and Valentine (2002) have described 
how members of certain South American societies, such as the Bari of Venezuela 
(Beckerman et ah, 1998; Beckeiman et a l, 2002), hold beliefs not in singular 
paternity but in ‘partible paternity’, the idea that children can have more than one 
‘biological’ father. Conception and foetal giowth are seen to result from the 
accumulation or other combined action of more than one man’s semen, and 
consequently a significant proportion of children in these populations aclmowledge 
‘secondaiy fathers’, i.e. men who slept with their mothers around the time of their
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conception or during pregnancy. This belief is illustrated by the following quotation 
concerning one of these South American societies, the Kulina of western Brazil:
“Conception is a process rather than an event for the Kulina.. .in which 
semen accumulates in a woman’s womb until it reaches a large and 
dense enough bolus to form a fetus. [This process] leaves open the 
possibility that more than one man may contribute to the seminal 
gi'owth of a fetus, and thus two or more men will be ‘fathers’ to the 
child. Among the Kulina this possibility was commonly a fact.” 
(Pollock, 2002, p. 52)
This belief in partible paternity contrasts with the beliefs of other ecologically 
similar South American societies (such as the Warao of Venezuela: Heinen & 
Wilbert, 2002), as well as the majority of the rest of the world, whose inliabitants 
believe in singular paternity.
Partible paternity is not a trivial, raie or inconsequential belief. It is observed in 
numerous societies, including the Baii, Kulina, Ache, Yanonami, Canela, Cashinahua, 
Ese Eja, Mehinaku, Ye’lcwana, Mebengokre and Xoclen, which are located across 
South America, in modem day Brazil, Pern, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia and 
Colombia (Beckeiman & Valentine, 2002b). It also significantly affects these 
people’s lives. The sexual division of labour practised by these societies means that 
males go out hunting and provide valuable animal proteins and animal fats. If a child 
has additional fathers as a result of the partible paternity belief, then each one of these 
fathers provisions the child with extra food. This provisioning occurs directly to the 
child itself or indirectly to the child’s mother when the child is in the womb. 
Consequently, Bari children with two fathers have a significantly greater chance of 
survival to age 15 than children with only one father (Beckeiman et a l, 1998; 2002).
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Similarly, Hill and Hurtado (cited in Beckerman & Valentine, 2002a, p. 7) report that 
85% of Ache children with two fathers survived to age 10 compaied with just 70% of 
childien with one father. It is important to note that there are no known ecological, 
demographic or linguistic differences between partible societies and neighbouring 
singular paternity societies, so these survivorship differences are not simply a 
reflection of one of these factors, rather they seem to he due to the different paternity 
beliefs.
The existence of partible paternity societies not only highlights the potential 
dissociation between culturally ti'ansmitted folk beliefs and biological reality, but also 
challenges a number of fundamental assumptions held by the Western scientific 
establishment. In particular, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology hold that 
mating behaviour should be driven by essentially genetic interests. Steven Pinker, for 
example, writes that, “Sexual jealousy is found in all cultm*es...In most societies, 
some women readily share a husband, but in no society do men readily share a wife.” 
(Pinker, 1997, p. 488), while E.O, Wilson states that, “men are predicted to stress 
exclusive sexual access and guarantees of paternity” (Wilson, 1998, p. 170). If it is the 
case that men who believe in paitible paternity do not conform to such predictions, 
then these assumptions will have to be reconsidered.
The existence of partible paternity societies raises a number of questions 
accessible to theoretical investigation: (1) How does a belief in partible paternity 
affect the biological fitness of males and females? (2) Wliat impact do such beliefs 
have on human mating systems? (3) Can a (partible paternity) belief spread that has
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fitness benefits for one sex (females) and is disadvantageous to the other (males)? (4) 
How can two such distinct alternative beliefs about paternity persist when they are 
likely to have such direct effects on biological fitness? (5) More generally, can a 
consideration of cultural variation in beliefs about paternity shed light on the 
evolution of human mating systems?
The present study addressed these issues by mathematically modelling the 
coevolution of paternity beliefs and the genetic variation underlying human mating 
behaviour. Two alternative mathematical modelling techniques were used. Model 1 
employed the methods of gene-cultiue coevolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976); in Model la  
assuming vertical cultural transmission and in Model lb assuming oblique cultural 
transmission, both assuming random mating from an infinite population. Model 2 
adopted an agent-based modelling approach (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Kohler & 
Gmnerman, 2000), which featuied more realistic non-random mating rules and 
demographic factors.
11.3 M o d e l  1 - Ge n e -C u l t u r e  C o e v o l u t io n  M o d el
Gene-cultiue coevolution (or dual inheritance) models (Boyd & Richerson, 
1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976; Laland, 
Kumm, & Feldman, 1995) represent extensions of population genetics models that 
incoiporate both genetic and cultural inheritance. As well as tracking changes in allele 
frequencies in the gene pool in successive generations, gene-cultuie coevolution 
models also track changes in cultmal traits in the cultural pool. Hence each individual
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is described in terms of their ‘phenogenotype’ (the combined package of their genes 
and cultural traits), and transmission rules for both genes and culture are specified. 
Model 1 employed gene-culture coevolution methods to explore the interaction of the 
genetic bases of mating behaviour and culturally transmitted paternity beliefs, in 
Model la  assuming vertical cultural tiansmission and in Model lb assuming oblique 
cultui'al transmission.
1L3.1 Model la  - Vertical Cultural Transmission
11.3.1.1 Genetic variation
We assume that genetic variation either now or in the past to some degiee 
underlies variation in human mating behaviour. This genetic variation might act, 
along with environmental factors, via hormonally controlled emotional states such as 
‘jealousy’ or ‘faithfulness’ (although the precise proximate mechanisms are not of 
primary concern). This is consistent with findings that monogamous behaviours in 
voles, such as pair-bond formation, are facilitated by transfer of a specific gene into 
the ventral forebrain (Pitkow et a l, 2001). In humans, Cherkas et al (2004) have 
reported a study of 1600 female twin pairs in which the frequency of infidelity and the 
number of sexual paitners were both found to be under moderate genetic influence 
(around 40% heritability).
For simplicity, we assmne that individuals’ mating behaviom* is affected by 
variation at a single haploid genetic locus (M), at which we posit two alleles, M  and 
m. M  individuals are more prone towards monogamy and do not actively seek extia 
mates beyond a monogamous pairing, while m individuals are more prone towards
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polygamy and do seek extra mates. While humans aie obviously not haploid, a 
haploid model has the advantage of greater tractability, and a diploid model has also 
been analysed which gives equivalent results.
11.3.1.2 Cultural variation
We assume that individuals hold one of two discrete, mutually exclusive 
beliefs concerning paternity. Bpp individuals hold beliefs in partible paternity, while 
Bsp individuals hold beliefs in singular paternity. In Model la, vertical transmission 
was assumed, where these beliefs aie assumed to be inherited from parent to 
offspring. This assumption is consistent with several studies that have found a 
predominant role for vertical transmission of beliefs in pre-industrial societies similar 
to the Bari (e.g. Aunger, 2000a; Guglielmino et a l, 1995; Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza, 
1986; Hewlett et a l, 2002), in some cases specifically for traits regarding mating 
behaviour. However, the extent of vertical cultural tiansmission is contentious (Boyd, 
personal communication; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) so this assumption is relaxed by 
considering the case of oblique cultural tiansmission in Model lb and conformist 
cultural transmission in Model 2.
11.3.1.3 Phenogenotypes
Two genotypes and two cultural beliefs give the four possible combinations 
(henceforth ‘phenogenotypes’) shown in Table 11.1. These phenogenotypes are 
allotted frequencies oîxl-x4  in males 2LYiàyl-y4 in females.
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PHENOGENOTYPE FREQTJENCY
Males Females
MBpp x l y i
MBsp x2 y2
mBpp x3 y3
mBsp x4 y4
Table 11.1 - Phenogenotype frequency notation
Mating cluster Mating behaviour
1 male x 1 female Monogamy
1 male x 2 females Polygyny
2 males x 1 female Polyandry
2 males x 2 females Polygynandry
Table 11.2 -  Definitions of patterns of mating behaviour
11.3.1.4 Mating behaviour
Table 11.2 specifies how different combinations of males and females join to 
form ‘mating clusters’ of two, three or four individuals. For simplicity, each 
individual is limited to a maximum of two mates, which is also the common upper 
limit on mate numbers in the societies studied by the contributors to Beckerman and 
Valentine (2002b). Note that we assume that mating behaviour across a population 
can be chaiacterised by the frequencies of individuals behaving monogamously, 
polygynously, polyandiously and polygynandrously, and distinguish between the 
mating system as described by this collective activity across the population (which is 
termed the demographic mating system, to which Table 11.2 refers) and the 
institutionalised mating system which specifies the legal or socially sanctioned forms 
of mating behaviour (e.g. Muidock, 1967). A similar distinction was made by Low 
(2003), who used the term ‘socially monogamous’ to describe societies with 
normative rules limiting a person to a single spouse at a time, and the term
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‘genetically monogamous’ to describe populations in which the variance in
reproductive success of men and women is approximately equal.
Hence, different combinations of males and females linked by sexual activity 
are defined as categories of ‘mating behaviom*’ according to Table 11.2. One male 
and one female constitute monogamy; one male and two females constitute polygyny; 
one female and two males constitute polyandry; and two males and two females 
constitute polygynandry. Table 11.3 specifies how individuals’ genotypes determine 
the formation of the mating clusters shown in Table 11.2. hi row rl of Table 11.3, 
both of the initial mates (Male 1 and Female 1) are M and so neither will seek out 
extra mates. This pair will therefore remain monogamous. In row i*2, the male is m 
and so seeks out another female. This second female (Female 2) is here M, and so will 
not in turn seek out an extra male beyond Male 1. This combination thus constitutes 
polygyny. In row i*3 the genotypes of the initial pair are reversed, with the m female 
seeking out a second male (Male 2) who is M  and does not seek out a second female. 
This results in polyandry. Rows r4-rl 1 show all of the cases in which at least one of 
the initial mating pair are m and their second mate is also m. This second mate
therefore selects a further (fourth) mate, resulting in polygynandry.
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Genotypes of mating individuals Mating behaviourMale 1 Female 1 Male 2 Female 2
rl M M Monogamy
r2 m M M Polygyny
r3 M m M Polyandry
r4 M m m M
Polygynandry
r5 M m m m
r6 m M M m
xl m M m m
r8 m m M M
r9 m m M m
iTO m m m M
r l l m m m m
Table 11.3 - The formation of mating clusters as determined by genotype in Model 1 
11.3.1.5 Fitness
In order to minimise the number of paiameters that need to be tracked in the 
analysis, and hence limit the complexity of the model, the average fitness of the entire 
mating cluster is specified rather than giving different fitness ternis to individual 
males and females. (Note that Model 2 below specifies individual fitness values.) 
Accordingly, Table 11.4 gives the fitnesses, W1-W4, of each mating cluster. These 
paiameters represent the combined fitness of all females within a cluster, with 
separate terms for females who hold Bpp and Bsp beliefs (wj^ ,^ wssp, W4pp and w*^). 
Each female’s fitness is expressed as deviations fiom a baseline fitness of 1. Taking 
the Bpp teiins first, the sole fitness parameter is s (0<y<l), defined as the fitness 
benefit associated with the help of one male. Monogamous females, who receive the 
help of a single male, have a fitness of (I+5). Polygynous females must shaie a male
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with another female, giving an average fitness of (l+s/2), although as there are two 
females in polygynous clusters this is doubled to give 2(l+5/2). Polyandrous females 
receive the help of two males so have a fitness of (1+25'). Finally, polygynandrous 
females receive the help of two males but must share this help with another female, 
giving an average of one male’s help, i.e. (I+5), This is doubled because 
polygynandrous clusters contain two females, giving 2(1+^). This paiameterisation is 
broadly consistent with obseived patterns of help and its associated fitness benefits in 
animal and human societies (Beckerman & Valentine, 2002b; Davies, 1992).
Mating cluster Bpp Bsp
Monogamy Wi (1 + 4 Wj (I+5)
Polygyny W2 2(1+5/2) W2 2(1+5/2)
Polyandry (1+25) ^3sp (1+ (l+a)5 - r)
Polygynandry ^4pp 2(1+5) ^4sp 2(1+ 5 - r)
Table 11.4 - Mating cluster fitness terms for Model 1
Females who hold the Bsp belief have the same basic fitness terms as Bpp 
females but with two additional parameters. First, r (0<r<l) is defined as the fitness 
cost to polyandrous and polygynandr ous Bsp females of infanticide and/or injury from 
male aggression specifically motivated by jealousy or emotional states related to 
sharing a female. It is assumed that this fitness cost only applies to Bsp societies, as 
Bpp males believe that paternity is shared and have no cause for aggression 
(Beckerman et a l, 1998; Beckerman & Valentine, 2002b). In contrast, a significant 
effect of aggression has been observed in both Bsp human societies and non-human
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species engaged in polyandrous and polygynandrous behavioui* (Daly & Wilson, 
1988; Davies, 1992).
The second Bsp parameter is a (0<a<l), which parameterises ‘paternity 
confusion’. This parameter determines how cooperative the polyandry is, and hence 
applies only to polyandious individuals. When a=l, there is maximum paternity 
confusion; both males believe that the offspring is theirs, and so both help by 
providing resources to females at a maximum rate. This is a case of fully cooperative 
polyandry. The female hence receives the full help of both males, i.e. (1+û!)5 = 2s, 
Conversely, when û: is at a minimum (a=0), there is no paternity confusion, and only 
the male who is sure of paternity will help. Hence the female will receive only one 
male’s help, i.e. (1+û!)5 = s. Note that this is equivalent to monogamy. The parameter 
a therefore permits a continuum of polyandry from fully cooperative to the equivalent 
of monogamy. Again, this does not apply to Bpp societies, as males will always 
assume paternity to be fully shared and always help at a maximum rate.
11.3.1.6 Cultural bias
We assume that different phenogenotype matings have different probabilities of 
producing Bpp or Bsp offspring. Certain phenogenotypes may suffer some foim of 
‘internal conflict’ or ‘cognitive dissonance’ biasing them towards more compatible 
beliefs (although again the exact proximate mechanisms are not of primary concern). 
For instance, individuals genetically predisposed to monogamy might find Bsp more 
attractive than Bpp, as the latter belief holds that children are fonned through the
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accumulated action of more than one man’s semen, specifically conflicting with 
monogamous mating.
The specific nature of the bias is summaiised in Tables 11.5 and 11.6. We 
assume that a belief in Bsp is more compatible with predispositions towards 
monogamy than predispositions towards polygamy, so the offspring of M x Af 
matings are biased towards adopting Bsp with a probability bl, where 0<67<0.25 
(Table 11.5). Similarly, we assume the offspring of polygamous m x m matings are 
biased towards adopting Bpp with a probability 62, where 0<62<0.25 (Table 11.6). 
Where the genotypes of the parents differ, we assume that either no bias operates or 
that parent-specific biases cancel each other out, giving an equal chance of the 
offspring being either Bpp or Bsp (if parents differ in their beliefs). Note that the 
upper limit of 0.25 was required to ensure that total phenogenotype fiequencies did 
not exceed 1. Also note that the matmg pair in Table 11.6 will (as specified in Table 
11.3) be part of a larger polygynandrous mating cluster.
Offspring
Father (M) Mother (M) Bpp Bsp
Bpp Bpp 1 0
Bsp Bpp 0.5 - bl 0.5 + bl
Bpp Bsp 0.5 - bl 0.5 + bl
Bsp Bsp 0 1
Table 11.5 -  Cultural bias bl (0<67<0.25) favours Bsp among the offspring o îM x M
parents
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Offspring
Father (wi) Mother (/«) Bpp Bsp
Bpp Bpp 1 0
Bsp Bpp 0.5 + b2 0.5 - b2
Bpp Bsp 0.5 + b2 0.5 - b2
Bsp Bsp 0 1
Table 11.6 -  Cultui'al bias b2 (0<62<0.25) favours Bpp among the offspring of m x m
parents
11.3.1.7 Recursions
Appendix D.l shows the full set of 148 phenogenotype mating combinations 
(rows iT-iT48) based on the basic 11 genotype combinations specified in Table 11.3. 
Standard haploid mles of inheritance and the biases specified in Tables 11.5 and 11.6 
were used to calculate the probabilities that each of these mating clusters will give rise 
to each phenogenotype in the next generation. The offspring phenogenotype 
frequencies for each parental mating behaviour ar e given in columns cl-cl 4. The 
frequency of each of the 148 mating clusters occumng is given in column cO, 
assuming that each mating cluster occurs with a probability equal to the product of 
each of its constituent members. Hence mating was random apart fi'om the restriction 
imposed by the mating mles in Table 11.3 (e.g. two m individuals cannot be 
monogamous).
The fr equency of each phenogenotype in the next generation can be calculated 
by summing down the relevant columns of Appendix D.l (cl-cl4) and weighting by 
the probability that each mating occuis (cO of Appendix D.l), the fitness associated
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with that mating system (from Table 11.4) and the sex ratio {SR for males and l~SR 
for females, where SR is defined as the proportion of the population that is male).
For example, the frequency of MBpp males in the next generation {xl ') is given
by:
(wj EcOcl + W2 EcOc3 + wspp Sc0c7 + w^ pp ZcOcll) SRIWm-
That is, for each row (iT-rl48) we multiply the probability that the mating will 
give rise to a MBpp child (cl, c3, c7 and cl 1 in Appendix D.l) by the probability that 
the mating will occur (cO), and weight by the fitness of that mating cluster 
(monogamy (w;) for cl, polygyny (w j for c3, polyandry (wspp) for c7 and 
polygynandry {w4pp) for c ll). Finally, we multiply the entire expression by the 
proportion of males (SR) and divide by W„„ the mean fitness of the males (a 
normalising constant, that ensures that the total fr equency of all individuals does not 
differ from l\W f\s  the equivalent term for females). The full system of recursions is:
xl'= {w i ZcOcl + W2 ZcOc3 + wspp EcOc7 + W4pp ZcOcl 1) SRf W,,,, 
x2'=(wj Zc0c2 + W2 EcOc4 + W3sp ScOcS + W4sp Sc0cl2) SR/ Wm-> 
x3’=(w2 EcOc5 + wjpp Sc0c9 + W4pp ZcOcl3) SR/ W,,„ 
x4' = (w2 2cOc6 + W3sp HcOclO + W4sp ZcOcl4) SR/ W,,,,
y l '=  (wj EcOcl + W2 Ec0c3 + W3pp Ec0c7 + W4pp EcOcll) (1-SR)/Wf, 
y2'~{w] EcOc2 + W2 EcOc4 + Ec0c8 + W4sp EcOcl2) (1-57 )^/ Wp 
y3' = (w2 Ec0c5 + W3pp Ec0c9 + W4pp EcOcl3) (l-SR)/ Wf, 
y4' — {w2 Ec0c6 + EcOclO + EcOcl4) (l-SR)/ Wf,
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11.3.1.8 Analysis
The system of recursions has been subject to extensive numerical analysis. For 
each set of parameter values, at least 500,000 generations were iim from each of 121 
systematically varied starting frequencies of M/m and Bsp/Bpp (although equilibria 
were typically reached in less than 50 generations: see below). The parameter values 
were in turn systematically varied across a range of biologically plausible values of 
each (for j  and r: 0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25; for a: 0, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0; for bl and 
b2\ 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25; and for SR\ 0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.75). Each parameter 
was varied both in isolation (i.e. where all other parameters are not operating) and at 
each value of every other parameter,
11.3.1.9 Results and Discussion
Figure 11.1 explains the format of the results diagrams presented in 
subsequent figures. Figure 11.1a shows the phenogenotype space, in which the 
fr equencies of alleles M  and m are plotted on the vertical axis and the frequencies of 
cultural ti'aits Bsp and Bpp are plotted on the horizontal axis. Fig 11.1b shows one 
example simulation from the centre of the phenogenotype space 
{M=m=Bsp=Bpp=Q.S). In this case, the population moves from the central starting 
point to an equilibrium at MBsp. Hence a line is drawn from the centre to MBsp, 
which is marked with a circle. Fig 11.1c shows all 121 starting frequencies from 
which simulations were run. hi the subsequent figures, lines are drawn from each of 
these 121 starting frequencies to equilibrium points (solid lines or circles). The arr ows 
surrounding the graphs indicate the direction of selection. Crosses indicate points of 
unstable equilibria, while dashed lines represent lines of imstable equilibria.
290
Figure 11.1 - The format of the outputs. Fig 11.1a shows the phenogenotype space, 
with Mlm on the vertical axis and Bsp/Bpp on the horizontal axis. Fig 11.1b shows 
one example simulation from the centre of the phenogenotype space 
{M=m^Bpp=Bsp=Qi.5). In tliis case, the population moves from the centre to an 
equilibrium at MBsp, which is marked with a circle. Fig 11.1c shows all 121 starting 
frequencies from which simulations were run.
IVI
Bsp Bpp
M
m
BppBsp
Fig 11.1a - The phenogenotype space Fig 11.1b - A population moves from 
the centre to equilibrium at MBsp
M
Bsp Bpp
Fig 11.1c -All 121 starting points
Figure 11.2a shows the behaviour of Model la  when no selection or bias in 
cultural transmission is acting (s=r=bJ=^b2=Q, a=l, SR-0.5). Any population starting 
above the line M=0.12 (approx.) undergoes selection for M  and converges on the line
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M=l. Any population staiding below the line M=0.12 undergoes selection for m and 
converges on the line tw=1.
Figure 11.2 - Illustrative outputs from Model 1 a with no parameters acting (Fig 11.2a) 
and the individualised effects of j- (Fig 11.2b) and r (Fig 11.2c).
Bpp Bsp
Fig 11.2a-No parameters 
(5=r=6i=62=^0, a=l, SR-Q.5)
Fig 11.2b - The effect of s 
(5=0.1, r=bl=b2=0, a=l, ^i?=0.5)
Fig 11.2c - The effect of r 
(r=0.01, s=bl-b2=0, a=l, SR=0.5)
Selection for M predominates because, under the assumption of random mating, 
the fewer individuals there are in a cluster the more likely it is to occur. Hence 
monogamy (2 individuals) is more likely to occur than polygyny (3 individuals), 
polyandry (3 individuals) and polygynandiy (4 individuals). This can be seen in
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Appendix D.l, where the frequency of each monogamous cluster (column cO, rows 
rl-r4) is the product of two terms (e.g. x ly l), each polyandrous/polygynous cluster 
(cO, r5-r20) is the product of tliree tenns (e.g. x3yly2) and each polygynandrous 
cluster (cO, r21-rl48) is the product of four terms (e.g. xly3x3yl). This multiplicative 
effect outweighs the additive numerical advantage of polygynandry (128 possible 
mating combinations) and polygyny/polyandry (8 combinations each) over 
monogamy (4 combinations). This random mating assumption therefore generates 
selection for monogamy and hence M  (N.B. in Model 2 the validity of this assumption 
is addressed).
Where starting populations initially have a large majority of m (where M<0.12), 
we see selection for m. This is because of the fitness advantage of polygynandry over 
monogamy, primarily the fact that polygynandrous clusters have twice the females 
and hence produce twice the offspring of monogamous clusters (Table 11.4: 2(1+5) 
vs. (1+5)). Wlien the fitness of polygynandry is not doubled there is no selection for 
m.
Figure 11.2a also shows fluctuation in the Bsp/Bpp dimension, althougli there is 
no systematic selection for either Bsp or Bpp. This is due to the manner in which 
beliefs are inherited within clusters, and is discussed further in relation to Model lb 
below. Figure 11.2b shows the effect of the fitness benefit to a female of the help of 
one male {s>0). This produces an identical result to Figiue 11.2a, indicating that s 
does not affect the position of these equilibria. This is because the factors discussed 
previously causing selection of M/m (the random mating assiunption and the doubling
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of polygynandrous fitnesses) outweigh any effect of s in the M/m dimension, while 
the s parameter is identical for both Bsp and Bpp individuals so does not affect the end 
Bsp/Bpp frequencies.
Figure 11.2c shows the effect of r, the fitness cost of male aggr ession to Bsp 
believers, which causes selection for Bpp in regions where M<0.12. Combined with 
the selection for m in this region seen in Figures 11.2a and 11.2b, this results in 
selection for mBpp. This selection for Bpp occrus because r imposes a cost on Bsp 
individuals, and only occurs in this region because r only affects polyandrous and 
polygynandrous clusters which will be partly or entirely m. Monogamous (M x M) 
clusters, which dominate above this line, will be unaffected by r.
Finally, a had no observable effect on the dynamics of the model, and is not 
shown in the figures or discussed further (in all future frgur*es, a=l). This is because 
the populations shown in Figure 11.2 rapidly become either entirely monogamous or 
entirely polygynandrous (often in less than 50 generations: see below), and a only 
affects polyandrous matings.
Figure 11.3 shows the effect of the cultural biases bl and b2. When bl is 
operating (67=0.05: Figure 11.3a) we see selection for Bsp from starting conditions 
where M>0.12. This is to be expected given that bl promotes Bsp in monogamous M  
X M matings (Table 11.5). Figure 11.3b shows that b2 (62=0.05) causes selection for 
Bpp from starting conditions where M<0.12. Again, this is to be expected given that
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b2 promotes Bpp in polygamous m x m matings (Table 11.6). Note that b2 has the 
same effect as r shown in Figure 11.2c, although for different reasons.
Figure 11.3 - Individualised effects of 67 (Fig 11.3a) and 62 (Fig 11.3b) in Model la.
m
Bpp Bsp
Fig 11.3a- The effect of 67 
(67=0.05,5=r=62=0, &R=0.5)
Fig 11.3b - The effect of 62 
(62=0.05, r=67=0, ^7?=0.5)
Figure 11.4a shows all of the previously analysed parameters acting in concert 
(5=0 .1 , r=0.01, 67=0.1, 62=0.05, SR-0.5). Populations in Figure 11.4a converge on 
one of two equilibria: the MBsp equilibrium from starting frequencies with M>0.12, 
and the mBpp equilibrium from staiting frequencies withM<0.12.
These parameter values (5=0.1, r=0.01, 67=0.1, 62=0.05) constitute our best 
approximation of biological reality (N.B. the sex ratio is discussed in more detail 
below and in Model 2). Estimates of viability deficits caused by jealous aggiession in 
western (Daly & Wilson, 1988) and pre-industrial societies (Hill & Hurtado, 1996; 
Hill & Kaplan, 1988) suggest that r will range between 1 and 3 orders of magnitude 
smaller than 5. Additionally, 67 is assumed to be stronger than 62 because a belief in
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Bpp, in which the formation of a foetus requires the accumulation of semen from 
more than one man, is specifically incompatible with monogamy. A belief in Bsp, on 
the other hand, does not specifically prohibit polygamy, although may promote it. We 
would therefore expect Bsp to be favoured in monogamous M x M matings (the effect 
of bl) more strongly than Bpp is favouied in polygynandrous m x m matings (the 
effect of 62).
Figure 11.4 - The combined effect of all parameters in Model la  (Fig 11.4a) and the 
effect of skewing the sex ratio (Fig 11.4b)
M
m
BppBsp
Fig 11.4a- All parameters 
(5=0. l,r=0.01,67=0.1, 
62=0.05,57?=0.5)
M
A
m
BppBsp
Fig 11.4b - The effect of SR 
(s=0.1 ,r=0.01,67=0.1, 
62=0.05,57^=0.75/0.25)
Figure 11.4b shows the result of extreme skewing of the sex ratio to either 
57?=0.75 (male biased) or SR=0.25 (female biased), which both had the identical 
effect of removing the threshold at M=0.12 and causing widespread selection to 
MBsp. Any deviation less than 0.25 from an equal sex ratio (i.e. where 0.25<57(<0.75) 
did not have this effect, giving the same result as Figure 11.4a.
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Figure 11.5 - Changes in frequencies of mating behaviour at the two stable equilibria 
shown in Figure 11.4a (where 5=0.1, r=0.01, 67=0.1, 62=0.05, SR=0.5)
Frequency
Generation
25 Po.i^nânày
Figure 11.5a: The MBsp equilibrium
Frequency
Generation
Figure 11.5b: The mBpp equilibrium
Figure 11.5 gives exemplar time-courses depicting the changes in frequencies of 
the four classes of mating behaviour in the approach to the two equilibria obseiwed in 
Figure 11.4a. Figure 11.5a shows that the MBsp equilibrium is entirely monogamous, 
while Figuie 11.5b shows that the mBpp equilibrium is entirely polygynandrous. This 
is to be expected from the mating rules specified in Table 11.3. Figure 11.5 also
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shows that populations rapidly converge on these equilibria, tire MBsp equilibrium 
after approximately 25 generations and the mBpp equilibrium after approximately 15 
generations (although polygynandry almost immediately dominates the population).
11.3,2 Model lb  - Oblique Cultural Transmission
hr Model lb the vertical cultural transmission of Model la  was replaced with 
oblique cultural transmission, in which cultural beliefs are adopted according to the 
beliefs not just of the parents but of the entire parental generation (Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman, 1981).
Appendix D.2 shows the probabilities that each phenogenotype will result from 
each mating under the assumption of oblique transmission. In this case the cultural 
belief of the parents is not of specific importance, so orrly their genotypes are given. 
These are used to calculate the offspring gerrotypes as before. The cultural beliefs of 
the offspring are given by the fi-equencies of beliefs in the previous generation 
(irrespective of their parents’ beliefs or genes). Hence the offspring are Bpp with a 
probability equal to the frequency of Bpp in the parental generation (z, where 
z=xl+yl+x3+y3) and Bsp with a probability equal to the fr equency of Bsp in the 
parental generation (1-z). The cultural biases bl and b2 are modified slightly to 
conform with this new mode of cultural tr ansmission, and are now dependent on the z 
term. (Note that z here is equivalent to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s ^fW.)
Analysis of the oblique model reveals that each parameter (5 , r, a , bl, b2 and 
SK), individually and combined, generates largely the same results as they did in
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Model la. Figure 11.6 summarises these effects. Figure 11.6a shows the case where 
no parameter is acting, and where s alone is acting (both are identical, as before). As 
in Model la, there is selection for M  from starting values where M>0.12 and selection 
for in from starting values where M<0.12.
One difference is that there is no longer fluctuation in the Bsp/Bpp dimension. 
This suggests that the fluctuation obseiwed in Model la  was caused by the manner in 
which cultural beliefs are inherited in the clusters. Specifically, in many 
polygynandrous clusters one female has one mate and the other female has two mates, 
with the overall frequency of beliefs in the offspring given by the average of these 
two females’ expected frequencies. This imbalance in inheritance, with the single­
mate male having a greater influence than either of the males sharing a female, caused 
the fluctuation seen in Model la. Under the assimiption of oblique cultrual 
transmission in Model lb beliefs are no longer inherited via the mating clusters.
Figure 11.6b shows that r and b2 both cause selection for Bpp in regions 
starting from M<0.12; Figure 11.6c shows that bl causes selection for Bsp in regions 
starting from M>0.12; and Figure 11.6d shows the combined effect of all parameters, 
with two stable equilibria at MBsp and mBpp. Figure 11.6e shows that skewing the 
sex ratio causes universal selection to MBsp^ although this deviation must now be 
greater than 0.35 (i.e. 0.15>6'72>0.85).
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Figure 11.6 - The dynamics of Model lb (oblique cultural transmission). Parameter 
values aie the same as for the equivalent outputs in Figures 11.2,11.3 and 11.4, 
except Figure 11.6e where 6^=0.85/0.15
^  BppBpp BspBsp
Fig 11.6a-No parameters/the effect of s Fig 11.6b - The effect of r!b2
I ni
Bsp Bpp Bsp Bpp
Fig 11.6c - The effect of bl Fig 11.6d - All parameters combined
M
A
m
BppBsp
Fig 11.6e - Skewed sex ratio (67^=0.85/0.15)
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11.3.3 Model 1: Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of Model 1 is that the most 
common outcome, including the outcome derived from the most biologically 
plausible conditions, is the convergence of populations on two culturally and 
genetically homogeneous simultaneously stable equilibria, one in which Bsp and M  
are fixed, and the other in which Bpp and m are fixed (e.g. Figure 11.4a). Each 
parameter was systematically varied across a range of biologically plausible values 
and, for each set of parameter values, at least 500,000 generations were simulated 
from each of 121 starting frequencies of M/m and Bsp/Bpp. For those cases in which 
all parameters were acting (i.e. 5-,r>0, a<l, bl,b2>0) and 67?=0.5, 100% of initially 
polymoiphic simulations resulted in convergence on one of these two equilibria. 
Where SR was also varied (jS7?=0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.75), the proportion of initially 
polymorphic simulations converging on one of these two equilibria fell to 91.7%, with 
the remaining 8.3% comprising the cases where 0.25>67<!>0.75 and only featuring the 
MBsp equilibrium (e.g. Fig 11.4b). These results held under the assumption of both 
vertical (Model la) and oblique (Model lb) cultural transmission.
The analysis suggests that there are two stable foims of human society: (1) a 
society in which all members hold the singular paternity belief and are genetically 
predisposed toward monogamy, and (2) a society in which all members hold the 
paifible paternity belief and are genetically predisposed toward polygamy. These two 
forms of society correspond well to the partible and singular paternity societies 
described in Beckeiman and Valentine (2002b). The gieater incidence of singular 
paternity societies world-wide, including most if not all post-industrial societies, is
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also consistent with the model, with the Bsp equilibrium reached from a larger 
number of staiting conditions than the Bpp equilibrium (e.g. Figuie 11.4a).
However, a general limitation of the gene-culture coevolution method is the 
assumption of random mating fr om an infinite population. As discussed above, the 
assumption of random mating generated strong selection for M  from the majority of 
the initial starting conditions. It does not seem realistic, however, that monogamy 
should be orders of magnitude more likely to occur than polygamy simply because it 
only involves two individuals. Model 1 also assumes that individuals have an infinite 
number of potential mates available to them, whereas in a realistic finite population 
the desired mates may not be available. To addiess these issues, and to verify the 
results of Model 1, Model 2 used an agent-based modelling approach.
11.4 M o d e l  2 - A g e n t  B a se d  M o d e l
In the agent-based model a number of ‘agents’ or ‘individuals’ each with a set 
of characteristics interact and reproduce according to a set of specified rules. Each 
non-overlapping generation of N  agents undergoes first mating, then reproduction. 
The following sections specify the characteristics of the agents and describe rules of 
mating and reproduction.
11.4.1 Agent Characteristics
Each agent has four characteristics: sex (male or female); genetic predisposition 
{M or 7m), where M  agents do not seek extra mates beyond a single partner (i.e. the M  
allele specifies a genetic predisposition for monogamy), and m agents do seek extra
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mates (i.e. the m allele specifies a genetic predisposition for polygamy); cultural 
belief {Bsp or Bpp), where Bsp represents a belief in singular paternity and Bpp 
represents a belief in partible paternity; and finally mating status (mated or umnated).
11.4.2 Mating
During the mating phase each unmated agent is selected at random and selects a 
mate(s) according to their genotype and a set of mating rules. The agent’s genotype 
deteimines whether the agent will seek or accept one mate or two mates: M  agents 
seek or accept only one mate, wliile m agents seek or accept up to two mates (as in 
Model 1, and the South American societies studied by Beckeiman & Valentine 
(2002b), agents are restiicted to a maximum of two mates).
Given these genetically specified constiaints, each agent chooses a mate(s) 
according to a set of preferences. Males strive to maximise reproductive access to 
females. Hence all males prefer to mate with M  females to m females, as 
monogamous M  females will provide exclusive reproductive access while 
polygamous m females may find another mate, forcing the male to share reproductive 
access. Additionally, m males prefer two mates to one mate (as this will result in their 
receiving twice the reproductive access). Females strive to maximise male help, in the 
form of provisioning of food or protection from other males. Hence all females prefer 
to mate with M  males to m males, as monogamous M  males will provide exclusive 
help while polygamous m males may find another mate (forcing the female to share 
provisions). Additionally, m females prefer two mates to one mate (as they will
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receive twice the male help). Note that these more realistic mating preferences replace 
the assumption of random mating in Model 1.
The application of these mating mles results in the fomiation of clusters of 
monogamy, polygyny, polyandiy or polygynandry, as defined in Table 11.2. Once an 
agent is designated a mate, their mating status is switched from ‘unmated’ to ‘mated’. 
Mating continues until there are no unmated agents left in the generation. This 
conti'asts with Model 1, in which the mating population is assumed to be infinitely 
large.
An additional paiameter c detemiined the control over mating afforded to each 
sex. With c = 0.5, agents were chosen at random by the model to select a mate(s) 
iiTespective of the chooser’s sex. With c = 1, only females were chosen to select a 
mate(s), and with c = 0 only males were chosen. This is designed to allow us to 
explore the claim by Beckeiman and Valentine (2002b, pp. 11-12) that South 
American paifible paternity societies are characterised by female control over mating 
and singular paternity societies are characterised by male control over mating.
11.4,3 Reproduction
Once mating is completed, each mated female is selected at random and 
reproduces with a probability given in Table 11.7. The parameters used in Table 11.7 
are broadly similai* to the fitness paiameterisation used in Model 1 (Table 11.4). Here, 
however, each female is given a baseline probability of producing an offspring of 0.5 
rather than 1, as the values in Table 11.7 specify probabilities rather than fitnesses and
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hence cannot exceed 1. We impose the constraints that 5'<0.25 and r<0.5+j to ensure 
that the probabilities in Table 11.7 remain witliin the range 0-1. As in Model 1, s 
represents the resources or help received from a single male, r represents the cost of 
polyandrous or polygynandrous Bsp males fighting and/or practising infanticide, and 
a represents ‘paternity confusion’ and deteimines how cooperative the Bsp polyandry 
is. Note that the probabilities in Table 11.7 are for individual females rather than 
entire clusters (as in Table 11.4), so polygyny and polygynandiy are not doubled.
Mating system Bpp female Bsp female
Monogamy Wi 0.5 +s Wi 0.5 +s
Polygyny W2 0.5+s/2 W2 0.5 + s/2
Polyandry ^3pp 0.5 + 2s 0.5 + (l+a)5 - r
Polygynandry ^4pp 0.5 + s ^4sp 0.5 +s - r
Table 11.7 - The probability of a female producing an offspring in Model 2
Note that with an s of around 0.1 or 0.2 these probabilities roughly correspond 
to suiwivorship probabilities observed in the Barf by Beckerman et al (1998) of 0.8 
for children with two fathers (polyandry: 0.5 + 2s) and 0.65 for children with one 
father (monogamy: 0.5 + s), and similar probabilities in the Ache from Hill (cited in 
Beckerman & Valentine, 2002b, p. 7) of 0.85 for childien with two fathers and 0.7 for 
children with one father.
If, depending on this probability, a female produces an offspring, then that 
offspring inlierits the genes and beliefs of its parents according to standard haploid 
inlieritance mles. Offspring sex is determined by the sex ratio {SR), which represents
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the probability that an offspring will be male (and hence the proportion of the 
population that is male). With respect to the South American societies reported in 
Beckeiman and Valentine (2002b), Zaldivar, Lizarralde and Beckerman (1991) report 
a sex ratio at birth and through childhood in pre- and post-contact Bari close to 1. This 
model, however, concerns the reproductively active population, and there is evidence 
of higher male mortality among Bari adults (Beckeiman & Lizarralde, 1995) possibly 
leading to a female-biased adult sex ratio.
The cultural bias again operated to promote Bsp in the offspring of 
monogamous M x M  matings (bias bl, where bl>0.5) and Bpp in the offspring of 
polygamous m x m  matings (bias b2, where 62>0.5). Two additional parameters were 
introduced in Model 2. The assortative cultural mating parameter d specified the 
probability that agents will refuse to mate with an agent with a different belief to 
themselves. The confoimity parameter k specified the probability that an offspring 
adopts the majority belief of the entire parental generation, rather than inheriting 
beliefs from the parents only.
Females reproduce m this way until all slots of the next generation are filled. 
The next generation then goes through the same process of mating and reproduction, 
and this process is repeated for 1000 generations (although equilibria were typically 
reached long before the 1000th generation). Note that generations aie non­
overlapping; once a generation has mated and reproduced it is removed and mating 
continues exclusively within the next generation.
306
11.4.4 Analysis
To analyse the model, 10 separate 1000-generation simulations were run from 
each of 164 systematically varied staiding values of M/m and Bsp/Bpp. This entire 
analysis was performed for a range of values of each parameter: for 5 and r. 0, 0.001, 
0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25; for bl and b2\ 0.5, 0.6, 0.75, 0.9; for d and /c: 0, 0.1, 0.5; for c\ 0, 
0.5, 1; and for SR: 0.5, 0.25, 0.75. These parameters were varied on their own and in 
combination with each other.
11.4.5 Results
The majority of the parameter value combinations (83.5%) resulted in the 
dynamics shown in Figure 11.7a, with selection to m = 1. Populations also fixated at 
either 100% Bsp or 100% Bpp. A larger proportion of populations (86%) fixated at 
mBpp than at mBsp (8.5%) due to the cultui'al bias b2 promoting Bpp in m x m 
matings. Figures 11.7b and 11.7c show the changes in the frequencies of each mating 
system over the first 150 generations (equilibrium for genotype and belief was 
typically reached after no more than 50 generations). These largely identical graphs 
show frequencies of polyandry and polygyny at aiound 0.4 each, with around 0.2 of 
polygynandry. These frequencies fluctuate due to the stochastic natme of the agent- 
based model.
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Figure 11.7 - Typical model dynamics of Model 2 (Fig 11.7a). The N values represent 
the number of starting values ending at each equilibrium. Figures 11.7b and 11.7c 
show time series of the frequencies of each mating system over the first 150 
generations at the Bsp equilibrium (Fig 11.7b) and the Bpp equilibrium (Fig 11.7c).
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Two factors were responsible for selection for m in these cases. First, 
polygynandrous matings have a numerical advantage over monogamous matings 
because they have twice as many reproducing females, out-reproducing the mainly M  
monogamous pairs, m agents also have an advantage in that they can mate with either 
one or two mates, whereas M  agents can mate with only one mate. Hence m agents 
can potentially form any of the four mating types, whereas M  agents are restricted to 
monogamy, polygyny and polyandry (the latter two only with at least one m agent).
The other 16.5% of parameter combinations that did not result in fixation of m 
featured a skewed sex ratio (SR<0.3> or SR>0.1). Figure 11.8a shows a female-biased 
sex ratio {SR = 0.3). In this case the majority of populations end at one of three 
equilibria. There are two equilibria ending at 100% Bsp, either fluctuating around M = 
0.757 (Figure 11.8b) or fixated at M = 1 (Figure 11.8c). The third is a 100% Bpp 
equilibrium at which the frequency of M fluctuates with a mean of M = 0.596 (Figure 
11.8d). (Note that the fluctuation in Mlm observed in Figures 11.8b, 11.8c and 11.8d 
mean that these are not equilibria, but basins of attmction).
This selection for Mwhen the sex ratio is skewed occurs because the minority 
sex are all able to select Mmates from the majority sex (as M mates are preferred over 
m mates), thereby preserving M  in the population. With an equal sex ratio, on the 
other hand, M  agents are quickly used up and agents move on to selecting m mates. 
This results in similar numbers of monogamous M  clusters and polygynandrous m 
clusters, leading to the polygynandry/m advantage discussed above.
309
Figure 11.8 - A female-biased sex ratio (Fig 11.8a). The N values represent the 
number of starting values ending at that equilibrium and the M values show the 
proportion of the A/allele at that equilibrium. Figures 11.8b, 11.8c and 11.8d show 
time series of mating system frequencies at the polymorphic Bsp equilibrium (Fig 
11.8b), the monomorphic Bsp equilibrium (Fig 11.8c) and the Bpp equilibrium (Fig
11.8d).
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Fig 11.8a: Female-biased sex ratio 
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The increased monogamy in Bsp populations observed in Figure 11.8a is a 
result of r (male fighting/infanticide), which imposes a fitness cost on polyandrous 
and polygynandrous Bsp agents, thereby increasing the relative fitness of monogamy.
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This cost does not apply to Bpp agents and creates a more equal mix of M  and m in 
the Bpp population.
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(c=l)
Equal
control
(c=0.5)
Male
control
(c=0)
Figure 11.9- The interaction between sex ratio and control over mating 
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Figure 11.9 illustrates the interaction between the sex ratio {SIC) and control 
over mating (c). The left-hand column of Figure 11.9 shows that with a female-biased 
sex ratio, female control over mating causes selection for jnBpp, while male control 
over mating causes selection for MBsp. This reflects the anthropological evidence in 
South America (Beckeiman & Valentine, 2002b). Note that a male-biased sex ratio
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produces the opposite pattern (female control promotes MBsp and male contiol 
promotes mBpp).
Further analyses (not illusti'ated) suggested that the other parameters had 
expected effects, bl caused selection for Bsp in regions where M  is dominant, and b2 
caused selection for Bpp in regions where m is dominant, d and k both increased the 
likelihood of populations becoming fixated at Bsp from Bsp dominant regions and at 
Bpp fr om Bpp dominant regions, s and a had no observable effect on the positions of 
the equilibria.
11.4.6 Comparison with Model 1
We are now in a position to compare the results of Models 1 and 2. Importantly, 
all of the parameters (j, r, bl, b2 and SR) had the same effects in both models (or 
similarly had no effect in either in the case of s and a). We have also seen how 
various additional or alternative cultural transmission mles (oblique cultural 
transmission in Model lb, assortative cultuial mating and confoimist cultural 
tiansmission in Model 2) do not significantly alter the dynamics of the basic models. 
These findings mcrease oui' confidence in the validity of the results discussed above.
The only significant difference between the two models lies in the 
assumptions regarding the formation of mating clusters and the effect of these 
assumptions on selection in the Mhn dimension. The random mating assumption of 
Model 1 generated sti'ong selection for monogamous M x M mating clusters, as under 
random mating clusters of two individuals are more likely to occur than clusters of
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three or four individuals. Model 2 instead featured what might be considered more 
realistic mating mles, where all individuals express preferences for monopolisable M  
mates, and m individuals prefer two mates to one mate. These assumptions led to 
selection for m rather than M.
11.4.7 Conclusions
The majority of parameter values in Model 2 resulted in selection for m, the 
genetic predisposition for polygamy. This is because m agents are more flexible in 
mating and the mating clusters they aie most associated with are more fecund in 
reproduction. According to Model 2, therefore, modem societies with equal adult sex 
ratios (e.g. Western societies) should be genetically polygamous, with individuals 
willing to mate with more than one person. This is perhaps not an umeasonable 
assumption, particularly given that this model did not incorporate effects of 
institutional mating systems. The model also predicts that these polygamous societies 
should be primarily Bpp, which is clearly not obseiwed. If partible paternity beliefs 
were never present this perhaps explains the absence of Bpp in most modem societies, 
although it does lead to the prediction that if Bpp had been present it would have 
quickly become prevalent.
More interesting were the dynamics of Model 2 when the sex ratio was skewed. 
With a female-biased sex ratio we saw two patterns which reflect aspects of the 
anthropological evidence discussed previously. First, two (or tliree) basins of 
attraction typically emerged (e.g. Figme 11.8a), one (or two) entirely Bsp with a large 
degi'ee of genetic predispositions for monogamy, and the other one entirely Bpp with
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a more equal mix of genetic predispositions for monogamy and polygamy. These two 
basins of attiaction parallel the relatively monogamous singular paternity and more 
polygamous partible paternity societies observed by Beckennan and Valentine 
(2002b), and suggests that the presence of adult sex ratio distortion, perhaps resulting 
from excess male mortality (Beckennan & LizaiTalde, 1995), may be responsible for 
these differences in mating systems.
The female-biased Model 2 (like Model 1) also predicts possible genetic 
differences between societies with histories of Bsp and Bpp beliefs. Specifically, 
members of Bpp societies should show greater tendencies toward and adaptations for 
polygamy, such as less fr*equent and less intense jealousy, less faithfulness and less 
moralistic or jealousy-based aggression. Bpp societies should feature less internal 
male fighting over female infidelity and less male initiated infanticide over paternity 
issues than otheiwise equivalent Bsp societies. The aforementioned literature is 
consistent with these predictions. However, it is also important to recognise there may 
be no genetic differences between human populations with different mating systems, 
and that sexual practices may change rapidly due to purely cultural change (that is, 
cultural beliefs and practices umelated to singulaiYpaifible paternity).
A second parallel between the female-biased model and the anthropological 
literature lies in the fact tliat female control over mating causes selection for mBpp 
and male control over mating causes selection for MBsp. Beckennan and Valentine 
(2002b, pp. 11-12) noted a similai' association between female control, partible
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paternity and polygamy on the one hand, and male control, singular paternity and 
monogamy on the other.
These two parallels suggest a possible evolutionaiy scenario in which different 
populations of the ancestors of the present-day inhabitants of Lowland South 
America, in the presence of a female-biased sex ratio and small differences in belief 
or genetic predispositions towaids monogamy, were subject to divergent selection 
leading to the present day distribution of singulai' and partible paternity societies. The 
higher adult male mortality obseiwed in present-day societies (Beckennan & 
Lizarralde, 1995) may offer one explanation for tliis postulated female-biased sex 
ratio. Beckennan (personal communication) suspects a slightly female-biased sex 
ratio amongst adult Bari, although not as skewed as the model requires (although an 
evolutionary bottleneck may have distorted the sex ratio to the level assumed here). 
Finally, a female-biased sex ratio may also have provided ideal conditions for a belief 
in partible paternity to evolve. If males are rare then they will be in high demand as 
resource-providing fathers, perhaps making beliefs in multiple fathers more attractive 
and more likely to emerge. This evolutionary scenario could be tested by seeking 
genetic evidence from existing South American populations for a past population 
bottleneck and a female-biased sex ratio.
The female-biased Model 2 also predicts that, as well as broad differences 
between the two equilibria, there will be significant genetic variation among 
individuals within societies at equilibrium. Even within societies at the largely 
monogamous Bsp equilibrium there is still a significant amount of polygyny.
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polyandry and polygynandry (see Figure 11.8b). The present analysis is consistent 
with the view that humans collectively are not well-described as ‘natui'ally’ 
monogamous or ‘natmally’ polygynous since, if anything, they aie ‘naturally’ 
variable in their mating behaviour. This does not preclude the possibility, suggested 
above, that we would expect a large proportion of individuals (the majority) in those 
societies represented by the Bsp equilibrium to be biologically predisposed towaids 
monogamy.
If these analyses are correct it fuither suggests that anthiopological labels 
describing entire societies as ‘monogamous’ or ‘polygynous’ are misleading, and it 
may be more representative to describe societies in tenns of frequencies of individual 
mating behaviour at equilibrium. There is a mismatch between the demographic 
mating system, as represented by the results of the present model, and the 
institutionalised mating system, as reflected in the patterns observed in Murdock’s 
Ethnographic Atlas (1967). Murdock’s (1967) influential antluopological database 
describes the majority of human societies as ‘polygynous’ (83.5%) and the rest as 
‘monogamous’ (16%), with a very small minority ‘polyandrous’ (0.5%). The results 
presented above suggest that the global percentage of polygynous mating should be 
smaller than the percentage of societies in which polygyny is the institutionalised 
mating system. That is, if polygyny is the dominant institutionalised mating system it 
is not because it is the most frequent human behaviour. It may be that this mismatch is 
an artefact of the simplicity of the model - for instance, the neglect of sex-linked 
genes - which prevents the independent evolution of polygyny and polyandry in males 
and females. However, it is also possible that the mismatch is real, which might
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suggest that the widespread institutionalisation of polygyny (and corresponding 
disestablislunent of polyandry) is a product of factors such as greater male than 
female resource-holding power, hierarchically organised societies and/or patiilineal 
inlieritance of wealth (Hrdy, 1981, 1999), conceivably amplified by recent historical 
trends such as the rise of agiiculture (Holden & Mace, 2003).
The genetic variability observed at equilibrium is in part a manifestation of 
differential and conflicting patterns of selection on the sexes. If, as the model 
assumes, a significant proportion of such variation is found on autosomes and 
expressed in both sexes, then the members of each sex will vary in their 
predispositions towai'd monogamy and polygamy. Extensions of the present model 
might incoiporate genetic modifiers on sex chiomosomes to bias the behaviour of 
members of each sex (e.g. conceivably selecting for greater polygyny in males than 
females). This might generate stronger sex differences than observed in the cunent 
analysis. However, the presence of autosomal variation will mean that within-sex 
variation in behaviouial strategies is to be expected. This means, for instance, we 
expect that some monogamous males in institutionally polygynous societies will be 
monogamous by choice and not because there are insufficient females for them to 
pursue polygynous mating.
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11.5 G e n e r a l  D i s c u s s i o n
We can now begin to addi'ess the questions posed at the start of the paper:
How does a belief in partible paternity affect the biological fitness o f males and 
females? A belief in partible paternity, as opposed to a belief in singular paternity or 
no belief at all, is assumed to affect the biological fitness of individuals in two ways. 
First, polyandrous and polygynandrous Bpp individuals bear no cost of male 
aggression (the parameter r), unlike polyandrous and polygynandrous Bsp individuals. 
Second, Bpp polyandiy is always fully cooperative (a=l), unlike Bsp polyandry which 
could be potentially no different to monogamy (a<l). In both of these cases, 
therefore, Bpp females receive more help than Bsp females. Males, while not given 
separate fitnesses in the model, will nevertheless be paying gieater costs (i.e. 
resoui'ces) and be less certain of paternity (given the lack of jealous aggression) in 
Bpp societies compared with Bsp societies. Overall, then, Bpp can be said to benefit 
females and impose a cost on males, relative to Bsp.
Note that this does not mean that males will never benefit from Bpp. For 
example, males would benefit from Bpp when the increased smwival of offspring due 
to the help of an extra male offsets the cost to males of sharing paternity. This would 
most likely occur under harsh ecological conditions, where care is costly and two 
male providers are much better than one, or where death of husbands is fi*equent due 
to staiwation or war, so having two husbands increases the chance of one surviving 
during the period of parental care. The model could be extended by introducing a
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function which relates offspring fitness to number of carers, with the shape of this 
function reflecting ecological conditions (Davies, 1992).
What impact do such beliefs have on human mating systems? Partible paternity 
beliefs have the effect of promoting polygamous mating at the expense of monogamy. 
In the absence of cultuial processes, gene fr equencies converge on those observed at 
the Bsp equilibrium. Consequently, the inheritance of cultuial beliefs concerning 
paternity, unique to humans, would appeal* to have created a new genetic equilibrium 
{Bpp) characterised by different levels of monogamy and polygamy than observed in 
its absence. In the female-biased Model 2, for example, Bpp societies feature a mix of 
polygyny, polyandry, polygynandry and monogamy, whereas Bsp societies are 
dominated by monogamy. These differences are mainly due to the male aggiession 
parameter r, which imposes a cost on all polygamous Bsp mating systems, increasing 
the frequency of Bsp monogamy relative to Bpp monogamy, which is unaffected by r.
Can a (partible paternity) belief spread that has fitness benefits for one sex 
(females) and is disadvantageous to the other (males)? Partible paternity societies 
might be characterised as advantaging females, since females frequently reap the 
benefits of multiple male help, while incurring additional costs on males. The analysis 
therefore suggests that human behaviour can evolve that benefits one sex at the 
expense of the other, without coercion. Model 2 with an unbiased sex ratio predicts 
that the majority of populations will converge on Bpp, due to strong selection for m. 
Model 1 and the female-biased Model 2 predict that fewer populations will converge
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on Bpp, and only from starting points which are already fairly polygamous (i.e. that 
feature a high initial frequency of m).
How can two such distinct alternative beliefs about paternity persist when they 
are likely to have such direct effects on biological fitness? The biases in cultural 
tiansmission {bl and b2), in combination with the fitness costs of jealous aggression 
(r), are responsible for the persistence of the two cultural beliefs. These biases diive 
populations to either the 100% Bsp or the 100% Bpp equilibrium. However, even 
without the bias {b2), jealous aggiession can create a Bpp equilibrium if believers in 
singular paternity pay even a weak fitness cost to polyandrous and polygynandrous 
mating not paid by believers in partible paternity.
Can a consideration o f cultural variation in beliefs about paternity shed light 
on the evolution o f human mating systems? Polygamous mating is characteristic of 
many non-human primates and may conceivably have been a feature of our primate 
ancestors (Hrdy, 1981, 1997). However, in the absence of cultural transmission, 
ancestral populations would have approached the genetic equivalent of the Bsp 
equilibrium. Wlien our species evolved the ability to acquire, cognise and transmit 
belief states about paternity this modified the selection acting on a minority of 
polygamous populations, allowing them to evolve to the Bpp state. This suggests that 
a phylogenetic analysis of the divergence of these cultuial beliefs about paternity, 
similar to that employed to investigate the geographical distribution and evolution of 
other cultural tiaits, including dairy farming (Holden & Mace, 1997), might provide 
an upper limit on the date of emergence of human belief systems.
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Concluding Remarks
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CHAPTER 12 - G e n e r a l  D is c u s s io n
The three paits of this thesis constituted theoretical, empirical and mathematical 
approaches to the study of the tiansmission and evolution of human culture. Part A 
explored the parallel or analogy between biological and cultuial evolution, arguing 
that there is now as compelling evidence for cultural evolution as Charles Darwin 
presented in The Origin o f Species for biological evolution (Chapter 2). Hence human 
culture was shown to exhibit the key evolutionary properties of variation, selection 
and inheritance, as well as the accumulation of modifications, adaptation, 
convergence, and the loss or change of function. It was then aigued that if cultuie 
does indeed evolve in a manner analogous to that of biological organisms, it follows 
that the structure of a unified science of cultural evolution should broadly resemble 
that of the science of biological evolution, i.e. evolutionary biology (Chapter 3). 
Existing or potential cultural analogues of the different sub-disciplines of evolutionary 
biology were then examined in detail, and a unified science of cultural evolution was 
sketched.
Parts B and C presented original empirical and theoretical work contributing to 
two branches of tliis science of cultural evolution. Part B comprised a series of 
experiments testing for a number of hypothesised biases in cultural transmission, 
updating Bartlett’s (1932) under-used transmission chain method according to modem 
standards of scientific practice. Evidence was found for two of these hypothesised 
biases: first a ‘social bias’ that acts to promote information concerning third-party 
social relationships over non-social information concerning individual behaviour or
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physical mteractions (Chapter 5); and second a ‘hierarchical bias’ that acts to 
transform laiowledge of everyday events from low-level actions into high-level goals 
and sub-goals (Chapter 6). Three other hypothesised biases concerning status 
(Chapter 7), anthropomorphism (Chapter 8) and neoteny (Chapter 9) were not 
supported, although each gave rise to potential future work using this methodology.
Part C presented a theoretical investigation into the coevolution of the genetic 
bases of human mating behaviour and culturally inherited folk beliefs regarding 
paternity, using both population-based and agent-based modelling techniques. The 
models suggested that the inheritance of cultural beliefs regarding paternity, i.e. 
whether paternity is seen as ‘singular’ (children can have only one true father) or 
‘partible’ (children may have more than one ‘tme’ father), significantly affects the 
evolution of human mating behaviour, and can specifically account for the 
distribution and characteristics of mating systems in Lowland South American 
societies. Generally, beliefs in partible paternity create a new more polygamous form 
of society compared with beliefs in singular paternity.
 ^ The work presented in Parts B and C covered a wide range of topics, from 
primate social intelligence to hierarchical script theories to paternity beliefs and 
mating behavioiu*. The two methodological approaches of Parts B and C 
(experimental versus mathematical) were also very different. All of this work, 
however, is imited by the evolutionary framework presented in Part A. Hence the 
population-based and agent-based models of Part C represent mathematical 
simulations of cultural evolution (as well as biological, evolution), in the same way
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that pinely gene-based population genetics models have long been used to simulate 
biological evolution. The cultural transmission experiments of Part B, meanwhile, 
provide data on micro-scale transmission biases that may have important population- 
level effects, analogous to the breeding experiments of evolutionary biology that are 
used to explore biological inheritance.
Indeed, Mayr (1982) has argued that one of the most important functions of an 
evolutionary framework in biology was to integrate the study of micro- and macro­
evolution. That is, the micro-scale principles of inlieritance discovered by 
experimental population geneticists, when extrapolated to the population level, can 
account for the macro-scale historical and geogiaphical patterns observed by 
palaeontologists and field biologists. It was only after this ‘evolutionary synthesis’ of 
the early 20th century that the theory of evolution became truly established within 
biology. The evolutionary fr amework presented in Part A offers the potential for the 
same synthesis of the micro- and macro-scale study of culture. Hence the results of 
cultural transmission experiments such as those employed in Part B might be 
extrapolated to the population level to explain certain macro-scale historical or 
geographical cultural patterns. Although this integration was not formally pursued 
here, some findings (e.g. the social bias of Chapter 5) are consistent with informal 
observations of large-scale cultural phenomena (e.g. tlie prevalence of ‘social’ over 
‘non-social’ mass media: Chapter 10), and they provide a methodological platfonn for 
more explicitly integiative studies in the future (see below).
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The mathematical models of gene-culture coevolution presented in Part C also 
demonstiate how evolutionary principles serve to link micro- and macro-level change. 
By specifying the precise mating rules and cultural transmission biases that were 
hypothesised to act upon the inheritance of genes and cultural traits, it was possible to 
exti'apolate up to long-term multiple-generation change at the population level, 
comparing the resultant dynamics with anthropological evidence of mating system 
distributions in South America.
As ai-gued in Chapter 3, another benefit of an evolutionary framework is that 
some of the tools, methods and approaches used by evolutionary biologists to study 
biological evolution can be borrowed and adapted to study cultural evolution. One 
general tactic commonly used by biologists is the use of highly simplified 
experimental or mathematical simulations of complex real-life biological phenomena. 
Similarly, Parts B and C both constituted simplified simulations of complex real-life 
cultural phenomena, in Part B experimentally and in Part C mathematically. As noted 
in Section 3.4.1, such simulations are frequently criticised by social scientists for 
failing to capture the complexity of human culture. The response to this criticism 
given in Section 3.4.1 is worth repeating: the fact that simulations are highly 
simplified is the very reason for their usefulness. They allow, for example, researchers 
to isolate and manipulate single variables, and force them to exactly and explicitly 
specify their theoretical assumptions. Simplified experimental and mathematical 
models of reality have allowed biologists to make great strides in understanding 
biological phenomena, which are in many respects at least as complex as cultural 
phenomena. Hopefully more social scientists will adopt these experimental and
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mathematical means of studying cultuie (for further discussion of the use of 
simulations in the social sciences see Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Kohler & Gumennan, 
2000; Richerson & Boyd, 1987).
An evolutionary approach to cultuie also highlights the relationship between 
cultural and biological evolution, where they may be seen as separate but interacting 
evolutionary processes within a larger hierarchical framework (e.g. Odling Smee, 
Laland, & Feldman, 2003; Plotkin & Odling Smee, 1981). As argued by Plotkin 
(2002) and Richerson and Boyd (2005), the complexity of the human capacity for 
ciunulative cultural evolution suggests that it is a biologically evolved adaptation, 
made possible by a number of biologically evolved psychological mechanisms such 
as imitation, language or theory of mind (Plotkin, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). 
Theoretical analyses (e.g. Aoki et a l, 2005; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Boyd & 
Richerson, 1988), however, indicate that the adaptive value of culture is to respond to 
enviromnental change that is too rapid or unpredictable to be encoded genetically 
(although not so rapid as to malce culturally transmitted information quickly out-of- 
date). Culture must therefore be to some degi ee de-coupled from biological evolution, 
making possible the spread of genetically maladaptive cultuial traits. As Richerson 
and Boyd (2005) argue, horizontal transmission from non-kin and imperfect 
transmission biases may also lead to the spread of genetically maladaptive traits. This 
general view of cultuial and biological evolution as intimately inter-related yet 
causally independent typifies the broad ‘gene-culture coevolution’ perspective (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1992; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
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The interaction between biological and cultural evolution was explored in this 
thesis in two ways. First, some of the experiments of Part B tested for biases in 
cultural transmission that were argued to have been at least partly the result of 
biological evolution. For example, the social bias of Chapter 5 was argued to have 
been due in part to biologically evolved features of human cognition that have been 
shaped by social selection pressures. Second, the mathematical models employed in 
Chapter 11 concluded that the capacity to transmit cultural beliefs regarding paternity 
may have significantly altered the biological evolution of human mating behaviour. 
The plurality of this approach, in which biologically evolved features of cognition 
may bias cultural transmission and cultuial inheritance may affect the selection of 
genes, is recommended in contrast to the more exclusionary and narrow views of 
certain evolutionary psychologists (e.g. Barkow et a l, 1992; Pinlcer, 1997), who tend 
to downplay the role of transmitted culture in human behaviour, and certain social 
scientists (e.g. Rose, Lewontin, & Kamin, 1984; Rose & Rose, 2000), who remain 
hostile to any biological or genetic interpretation of human behaviour.
An evolutionary approach to culture also highlights a number of potentially 
fruitful directions for frituie study, some of which follow from the work presented in 
Parts B and C. More work is needed regarding the experimental study of cultural 
transmission, to add to the findings of Part B. Chapter 10 outlined a number of 
extensions and modifications to the basic Bartlett (1932) methodology, such as the 
study of face-to-face transmission and the transmission of behaviour. Chapter 3 raised 
a number of possibilities for adapting the methods of experimental population 
genetics to study cultural processes, such as artificial selection or natural selection
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paradigms, and measures of the rate or strength of selection such as the daiwin or the 
haldane. There is a real need to provide foimal empirical demonstrations of cultural 
evolution ‘in action’.
Future work might more explicitly explore the relationship between cultural 
micro- and macro-evolution. For example, the experimental methods used in Part B to 
study micro-scale cultural transmission might be used to simulate in the laboratory the 
macro-scale historical patterns found by archaeologists, in order to better understand 
the transmission processes originally responsible for generating those patterns. For 
example, it is often claimed (e.g. Dimnell, 1978; O'Brien & Lyman, 2003b) that 
certain archaeological traits are either ‘functional’ (the result of selection) or 
‘stylistic’ (the result of random diift). Such hypothesised selection histories might be 
tested by experimentally transmitting lineages of a tradition under conditions of either 
selection or a lack of selection, comparing the resulting data with the equivalent 
ai'chaeological patterns. Other archaeological patterns have been hypothesised to have 
arisen through processes of confoiinity (e.g. Kohler, VanBuskirk, & Ruscavage-Barz, 
2004) or indirect bias (e.g. Bettinger & Eerkens, 1999), which could be simulated in 
the laboratory by manipulating the type of information available to participants (e.g. 
which trait was most populai* in the previous generation, or which trait was associated 
with the most successful participants). Experimental methods afford a number of 
advantages not available to archaeologists and historians, such as the ability to isolate 
and manipulate single variables, the generation of complete data sets, and the ability 
to ‘re-run’ history several times to study contingency.
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As noted at the end of Part A, biological evolution should not be used as too 
strict a model for cultural evolution, and there may be significant evolutionary 
phenomena that are unique to cultuie. Plotkin (2002), for example, has argued that 
intangible ‘social constiaictions’ such as justice or money that only exist because of 
shared agreement may require a fundamentally different evolutionaiy explanation to 
anything seen in biology. This highlights the need for a complete taxonomy of 
cultuial traits (e.g. social constructions, semantic knowledge, technological artifacts, 
procedural skills) and the associated and probably different evolutionary forces acting 
on each. This will also require a detailed understanding of the social learning 
mechanisms that aie responsible for their persistence. For example, semantic 
laiowledge is continuously acquired and updated tlnoughout one’s lifetime via spoken 
and written language, whereas behavioural skills such as learning to use a knife and 
fork (or chopsticks) are acquired only once in a lifetime, via imitation or affordance 
learning (Wliiten et a l, 2004). A combination of experimental and field studies will 
be necessary to explore these issues.
To sum up, the theoretical integiations of Pait A, the experimental simulations 
of Part B, and the mathematical models of Part C have all aimed to contiibute to our 
understanding of the tiansmission and evolution of human culture. As yet, this 
understanding is relatively poor, especially when compared with that achieved by 
biologists for the immense complexity and diversity of biological forms. In many 
respects human culture is at least as complex and diverse. The capacity to accumulate 
successful cultural variants across multiple generations has transfonned the human 
species, allowing us to eradicate diseases, walk on the moon, and begin to umavel the
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intricate workings of the universe. At the end of The Origin o f Species, Charles 
Darwin famously remarked of his theory of evolution that “there is grandeur in this 
view of life” (Darwin, 1859, p. 459). Hopefully oui* view of culture will one day 
become just as grand.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A - M a t er ia l  Fo r  Chap t e r  5
Appendix A,1 - M a t e r i a l  f o r  E x p e r im e n t  5 a
The first participant of each chain in Experiment 5a read the following three 
par agraphs. The bracketed labels, indicating the type of material and the numbers of 
words, sentences and propositions, were not presented to the participants.
[Individual]
Nancy is a 22 year old college student studying history at the University of 
Denver. Her father works as an accountant and her mother is a teacher. At weekends, 
she works part-time in a book store. When she finishes her studies, Nancy plans to 
travel abroad before pursuing a career as either a novelist or a journalist. [58 words, 4 
sentences, 14 propositions]
[Gossip]
Nancy is having an affair with her mamed college professor. She has been lying 
to her fiiends about seeing him. Nancy recently became pregnant with the professor’s 
child. The professor promised Nancy that he would leave his wife, but since she told 
him she was pregnant, the professor has refused to see her. Nancy is threatening to tell 
his wife about the affair. [63 words, 5 sentences, 14 propositions]
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[Physical]
Denver is the state capital of Colorado, located in the western United 
States near the Rocky Mountains. An early stopping place for Indians, Denver 
was settled permanently after the gold rush of 1859. Its main industry is 
agriculture. Denver is a major centre for winter sports, and also contains a 
branch of the US mint, which produces most of America’s coinage. [61 words, 
4 sentences, 14 propositions]
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Appendix A.2 - M a t e r i a l  f o r  E x p e r im e n t  5b
The first participant of each chain in Experiment 5b read the following four 
paragi'aphs. The bracketed labels, indicating the type of material and the numbers of 
words, sentences and propositions, were not presented to the participants.
[Gossip]
Nancy is having an affair with her married college professor. Nancy recently 
became pregnant with the professor’s child. The professor promised Nancy that he 
would leave his wife, but since Nancy told him she was pregnant, the professor 
refused to see her. So Nancy told the professor’s wife about the affair. The professor’s 
wife was so upset that she left the professor. [62 words, 5 sentences, 14 propositions]
[Social]
Nancy enjoys swimming. Nancy was going to the swimming pool but got lost, 
so she asked an old man waiting at a bus stop for dhections. The old man could not 
give her directions. A bus arrived at the bus stop and the old man asked the driver for 
directions. The driver gave Nancy directions to the swimming pool, so Nancy was 
able to go swimming. [66 words, 5 sentences, 14 propositions]
[Individual]
One morning Nancy’s alarm clock broke and she overslept. When she woke up 
she realised that she was late for an important lectuie. She got dressed as quickly as 
she could, left the house and ran to the lecture tlieatie. When she got there the lecture
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theatre was empty. Nancy had missed the lecture. [54 words, 5 sentences, 14 
propositions]
[Physical]
The weather in Colorado gets hot and dry in the summer. This removes 
moisture from the soil and dries out the plants that grow there. The dry 
vegetation catches fire easily, leading to frequent forest fires. These fires 
release smoke containing carbon monoxide into the atmosphere. This smoke 
contributes to global warming, increasing temperatures further. [55 words, 5 
sentences, 14 propositions]
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APPENDIX B - M a t e r i a l  f o r  C hap  t e r  7 
A p p en d ix  B .l  - M a t e r i a l  f o r  E x p e r im e n t  7 a
B.1.1 Argument for fluoridation, as presented to the first participants in each chain.
“Fluoride makes teeth more resistant to decay. This is especially important 
given modern diets high in sugar, which form the acids that attack tooth enamel. For 
example, in Birmingham, where tap water has been fluoridated for almost 40 years, 
childrens’ teeth are three times healthier than in Manchester, where there is no 
fluoridation. This is a cheap way of helping poorer families, who can’t afford healthy 
diets and expensive dental services. And there is no stiong evidence that adding 
fluoride creates any adverse effects, such as cancer or an increased risk of bone 
fractures. There really is no reason why we should not be adding fluoride to our 
water, given the obvious health benefits.”
B.l.2 Argument against fluoridation, as presented to the first participant in each 
chain.
“Although there are small health benefits to fluoridation, there are also 
considerable risks. There is a strong link between taking extra fluoride and a disease 
called dental fluorosis, which causes peimanently mottled and discoloured teeth. 
Adding fluoride to peoples’ diets has also been linked to an increased risk of cancer. 
Downs Syndrome and bone disease, and may interfere with the functioning of the 
thyroid gland. With more and more use of high-fluoride toothpaste, mouthwash and 
chewing gum, extia fluoride in the water may be pushing overall fluoride levels over 
healthy limits. And ultimately, I think that people should be left to decide for
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themselves whether or not they want to take fluoride, not have the substance force-fed 
to them in tap water without being consulted.”
A p p en dix  B .2 - F o r m u l a  f o r  c a l c u l a t in g  p o w e r
Potvin and Schütz’s (2000) fomiula for calculating the noncentrality par ameter 
Xa for the effect of Factor A (here ‘status’) in a two-factor repeated measures 
ANOVA is;
Xa
o  ( 1 - P a) +  o (q - 1)( pB - P a b )
where n is the sample size, q is the number of levels of Factor B (here 
‘generation’), pi is the marginal mean for Factor A (where i is each level of Factor A), 
p is the grand mean, o  ^is the within-cell variance, and pA, pe and pab are the averages 
of the off-diagonal correlation coefficients of the A, B and AxB matrices respectively. 
Note that where the correlations came out negative then on the advice of R.W. Schütz 
(personal communication, 12 February 2005) the averages were calculated using these 
negative correlations (rather than taking their absolute values). The noncentrality 
parameter was then used to calculate power using the table provided by Howell 
(1997).
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A p p en dix  B .3 - MATERIAL f o r  E x p e r im e n t  7b
B.3.1 Argument for the euro, as presented to the first participants in each chain,
“I thinlc the UK should join the euro. The UK does half of its trade with other 
European countries, and adopting the euro will make this trade easier and encourage 
economic growth. Increased political ties with Europe will mean less chance of 
disagreements and conflicts. A single European cuiTcncy is more convenient for 
tr avellers, who won’t have to change their money when visiting Europe. People will 
be quick to adapt to the new currency, just as they were when the pound was 
decimalised and shillings were replaced.”
B.3,2 Argument against the euro, as presented to the first participants in each chain.
“I’m against the euro. Adopting the euro means that the UK will lose control 
over its economy, for example by being able to set independent interest rates. The UK 
will also lose political independence, and decisions will be made by unelected 
officials in Brussels. It will cost UK businesses to convei*t cash tills, vending 
machines and accounting systems to a new ciuTency. The pound is a symbol of British 
national identity, and people will be reluctant to change the cuiTency they grew up 
with.”
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APPENDIX C - M a t e r ia l  f o r  Chap t e r  8
A p p en dix  C .l  -  M a t e r ia l  f o r  E x p e r im e n t  8a
C .Ll Emotional concealment (adaptedfrom Mitchell & Hamm, 1997)
“Male Child A is sitting with female Child B, Another male, Child C, 
approaches, and Child A moves away from Child B. Child C sits down close to Child
B. Child A turns away and looks intently at his hand.”
“Male Chimp A is sitting with female Chimp B. Another male. Chimp C, 
approaches, and Chimp A moves away from Chimp B. Chimp C sits down close to 
Chimp B. Chimp A turns away and looks intently at his hand.”
“Male Dog A is sitting with female Dog B. Another male. Dog C, approaches, 
and Dog A moves away from Dog B. Dog C sits down close to Dog B. Dog A turns 
away and looks intently at his paw.”
“Male Newt A is swimming with female Newt B. Another male. Newt C, 
approaches, and Newt A swims away from Newt B. Newt C swims close to Newt B. 
Newt A turns away and looks intently at his foot.”
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C.L2 Jealousy (adaptedfrom Mitchell &. Hamm, 1997)
“Male Child A is sitting with female Child B. Child A touches Child B on the 
arm. Another male, Child C, rushes over and moves between them, facing and staring 
at Child A.”
“Male Chimp A is sitting with female Chimp B. Chimp A touches Chimp B on 
the arm. Another male. Chimp C, mshes over and moves between them, facing and 
staring at Chimp A.”
“Male Dog A is sitting with female Dog B. Dog A touches Dog B on the aim. 
Another male. Dog C, rushes over and moves between them, facing and staring at 
Dog A.”
“Male Newt A is swimming with female Newt B. Newt A touches Newt B on 
the fin. Another male. Newt C, swims over and moves between them, facing and 
staring at Newt A.”
C.1.3 Deception (after Whiten &' Byrne, 1988)
“Child A is playing in the kitchen and finds some sweets hidden in a cupboard. 
Child B enters the kitchen and Child A quietly closes the cupboard and looks away. 
When Child B leaves. Child A opens the cupboard and eats the sweets.”
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“Chimp A is playing, in an enclosm*e and finds some food hidden under a box. 
Chimp B enters the enclosure and Chimp A quietly places the box back over the food 
and looks away. When Chimp B leaves, Chimp A lifts the box and eats the food.”
“Dog A is digging in the garden and unearths an old bone. Dog B enters the 
garden and Dog A sits in front of the bone and faces the other way. When Dog B 
leaves, Dog A turns around and starts to chew on the bone.”
“Newt A is swimming in a pond and finds some food behind a rock. Newt B 
swims over and Newt A swims away from the rock and faces the other way. When 
Newt B swims off again. Newt A swims back to the rock and eats the food.”
C.l,4 Reconciliation (after de Waal & van Roosmalen, 1979)
“While playing a game. Child A backs into Child B and Imocks Child B over. 
Child B gets up and hits Child A in the arm, then walks away. Later that day. Child A 
offers Child B some chocolate. Child B takes the chocolate and sits down next to 
Child A.”
“While climbing in their enclosure. Chimp A backs into Chimp B and knocks 
Chimp B over. Chimp B gets up and bites Chimp A on the arm, then walks away. 
Later that day. Chimp A offers Chimp B some food. Chimp B takes the food and sits 
down next to Chimp A.”
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“While running in the park, Dog A backs into Dog B and knocks Dog B over. 
Dog B gets up and bites Dog A on the leg, then mns off. Later that day. Dog A offers 
Dog B a bone. Dog B takes the bone and sits down next to Dog A.”
“While swimming. Newt A knocks into Newt B. Newt B swims over and bites 
Newt A, then swims off. Later that day. Newt A offers Newt B some food. Newt B 
eats the food and swims along beside Newt A.”
C J.5 Problem-solving (after Kohler, 1925)
“Child A sees some biscuits on a high shelf in the kitchen. Child A moves a 
chair over from the table so tliat it is beneath the shelf, climbs up onto the chair and 
reaches the biscuits. Child A eats the biscuits.”
“Chimp A sees some food on a high ledge in the enclosure. Chimp A moves a 
large box over from one side of the enclosure so that it is beneath the ledge, climbs up 
onto the box and reaches the food. Chimp A eats the food.”
“Dog A sees some food on a high shelf. Dog A moves a chair over from the 
table so that it is beneath the shelf, climbs up onto the chair and reaches the food. Dog 
A eats the food.”
“Newt A sees an insect resting on a high blade of glass. Newt A moves a pebble 
so that it is beside the blade of grass, climbs up onto the pebble and reaches the insect. 
Newt A eats the insect.”
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A p p en d ix  C .2 -  M ATERIAL f o r  E x p e r im e n t  8b
C.2.1 Emotional concealment (adaptedfrom Mitchell & Hamm, 1997)
“A male child is sitting with a female child. Another male child approaches, and 
the first male moves away from the female child. The second male child sits down 
close to the female. The other male turns away and looks closely at his hand.”
"A male chimp is sitting with a female chimp. Another male chimp approaches, 
and the first male moves away from the female chimp. The second male chimp sits 
down close to the female. The other male turns away and looks closely at his hand.”
“A male dog is sitting with a female dog. Another male dog approaches, and the 
first male moves away from the female dog. The second male dog sits down close to 
the female. The other male turns away and looks closely at his paw.”
“A male newt is swimming with a female newt. Another male newt approaches, 
and the first male swims away from the female newt. The second male newt swims 
close to the female. The other male turns away and looks closely at his foot.”
C.2.2 Jealousy (adaptedfrom Mitchell & Hamm, 1997)
“A male child is sitting with a female child. The male child touches the female 
child on the aim. Another male child mshes over and moves between them, facing 
and staring at the first male child.”
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“A male chimp is sitting with a female chimp. The male chimp touches the 
female chimp on the aim. Another male chimp rushes over and moves between them, 
facing and staring at the first male chimp.”
“A male dog is sitting with a female dog. The male dog touches the female dog 
on the leg. Another male dog rushes over and moves between them, facing and staring 
at the first male dog.”
• “A male newt is swimming with a female newt. The male newt touches the 
female newt on the arm. Another male newt swims over and moves between them, 
facing and staring at the first male newt.”
C.2.3 Deception (after Whiten & Byrne, 1988)
“A child is playing in the kitchen and finds some sweets hidden in a cupboard. 
A second child enters the kitchen and the first child quietly closes the cupboard and 
looks away. When the second child leaves, the first child opens the cupboard and eats 
the sweets.”
“A chimp is playing in an enclosure and finds some food hidden under a box. A 
second chimp enters the enclosiue and the first chimp quietly places the box back 
over the food and looks away. When the second chimp leaves, the first chimp lifts the 
box and eats the food.”
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“A dog is digging in the garden and unearths an old bone. A second dog enters 
the garden and the first dog sits in front of the bone and looks away. When the second 
dog leaves, the first dog turns around and starts to chew on the bone.”
“A newt is swimming in a pond and finds some food behind a rock. A second 
newt swims over. The first newt swims away from the rock and faces the other way. 
When the second newt swims off again, the first newt swims back to the rock and eats 
the food.”
C.2.4 Reconciliation (after de Waal & van Roosmalen, 1979)
“While playing a game, one child backs into a second child and Imocks him 
over. The second child gets up and hits the first child in the arm, then walks away. 
Later that day, the first child offers the second some chocolate. He takes the chocolate 
and sits down next to the first child.”
“Wliile climbing in their enclosure, one chimp backs into a second chimp and 
knocks him over. The second chimp gets up and bites the first chimp on the arm, then 
walks away. Later that day, the first chimp offers the second some food. He takes the 
food and sits down next to the first chimp.”
“While running in the park, one dog backs into a second dog and Imocks him 
over. The second dog gets up and bites the first dog on the leg, then runs off. Later 
that day, the first dog offers the second dog a bone. He takes the bone and sits down 
next to the first dog.”
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“While swimming, one newt Imocks into a second newt. The second newt 
swims over and bites the first newt on the arm, then swims away. Later that day, the 
first newt offers the second some food. The first newt eats the food and swims 
alongside the first nevd.”
C.2.5 Problem-solving (after Kohler, 1925)
“A child is in the kitchen. Some biscuits are on a high shelf. The child moves a 
chair over from the table so that it is beneath the shelf, climbs up onto the chair and 
reaches the biscuits. The child eats the biscuits.”
“A chimp is in an enclosuie. Some food is on a high ledge. The chimp moves a 
lai'ge box over from one side of the enclosiue so that it is beneath the ledge, climbs up 
onto the box and reaches the food. The chimp eats the food.”
“A dog is in the kitchen. Some food is on a high shelf. The dog moves a chair 
over from the table so that it is beneath the shelf, climbs up onto the chair and reaches 
the food. The dog eats the food.”
“A newt is swimming in a pond. An insect is resting on a high blade of grass 
near the pond. The newt moves a pebble so that it is beside the blade of grass, climbs 
up onto the pebble and reaches the insect. The newt eats the insect.”
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APPENDIX D - T a b le s  f o r  C h a r te  r  11
A p p en dix  D.l -  MATING P r o b a b il it ie s  f o r  M o d e l  1a
The probabilities that each of the 148 possible matings will give rise to each 
phenogenotype in Model la.
MATING FREQ
OFFSPRING
Monogamy Polygyny Polyandry
cO cl c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 clO
Malel Female 1Male2Female2 MBpp MBsp MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp
iT MBpp MBpp xly l 1
r2 MBpp MBsp xly2 1/2-67 1/2+67
r3 MBsp MBpp x2yl 1/2-67 1/2+67
r4 MBsp MBsp x2y2 1
r5 mBpp MBpp MBpp x3ylyl 1/2 1/2
r6 mBpp MBpp MBsp x3yly2 3/8 1/8 3/8 1/8
r7 mBpp MBsp MBpp x3y2yl 3/8 1/8 3/8 1/8
r8 mBpp MBsp MBsp k3y2y2 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
i'9 mBsp MBpp MBpp x4ylyl 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
rlO mBsp MBpp MBsp x4yly2 1/8 3/8 1/8 3/8
r ll mBsp MBsp MBpp x4y2yl 1/8 3/8 1/8 3/8
rl2 mBsp MBsp MBsp x4y2y2 1/2 1/2
rl3 MBpp mBpp MBpp y3xlxl 1/2 1/2
iT4 MBpp mBpp MBsp y3xlx2 3/8 1/8 3/8 1/8
iT5 MBsp mBpp MBpp y3x2xl 3/8 1/8 3/8 1/8
rl6 MBsp mBpp MBsp y3x2x2 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
iT7 MBpp mBsp MBpp y4xlxl 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
iT8 MBpp mBsp MBsp y4xlx2 1/8 3/8 1/8 3/8
rl9 MBsp mBsp MBpp y4x2xl 1/8 3/8 1/8 3/8
r20 MBsp mBsp MBsp y4x2x2 1/2 1/2
Appendix D.l (cont.)
MATING FREQ
OFFSPRING
Polygynandry
cO c ll cl2 cl3 cl4
Malel Femalel Male2 Pemale2 MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp
r21 MBpp mBpp mBpp MBpp xly3x3yl 3/8 5/8
r22 MBpp mBpp mBpp MBsp xly3x3y2 2/8 1/8 4/8 1/8
r23 MBpp mBpp mBpp mBpp xly3x3y3 1/8 7/8
r24 MBpp mBpp mBpp mBsp xly3x3y4 1/8 5/8 2/8
r25 MBsp mBpp mBpp MBpp x2y3x3yl 5/16 1/16 9/16 1/16
r26 MBsp mBpp mBpp MBsp x2y3x3y2 3/16 3/16 7/16 3/16
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r27 MBsp mBpp mBpp mBpp x2y3x3y3 1/16 1/16 13/16 1/16
r28 MBsp mBpp mBpp mBsp x2y3x3y4 1/16 1/16 9/16 5/16
[29 MBpp mBsp mBpp MBpp xly4x3yl 5/16 1/16 7/16 3/16
r30 MBpp mBsp mBpp MBsp xly4x3y2 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
r31 MBpp mBsp mBpp mBpp xly4x3y3 1/16 1/16 11/16 3/16
r32 MBpp mBsp mBpp mBsp xly4x3y4 1/16 1/16 7/16 7/16
r33 MBpp mBpp mBsp MBpp xly3x4yl 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
r34 MBpp mBpp mBsp MBsp xly3x4y2 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
1*35 MBpp mBpp mBsp mBpp xly3x4y3 1/8 4/8 3/8
r36 MBpp mBpp mBsp mBsp xly3x4y4 1/8 2/8 5/8
r37 MBsp mBsp mBpp MBpp x2y4x3yl 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
1*38 MBsp mBsp mBpp MBsp x2y4x3y2 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
r39 MBsp mBsp mBpp mBpp x2y4x3y3 1/8 5/8 2/8
r40 MBsp mBsp mBpp mBsp x2y4x3y4 1/8 3/8 4/8
r41 MBsp mBpp mBsp MBpp x2y3x4yl 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
1*42 MBsp mBpp mBsp MBsp x2y3x4y2 1/16 5/16 3/16 7/16
1*43 MBsp mBpp mBsp mBpp x2y3x4y3 1/16 1/16 7/16 7/16
r44 MBsp mBpp mBsp mBsp x2y3x4y4 1/16 1/16 3/16 11/16
1*45 MBpp mBsp mBsp MBpp xly4x4yl 3/16 3/16 3/16 7/16
[46 MBpp mBsp mBsp MBsp xly4x4y2 1/16 5/16 1/16 9/16
1*47 MBpp mBsp mBsp mBpp kly4x4y3 1/16 1/16 5/16 9/16
1*48 MBpp mBsp mBsp mBsp xly4x4y4 1/16 1/16 1/16 13/16
1*49 MBsp mBsp mBsp MBpp x2y4x4yl 1/8 2/8 1/8 4/8
1*50 MBsp mBsp mBsp MBsp x2y4x4y2 3/8 5/8
1*51 MBsp mBsp mBsp mBpp x2y4x4y3 1/8 2/8 5/8
r52 MBsp mBsp mBsp mBsp x2y4x4y4 1/8 7/8
r53 mBpp MBpp MBpp mBpp x3ylxly3 3/8 5/8
r54 mBpp MBpp MBsp mBpp x3ylx2y3 5/16 1/16 9/16 1/16
1*55 mBpp MBpp mBpp mBpp x3ylx3y3 4/16 12/16
r56 mBpp MBpp mBsp mBpp x3ylx4y3 2/8 5/8 1/8
1*57 mBpp MBsp MBpp mBpp x3y2xly3 2/8 1/8 4/8 1/8
r58 mBpp MBsp MBsp mBpp x3y2x2y3 3/16 3/16 7/16 3/16
1*59 mBpp MBsp mBpp mBpp x3y2x3y3 2/16 2/16 10/16 2/16
1*60 mBpp MBsp mBsp mBpp x3y2x4y3 2/16 2/16 8/16 4/16
r61 mBsp MBpp MBpp mBpp x4ylxly3 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
1-62 mBsp MBpp MBsp mBpp x4ylx2y3 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
r63 mBsp MBpp mBpp mBpp x4ylx3y3 2/16 2/16 8/16 4/16
r64 mBsp MBpp mBsp mBpp x4ylx4y3 2/16 2/16 6/16 6/16
r65 mBpp MBpp MBpp mBsp x3ylxly4 5/16 1/16 7/16 3/16
r66 mBpp MBpp MBsp mBsp x3ylx2y4 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
1*67 mBpp MBpp mBpp mBsp x3ylx3y4 4/16 8/16 4/16
r68 mBpp MBpp mBsp mBsp x3ylx4y4 2/8 3/8 3/8
r69 mBsp MBsp MBpp mBpp x4y2xly3 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
1*70 mBsp MBsp MBsp mBpp x4y2x2y3 1/16 5/16 3/16 7/16
1*71 mBsp MBsp mBpp mBpp x4y2x3y3 2/8 3/8 3/8
r72 mBsp MBsp mBsp mBpp x4y2x4y3 1/4 1/4 1/2
r73 mBpp MBsp MBpp mBsp x3y2xly4 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
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1*74 mBpp MBsp MBsp mBsp x3y2x2y4 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
r75 mBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp x3y2x3y4 1/8 1/8 3/8 3/8
r76 mBpp MBsp mBsp mBsp x3y2x4y4 1/8 1/8 2/8 4/8
r77 mBsp MBpp MBpp mBsp x4ylxly4 3/16 3/16 3/16 7/16
1*78 mBsp MBpp MBsp mBsp x4ylx2y4 1/8 2/8 1/8 4/8
r79 mBsp MBpp mBpp mBsp x4ylx3y4 1/8 1/8 2/8 4/8
1*80 mBsp MBpp mBsp mBsp x4ylx4y4 1/8 1/8 1/8 5/8
r81 mBsp MBsp MBpp mBsp x4y2xly4 1/16 5/16 1/16 9/16
r82 mBsp MBsp MBsp mBsp x4y2x2y4 3/8 5/8
r83 mBsp MBsp mBpp mBsp x4y2x3y4 2/8 1/8 5/8
1*84 mBsp mBsp mBsp x4y2x4y4 1/4 3/4
r85 mBpp mBpp MBpp MBpp x3y3xlyl 3/8 5/8
r86 mBpp mBpp MBpp MBsp x3y3xly2 2/8 1/8 4/8 1/8
r87 mBpp mBpp MBpp mBpp x3y3xly3 1/8 7/8
1*88 mBpp mBpp MBpp mBsp x3y3xly4 1/8 5/8 2/8
1*89 mBpp mBpp MBsp MBpp x3y3x2yl 5/16 1/16 9/16 1/16
1*90 mBpp mBpp MBsp MBsp x3y3x2y2 3/16 3/16 7/16 3/16
r91 mBpp mBpp MBsp mBpp x3y3x2y3 1/16 1/16 13/16 1/16
r92 mBpp mBpp MBsp mBsp x3y3x2y4 1/16 1/16 9/16 5/16
1*93 mBpp mBpp mBpp MBpp x3y3x3yl 1/4 3/4
1*94 mBpp mBpp mBpp MBsp x3y3x3y2 1/8 1/8 5/8 1/8
1*95 mBpp mBpp mBpp mBpp x3y3x3y3 1
r96 mBpp mBpp mBpp mBsp x3y3x3y4 3/4+62 1/4-62
1*97 mBpp mBpp mBsp MBpp x3y3x4yl 2/8 5/8 1/8
1*98 mBpp mBpp mBsp MBsp x3y3x4y2 1/8 1/8 4/8 2/8
r99 mBpp mBpp mBsp mBpp x3y3x4y3 7/8 1/8
rlOO mBpp mBpp mBsp mBsp x3y3x4y4 5/8 3/8
1*101 mBpp mBsp MBpp MBpp x3y4xlyl 5/16 1/16 7/16 3/16
rl02 mBpp mBsp MBpp MBsp x3y4xly2 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
rl03 mBpp mBsp MBpp mBpp x3y4xly3 1/16 1/16 11/16 3/16
1*104 mBpp mBsp MBpp mBsp x3y4xly4 1/16 1/16 7/16 7/16
1*105 mBpp mBsp MBsp MBpp x3y4x2yl 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
1*106 mBpp mBsp MBsp MBsp x3y4x2y2 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
rl07 mBpp mBsp MBsp mBpp x3y4x2y3 1/8 5/8 2/8
1*108 mBpp mBsp MBsp mBsp x3y4x2y4 1/8 3/8 4/8
rl09 mBpp mBsp mBpp MBpp x3y4x3yl 1/4 1/2 1/4
1*110 mBpp mBsp mBpp MBsp x3y4x3y2 1/8 1/8 3/8 3/8
d l l mBpp mBsp mBpp mBpp x3y4x3y3 3/4+62 1/4-62
1*112 mBpp mBsp mBpp mBsp x3y4x3y4 1/2+62 1/2-62
1*113 mBpp mBsp mBsp MBpp x3y4x4yl 2/8 3/8 3/8
1*114 mBpp mBsp mBsp MBsp x3y4x4y2 1/8 1/8 2/8 4/8
d l5 mBpp mBsp mBsp mBpp x3y4x4y3 5/8+62 3/8-62
1*116 mBpp mBsp mBsp mBsp x3y4x4y4 3/8+62 5/8-62
d l7 mBsp mBpp MBpp MBpp x4y3xlyl 2/8 1/8 3/8 2/8
d l8 mBsp mBpp MBpp MBsp x4y3xly2 1/8 2/8 2/8 3/8
1*119 mBsp mBpp MBpp mBpp x4y3xly3 1/8 4/8 3/8
1*120 mBsp mBpp MBpp mBsp x4y3xly4 1/8 2/8 5/8
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k'121 mBsp mBpp MBsp MBpp x4y3x2yl 3/16 3/16 5/16 5/16
rl22 mBsp mBpp MBsp MBsp x4y3x2y2 1/16 5/16 3/16 7/16
rl23 mBsp mBpp MBsp mBpp x4y3x2y3 1/16 1/16 7/16 7/16
rl24 mBsp mBpp MBsp mBsp x4y3x2y4 1/16 1/16 3/16 11/16
rl25 mBsp mBpp mBpp MBpp x4y3x3yl 1/8 1/8 4/8 2/8
rl26 mBsp mBpp mBpp MBsp x4y3x3y2 2/8 3/8 3/8
rl27 mBsp mBpp mBpp mBpp fx4y3x3y3 5/8+62 3/8-62
rl28 mBsp mBpp mBpp mBsp x4y3x3y4 3/8+62 5/8-62
rl29 mBsp mBpp fnBsp MBpp x4y3x4yl 1/8 1/8 3/8 3/8
iT30 mBsp piBpp mBsp MBsp x4y3x4y2 2/8 2/8 ^/8
rl31 mBsp mBpp mBsp mBpp x4y3x4y3 4/8+62 4/8-62
rl32 mBsp mBpp mBsp mBsp x4y3x4y4 ^/8+62 6/8-62
rl33 mBsp mBsp MBpp MBpp x4y4xlyl 3/16 3/16 3/16 7/16
rl34 mBsp mBsp MBpp MBsp x4y4xly2 1/16 5/16 1/16 9/16
iT35 mBsp mBsp MBpp mBpp x4y4xly3 1/16 1/16 5/16 9/16
iT36 mBsp mBsp MBpp mBsp x4y4xly4 1/16 1/16 1/16 13/16
rl37 mBsp mBsp MBsp MBpp x4y4x2yl 1/8 2/8 1/8 4/8
rl38 mBsp mBsp MBsp MBsp x4y4x2y2 3/8 5/8
rl39 mBsp mBsp MBsp mBpp x4y4x2y3 1/8 2/8 5/8
rl40 mBsp mBsp MBsp mBsp x4y4x2y4 1/8 7/8
rl41 mBsp mBsp mBpp MBpp x4y4x3yl 1/8 1/8 2/8 4/8
rl42 mBsp mBsp mBpp MBsp x4y4x3y2 2/8 1/8 5/8
iT43 mBsp mBsp mBpp mBpp x4y4x3y3 3/8+62 5/8-62
rl44 mBsp mBsp mBpp mBsp x4y4x3y4 1/8 7/8
rl45 mBsp mBsp mBsp MBpp x4y4x4yl 1/8 1/8 1/8 5/8
rl46 mBsp mBsp mBsp MBsp x4y4x4y2 2/8 6/8
rl47 mBsp mBsp mBsp mBpp x4y4x4y3 2/8+62 6/8-62
rl48 mBsp mBsp mBsp mBsp x4y4x4y4 1
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A p p en dix  D .2 -  M a t in g  P r o b a b il it ie s  f o r  M o d e l  1b
The probabilities that each of the 11 possible matings will give rise to each 
phenogenotype in Model lb (oblique cultuial transmission), z is the frequency of Bpp 
in the parental generation.
MATING FREQ
OFFSPRING
Monogamy Polygyny
cO cl c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
Malel Femalel Male2Female2 MBpp MBsp MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp
fl M M (xl+x2)(yl+y2) z - b l  z l-z+67 z
r2 m M M (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(yl+y2)
0.5 z 0.5(l-z) 0.5 z 0.5(l-z)
r3 M m M (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(xl+x2)
r4 M m m M (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(yl+y2)
t-5 M m m m (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(y3+y4)
r6 m M M m (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(xl+x2)(y3+y4)
r7 m M m m (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(x3+x4Xy3+y4)
r8 m m M M (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(xi+x2Xyl+y2)
r9 m m M m (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(xl+x2)(y3+y4)
iTO m m m M (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(yl+y2)
r l l m m m m (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4Xy3+y4)
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Appendix D.2 (cont.)
MATING FREQ
OFFSPRING
Polyandry Polygynandry
cO c7 c8 c9 clO c ll cl2 cl3 cl4
Malel Femalel Male2 Female2 MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp MBpp MBsp mBpp mBsp
rl M M (xl+x2)(yl+y2)
r2 m M M (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(yl+y2)
1*3 M m M (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(xl+x2)
0.5 z 0.5(l-z) 0.5 z0.5(l-z)
r4 M m m M (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(yl+y2)
3/8 z3/8(l-z) 5/8 z 5/8(l-z)
r5 M m m m (xl+x2)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(y3+y4)
1/8 z l/8(l-z) 7/8 z 7/8(1-z)
r6 m M M m (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(xl+x2)(y3+y4)
3/8 z3/8(l-z) 578 z 5/8(1-z)
r7 m M m m (x3+x4)(yl+y2)
(x3+x4)(y3+y4)
1/8 z l/8(l-z) 7/8 z 7/8(l-z)
r8 m m M M (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(xl+x2)(yl+y2)
0.5 z 0.5(l-z) 0.5 z 0.5(l-z)
1*9 m m M m (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(xl+x2)(y3+y4)
1/8 z l/8(l-z) 7/8 z 7/8(l-z)
dO m m m M (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(yl+y2)
1/4 z l/4(l-z) 3/4 z %(l-z)
d l m m m m (x3+x4)(y3+y4)
(x3+x4)(y3+y4)
z+62(l-z) l-z-62(l-
4
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